Plaintiff qualified as a candidate for the newly-created office of district judge of the 63d district. Plaintiff is presently an elected municipal judge of the city of East Grand Rapids, serving in that capacity. PA 1961, No 236, § 9923(3), as added by PA 1968, No 154 (MCLA § 600.9923[3], Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp § 27A.9923[3]), provides:
“ (3) In the primary and general election of judges of the district court to be held in 1968 any elected incumbent municipal or associate municipal judge who is a candidate for district judge shall be entitled to the designation on the ballot that he holds the judicial office of which he is then incumbent.”
*115 Pursuant to instructions from the director of the elections division of the office of the secretary of State, the Kent county clerk denied plaintiff such designation in the primary election. Having been advised by the clerk that he would also be denied the designation in the election to be held November 5, 1968, plaintiff filed his complaint with the circuit сourt requesting that an order be issued requiring defendant to comply with the provisions of the statute. The circuit court declared the quoted portion of the statute unconstitutional and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint. This Court granted leave to appeal prior to decision by the Court of Appeals. Hue to the need for decision in time for the 1968 November election, an order was issued by the Court on September 20, 1968 affirming the circuit judgе. Justices Black, O’Haba and Brennan dissented. This opinion follows as the opinion of the majority.
The issue in this case is the constitutionality of section 9923(3), as added by PA 1968, No 154.
It was the claim of appellant that Const 1963, art 6, § 26 provides that the method of election of judges of the new district courts shall be as prescribed by law and that such constitutional provision authorized the legislature to pass the statute in question. The pertinent portion оf section 26 reads:
“The offices of circuit court commissioner and justice of the peace are abolished at the expiration of five years from the date this constitution becomes effective or may within this period be abolished by law. Their jurisdiction, compensation and powers within this period shall be as provided by law. Within this five-year period, the legislature shall establish a court or courts of limited jurisdiction with powers and jurisdiction defined by law. The location of such court or courts, and the qualifications, tenure, method of election and salary of the judges of such court or courts, and by Avhat gov *116 ernmental units the judges shall he paid, shall be provided by law, subject to the limitations contained in this article.” (Emphasis added.)
In
Coffin
v.
Election Commissioners
(1893),
“The word ‘manner,’ it is true, is one of large signification, but it is clear that it cannot exceed the subject to which it belongs. It relates to the word ‘elected.’ The Constitution had already provided for electors, and when it prоvides that an officer shall be elected it certainly contemplates an election by the electorate which it has constituted. No other election is known to the Constitution, and, when it provides that the legislature may direct the manner in which an officer shall be elected, it simply empowers the legislature to provide the details for the holding of such election.”
We construe “method of election” as the Court did the word “manner” in Coffin. It applies to the details of an election, not to what may be considered to be a substantial right or benefit conferred upon only certain candidates. Furthermore, the final clause of the first paragraph, “subject to the limitations contained in this article,” makes it clear that any authority granted to the legislature by section 26 is to be exercised within the entire framework of judicial article 6.
In the case of
Burdick
v.
Secretary of State
(1964),
“There shall bе printed upon the ballot under the name of each elected incumbent justice or judge who is a candidate for nomination or election to the same office the designation of that office.” 1
*117 A majority of the Court concluded that the mandatory requirements of the section were such as clearly to exclude from the right of designation any candidate other than one who could qualify for the designation in accordance with the provisions of section 24.
In the early case of
People, ex rel. Twitchell,
v.
Blodgett
(1865),
“If the people, in establishing their government, see fit to place restrictions upon the exercise of any privilege, it must be assumed that in their view the exercise of the privilege without the restriction would be inexpedient and dangerous, and would not, therefore, have been permitted. Every restriction imposed by the Constitution must be considered as something which was designed to guard the public welfare, and it would be a viоlation of duty to give it any less than the fair and legitimate force which its terms require. What the people have said they design, they have an absolute and paramount right to have respected.”
The above passage was quoted with approval in the majority opinion in
Lockwood
v.
Commissioner of Revenue
(1959),
*118 Plaintiff urges that Burdick, he reconsidered, pointing out that section 24 in no way denies the use of a designation for candidates to judicial office but simply grants a designation tо elected incumbent justices or judges. The precise question in Burdick has been dealt with by the people by constitutional amendment, as noted in footnote 1, ante, and consequently is not before us at this time.
Const 1963, art 2 specifically deals with elections. Art 6, § 24 must be considered in connection with it. Section 4 of article 2 provides:
“The legislature shall enact laws to regulate the time, place and manner of all nominations and elections, except as otherwise provided in this constitution or in the constitution and laws of the United States. The legislature shall enact laws to preserve the purity of elections, to preserve the secrecy of the ballot, to guard against abuses of the elective franchise, and to provide for a system of voter registration and absentee voting. No law shall be enacted which permits a candidate in any partisan primary or partisan election to have a ballot designation except when required for identification of candidates for the same office who have the same or similar surnames.” (Emphasis added.) 2
While the above section restrains the legislature from conferring on a partisan candidate a ballot designation (except when required for identification of the candidates for the same office), it is silent as to a ballot designation for a nonpartisan candidate. *119 Appellant contended that the ballot designation of municipal judge would be beneficial to the electorate in that it would inform an elector about the background of a candidate, and that the provision is a reasonable exercise of legislative power to pass laws with regard to the purity of elections.
The phrase “purity of elections” has been considered in a number оf cases. In
Attorney General
v.
Board of Councilmen of the City of Detroit
(1885),
“There is nothing in the Constitution which permits the legislature, under the desire to purify elections, to impose any conditions which will destroy or seriоusly impede the enjoyment of the elective franchise.”
Attorney General, ex rel. Conely,
v.
Common Council of the City of Detroit
(1889),
“The object of a registry law, or of any law to preserve the purity of the ballot-box, and to guard against abuses of the elective franchise, is not to prevent any qualified elector from voting, or unnecessarily to hinder or impair his privilege. It is for the purpose of preventing fraudulent voting.”
*120 In Maynard v. Board of Canvassers (1890), 84 Mich 228 (11 LEA 332), the Court struck down a statute providing for cumulative voting for State representatives in multiple districts. Champlin, C. J., writing for a majority of the Court, stated (pp 241, 242) :
“It is true, the Constitution does not prohibit the legislature by express language from concocting some scheme by which the equality of the electors in the choice of representatives may be impaired or defeated. There is nothing in the Constitution which by express language prohibits the legislature from enacting a law providing that such electors as appear by the assessment roll of thе preceding-year to have been assessed $1,000 and upward shall have an additional vote for each $1,000 for which they are assessed and pay taxes on. This would permit every elector qualified under the Constitution to vote at least once, and others to vote as many times as they were assessed $1,000 upon the assessment roll. It requires no argument to show that such legislation would defeat the object of the elective franchise, which is that every elector’s franchise is of equal value to that of every other elector, and it would subvert the will of the people as expressed through the ballot.”
While in the above cases the statute in question was held unconstitutional, in
Attorney General, ex rel. Reynolds,
v.
May
(1894),
Printing of the name of a candidate more than once on a ballot as forbidden by statute was con
*121
sidered in the case of
Todd
v.
Boards of Election Commissioners
(1895),
“It does not deprive the members of those political parties of thе means to put their coalition into effect by their votes, but furnishes all reasonable facilities for so doing. It only requires some degree of intelligence and care on the part of the voters. We hold the law to he constitutional.”
A 1939 amendment to the 1908 Constitution for the first time provided for nonpartisan election of judges. In
Elliott
v.
Secretary of State
(1940),
“In determining the issue presented in the instant case it is of first importance to be mindful that the Constitution provides:
“ ‘Laws shall be passed to preserve the purity of elections and guard against abuses of the elective franchise.’ Const 1908, art 3, § 8.
“It cannot be doubted that the adoption of the recent constitutional amendment, which changed the election of judicial officers from one on a partisan basis to one that is nonpartisan was prompted by the desire to make more effective the last above quoted constitutional provision. Therefore, every-’ thing reasonably necessary to be done by election officials to accomplish the purpose of the amendment is fairly within its purview. It is a commonly known and accepted fact that in an election, either primary or gеneral, where a number of candidates or nominees for the same office are before the electorate, those whose names appear at the head of the list
*122
have a distinct advantage.
Groesbeck
v.
Board of State Canvassers,
In
Arvan
v.
Wayne County Clerk
(1968), see
“Article 2, § 4 of the Constitution of 1963 provides in part:
“ ‘The legislature shall enact laws to preserve the purity of elеctions, to preserve the secrecy of the ballot, to guard against abuses of the elective franchise, and to provide for a system of voter registration and absentee voting. No law shall be enacted which permits a candidate in any partisan primary or partisan election to have a ballot designation except when required for identification of candidates for the same office who havе the same or similar surnames.’ ”
*123 This Court, by order dated July 10, 1968, affirmed tbe circuit judge and tbe Court of Appeals. Tbe pertinent portion of tbe Court’s order reads:
“Tbe ruling of unconstitutionality, and tbe respective judgments of tbe circuit court and Division 1 of tbe Court of Appeals, are affirmed on authority of
Elliott
v.
Secretary of State,
From tbe above cases, it will be seen that tbe constitutional mandate to tbе legislature to enact laws to preserve tbe purity of elections has been interpreted by tbis Court to carry with it the corollary that any law enacted by tbe legislature which adversely affects tbe purity of elections is constitutionally infirm. Tbe phrase, “purity of elections,” is one of large dimensions. It has no single, precise meaning. Tbe above cases demonstrate, however, that one of tbe primary goals of election procedures is to achieve equality of treatment for all candidates whose names appear upon tbe ballot. Tbis principle appears not only in tbe cases but in tbe constitutional provision which permits designations in partisan elections only for identification of candidates for the same office who have the same or similar surnames.
Tbe only other exception to tbe principlе of equal treatment of candidates appears in judicial article 6, § 24, requiring that under the name of each elected incumbent justice or judge who is a candidate for nomination or election to tbe same office there shall be printed tbe designation of that office. In general, judicial office bolding has been regarded as being in a somewhat different class from all other public office. There has been and сontinues to be serious debate as to whether or not judges, once in office, ought to be required to run for office at all, or ought *124 to be required only to run on their record. In any event, there is no challenge of unconstitutionality before us to this exception of incumbency designation appearing in the judicial article.
Should the exception in article 6, § 24, be extended so as to permit through action by the legislature thе designation of a municipal judge upon the ballot in an election of judges of the new district courts?
In
Sullivan
v.
Secretary of State
(1964),
In
Buback
v.
Szymanski
(1968), (see
In
Evans
v.
City of Detroit Election Commission
(1968) (see
*125 “919 Arthur J. Koscinski
(former Judge of Recorder’s Court)
“920 Raymond A. Kosinski (4439-30th Street)
“922 J. J. Murphy
(19815 Asbury Park)
“923 John R. Murphy
(former Judge of Recorder’s Court).”
This Court affirmed the ruling of Division 1 оn the authority of Sullivan. 4
In the light of the facts disclosed in the above cases, any grant of a designation should be upheld only in the event it is clearly within those constitutional exceptions which permit such a designation or it aids in some way the purity of elections.
Candidates may undoubtedly be elected to office in many diverse fashions. In this State, however, except at a town meeting, the secret ballot is the almost universal method of conducting elections. Nothing appears on a ballot but the names of the candidates unless it be (1) party designations in partisan elections, (2) designations permitted to identify a candidate, or (3) designation due to the holding of judicial office. The importunity of party and friends, the appeals of the candidates, the din of the campaign — all these are left outside the election precincts. The campaigning is ovеr. Now the voter is alone with a ballot, in secret, to exercise “some degree of intelligence and care” in the selection of those who govern. The election laws and the election cases decided by this Court all attest to this fact.
*126 If it was proper for the legislature to forbid the printing "of the name of a candidate more than once on a ballot (Todd, supra), if it was proper for this Court to strike down a plan for сumulative voting because such a plan would subvert the will of the people as expressed through the ballot (Maynard, supra), if it was proper for this Court to order that names of candidates be rotated upon the ballot in the interest of fairness and equal treatment to all candidates (Elliott and Arvan, supra), then surely the trial judge did not e,rr in concluding that- the primary effect of the designation as municipal judge is to grant advertising to a candidate. It affords him an unfair advantage in the very secrecy of the ballot. While the designation would tell an elector that a particular candidate for district court judge had a judicial background as municipal judge, there is no uniformity in such background among municipal judges. Some municipal courts are part-time affairs in small cities. Others are of much greater importance. Also the new court districts may be made up of a number of governmental units. Ip this сase, 2 cities, 1 village and 8 townships make up the district. A justice of the peace with judicial background and experience, if running as a candidate for district judge, is not granted such a designation, nor is a judge of any other court who might be such a candidate. If the criterion for the ballot designation conferred by section 9923(3), as added, by PA 1968, No.154, is judicial experience, ,this, is an attempt by the legislature to place its own evaluatiоn on the qualification of candidates for office. As such, it amounts to an abuse of the elective franchise and invades the elector’s prerogative ■ and dpty to?usg his criteria in the selection of the •'candidate of his: choice. -
*127 Finally, it should be noted that the constitutional designation is now granted to all incumbent judges. Plaintiff Wells was a stranger to the office of district judge. It is his .situation only and the constitutionality of section 9923(3), as added by PA 1968, No 154, which we pass upon here.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. No costs, a public question being involved.
Notes
The above section of the Constitution was amended on August C, 1968 by the deletion of the word “elected.” The amended provision became effective September 20, 1968. Since the amended provi *117 sion was not in effect at the time of the enactment of PA 1968, No 154, we do not consider it to he of significance to the issue in this ease.
The Constitution of 1908 provided (art 3, § 8) :
“Laws shall be passed to preserve the purity of elections and guard against abuses of the elective franchise, and to provide for the recall of all elective officers, exeept judges of courts of record and courts of like jurisdiction upon petition of twenty-five per cеntum of the number of electors who voted at the preceding election for the office of governor in their respective electoral districts.” The Constitution of 1850 provided (art 7, § 6):
“Laws may be passed to preserve the purity of elections and guard against abuses of the elective franchise.”
See Ballot Designations: Their Nature, Function, and ¡Constitutionality, by Maurice Kelman, 12 Wayne Law Review 756 (1966), for a discussion of liow other states have handled the problem of bad faith candidacies by persons having the same or similar names (pp 761-764).