67 N.Y.S. 112 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1900
This is an action of conversion to recover the value of a quantity of pulp wood removed from a tract of 600 acres of land in Forestport, Oneida county. Plaintiff cut the wood, but was forbidden to remove the same by the assistant chief ñsh and game protector and forester, who thereupon sold it to parties who removed it, and subsequently sold and delivered it to defendants at Port Leyden, about 11 miles distant. The principal question presented for our consideration is as to whether the lands from which the timber was cut were owned by plaintiff or by the people of the state of New York. The claims of each are based solely upon tax titles. At a tax" sale in October, 1877, by the comptroller, pursuant to chapter 427 of the Laws of 1855, for default in payment of taxes levied prior to the year 1871, the lands in question, then owned by nonresidents, were bid in by the comptroller, and a certificate of sale thereof was duly made, pursuant to section 66 of said act. The lands not having been redeemed from such sale, the state presumptively became entitled to a deed at the expiration of two years thereafter. A comptroller’s deed, pursuant to said tax sale, was subsequently, but not until the 28th day of March, 1881, executed to the people of the state, and the same was recorded in the clerk’s office of Oneida county on the 30th day of June, 1882. By the express provisions of sections 63 and 66 of said act, this deed vested in the state “an absolute estate in fee simple, subject, however, to all the claims which the people of this state may have thereon for taxes, or other liens or incumbrances.” Section 65 made the deed presumptive evidence of the regularity of the sale and of all prior proceedings. This section was amended by chapter 448 of the Laws of 1885, making, after the lapse of six months, conveyances theretofore executed by the comptroller or by his grantee, which have been recorded, conclusive evidence of the regularity of the sale and of all prior proceedings, including the giving of notices to redeem, subject only to a direct application to the comptroller for concellation of such deed as then provided by law, and to an action for similar relief on the ground of payment or that the tax was levied without legal right. Such amendment, however, was not made applicable to comptroller’s sales of lands in Oneida county until 1891, at which time it was also made applicable to tax sales made by county treasurers. Chapter 217,
Subsequent to the comptroller’s sale, but prior to the execution of his deed to the state, an act was passed entitled “An act to enforce the collection of taxes levied in the county of Oneida” (chapter 91, Laws 1880), the effect of which was to provide that the tax sales for taxes assessed upon lands within said county should be made thereafter by the county treasurer instead of by the comptroller of the state, as theretofore. By the terms of said act, when the purchasei became entitled to a deed by failure to redeem within one year, as therein provided, the county treasurer was required to execute a conveyance of the lands, which should “vest in the grantee an absolute estate in fee.” Section 10 of this act, as amended by chapter 8 of the Laws of 1881, further provided that the conveyance should be conclusive evidence of the regularity of the sale, and presumptive
An interesting question arises as to whether these lands were assessable in 1880, after the state became the equitable owner, and entitled to a deed by reason of the nonredemption from the tax sale of October, 1877. 1 Rev. St. p. 388, § 4; People v. Board of Assessors, 111 N. Y. 505, 19 N. E. 90, 2 L. R. A. 148, note; Tracy v. Reed (C. C.) 38 Fed. 69, 2 L. R. A. 773. However that may be, we are of opinion that the tax sale made by the county treasurer under the Oneida county act was subject to the prior vested rights of the people of the state. Board v. Hamilton, 28 Kan. 376; Reid v. State, 74 Ind. 252; Buckley v. Osburn, 8 Ohio, 180; Braxton v. Rich (C. C.) 47 Fed. 178; People v. Campbell, 35 App. Div. 103, 54 N Y. Supp. 725; Id., 152 N. Y. 51, 46 N. E. 176; Id., 156 N. Y. 64, 50 N. E. 417. The policy of the law is to enforce payment of the taxes by the owner, or those having private liens upon, or an interest in, the premises, derived from the owner by foreclosing and cutting off his and their rights upon default in the payment of the taxes and by failure to redeem from a tax sale. Not so, however, as to the lien of the people of the state, which is the only means of enforcing a just contribution to the public burden by those owning or interested in the lands. Trustees of Public Schools v. Inhabitants of City of Trenton, 30 N. J. Eq. 667; Tifft v. City of Buffalo (Sup.) 9 N. Y. Supp. 920, note; Chard v. Holt, 136 N. Y. 30-45, 32 N. E. 740; Cooper v. Bushley, 72 Pa. St. 252. It may be, and doubtless is, competent for the legislature to relieve taxable lands from the lien of old taxes without the payment thereof, but it is not reasonable to suppose that the legislature would do so without making provision for the reassessment of such taxes. An examination of the Oneida county act discloses no evidence from which a legislative intention to waive the rights of the people to existing liens for taxes or the vested rights of the people to tax deeds of lands in that county can be inferred. We find in that act no new method for levying taxes, and no provision for reassessing old taxes. It merely provides that tax sales in the future shall be made at home instead of at the capítol. At the time of the sale by the county treasurer, the state had become the legal owner of the premises, and was constructively, at least, in possession thereof. People v. Turner, 145 N. Y. 451-461, 40 N. E. 400; Meigs v. Roberts, 162 N. Y. 371, 56 N. E. 838. Inquiry or search at the comptroller’s office would have disclosed the interest and title of the state. The purchaser at the tax sale was not justified in assuming that the state had no lien upon, or claim against, the premises, and he is charge