*1 firmed. PRESLAR, C.J., Before STEPHEN F. OSBORN,
and WARD and JJ.
OPINION WARD, Justice.
Appellants characterize this action as “an interlocutory from an order overruling Appellants’ Privilege.” Plea of *2 252 perfected eight by appeal the not until tion and at least cases the courts
Because
was
1, 1983,
September
appeals
passed on the
as
after
we will dismiss
of
jurisdiction.
procedural stages
of
the
for want of
various
varying
trial
with
reasons
the conclu
Appellee
The
filed suit on a sworn ac
date,
Supreme
the
sions each reached. To
count in the 65th
of
Paso
District Court
to
the
Court has not had occasion
construe
County;
Appellants
plea
the
filed their
of
However,
The
statute.
conflict exists.
privilege
county
to be
in the
of their
sued
Grocery,
of
v.
Butt
case
Gonzalez H.E.
residence,
prior
occurring
both
to
actions
Co.,
(Tex.App. Corpus
667
188
S.W.2d
—
1,
September
hearing
1983. A
was held
1983,
writ)
the
Christi
no
conflicts with
1983,
9,
privilege.
of
plea
June
on the
opinion.
majority
cases cited
our
Appellants’ plea
order
the
was en
898,
28,
Ap
Bill
of
As
Senate
tered on October
1983. Notice
1983,
repeals
Article
and
Arti-
10,
both amends
1995
peal
filed November
a
was
2008,
speaks
so that when it
of the
cle
deposit
cash in lieu of cost
certificate
changes
that
10,
includes
This
bond
filed November
is
Article 1995. Section 1 of the act makes
thus,
an order
purported appeal
a
from
to Article
extensive amendments
1995 with
overruling
plea
privilege
which was
many exceptions
general
its
to the
venue
1,
perfected
September
taken and
after
3,
by
rule.
It
followed
2 and
is
Sections
interlocutory appeal
is now
1983. No
providing:
permitted. Grubbs v. Mercantile Texas
2008,
Article
(Tex.App.
Section 2.
Revised Civil
Corp.,
sion,
Compa-
General Portland Cement
case
The instant
does
an
(Tex.1978).
ny,
fore is no implication” there “fair it to intended be retroactive. Nothing pre- to overcome the
sumption against If retroactivity. the act retroactive, is construed to be then all September 1, cases filed appeal by not on are without a MILLER, Harry Weldon Jr. Pat a/k/a remedy. They are too soon for the new act Miller, Appellant, and too late for the old law. What was when, pled, how and under old new, cannot be under for as ux., Rex et DICKENSON Sue some actions have been abolished and the Dickenson, Appellees. requirements for relief under the new law so harnessed new procedure, rules of 1983,that there is possibility carrying Fort Worth. over into the new what was started under Sept. 6, 1984. the old. through See Rules 86 inclu- fact, sive. reading Tex.R.Civ.P.
those rules raises the belief that the Su-
preme Court thought wrote them with no
that the act was retroactive. As to con-
struction of venue particular, statutes in
Texas courts have many times determined applicability of an of a amendment ven- ue statute to a case filed before the amend- time,
ment’s effective date. Each courts have held that the law in effect at filing
the time of the of suit determined Beginning Jemison, venue. with Baines v. (1983) 86 Tex. S.W. (answering question as a the very certified us). before For now an excellent discus- present sion see McCown, Date Effective of the Venue Amendments, Litigation Report, State Bar Advocate, April, Vol No.
Professor McCown cites authorities for the fact that since case Baines v. Jemi- son, “the never has been found
to have intended to alter the venue of a
