64 Pa. 207 | Pa. | 1870
The opinion of the court was delivered,
— The late Joseph R. Ingersoll, Esq., by, his will
We are met in this case with the objection that Mrs. Wells, then Miss Wilcocks, was a feme sole at the testator’s death, when his will took effect, and it is contended that the trust being intended for a protection against a coverture not then existing, could not take effect. The question therefore arises upon the power to provide a trust for a future marriage, and confronts us with the old and opposing forces already referred to. The ground of public policy invoked to destroy the trust, is the restraint it imposes upon the freedom of alienation; a restraint which, in Smith v. Starr, 3 Whart. 62, and Hamersly v. Smith, 4 Id. 126, is recognised as being ineffectual, as well in the case of a female as in that of a male, when repugnant to the nature of the gift. If therefore an absolute estate in personalty or a fee in realty be intended to be vested in a cestui que trust, her condition as a feme sole would, on this principle, render inoperative any attempt to fetter her power over the estate by means of a trust for a future and as yet uncertain purpose. But on all hands it is admitted that entire freedom of disposition would impose an unreasonable restriction upon the power of a parent (or indeed any other benefactor) to provide for the future support of a daughter. And Rogers, J., says precisely this in Smith v. Starr, supra; while the whole doctrine of Lancaster v. Dolan, supra, and its sequents is filled to saturation with this admission, and its principle acted upon therein. The necessary consequence of this conflict between private right and public interest is a compromise, which yields the doctrine of policy so far as to enable the donor to impress a trust upon his gift when it is done in “ immediate contemplation of marriage.” This is conceded in Smith v. Starr, Hamersly v. Smith, Cochran v. O’Hern, 4 W. & S. 95 (per Grier, P. J.), and in McBride v. Smyth, 4 P. F. Smith 245, a case most vigorously attacked by the trustees of Mrs. Wells, but which we think states the true doctrine in this state. The doctrine is supported also by Lancaster v. Dolan, Wallace v. Coston, 9 Watts 137, Lyne’s Executor v. Crouse, 1 Barr 113, and Rogers v. Smith, 4 Id. 93. In all these cases the trust was by deed,
Having these principles in view, it is obvious that the creation of the trust for Miss Wilcocks by Mr. Ingersoll, followed by her almost immediate marriage after his death, in connection with the facts set forth in the answers of her well-known engagement to Mr. Wells, and the testator’s knowledge of it, leave no doubt that the trust was created with a view to this particular marriage, and is therefore operative as well as active, as it clearly is.
The trust being valid, the quantity of estate or interest vested in Mrs. Wells is not material, for whether it be for life or absolute, the trust remains during coverture, which cannot outlast her life, to protect the estate from the control of her husband and from any liability she might be influenced to create for the payment of his debts. This is the very restriction the testator intended to impose upon his gift that it might not be diverted from her to him or to his creditors, and to effectuate this purpose he placed it in the hands of the trustees. Even if in all other respects her estate was by the terms of the will to be subject to her direction and disposition during her life, yet as to this restriction the trustees must still preserve their grasp of the fund to prevent that direction and disposition from being exercised in favor of the forbidden object.
The decree of the Court of Nisi Prius is therefore affirmed at the costs of the appellants.