Wells v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

1984] Firestone Wells RUBBER COMPANY TIRE AND WELLS v FIRESTONE 1). (Calendar 6, No. Argued December No. 65372. Docket De- 11, 28, February 1985. Released 1984. cided December liability brought third-party products action in the a James against Tire and Rubber Muskegon Firestone Circuit Court injuries damages resulting in the Company received from for Sup- Muskegon employment Auto Firestone with course of his Stores, corporate subsidiary wholly ply a owned and Service Firestone, rim a truck tire manufactured when Larnard, J., court, apart. A. found that Charles blew The separate corporate entity and denied Firestone was judgment. The Court motion for accelerated Firestone’s MacKenzie, JJ., Danhof, C.J., Appeals, R. B. Burns and and plaintiffs employer reversed, holding that Firestone was the compensation purposes and that the action act of the workers’ remedy provision of the act the exclusive under was barred 44027). (Docket appeals. plaintiff No. The Cavanagh, joined by opinion by Chief Justice In an Justice Supreme Ryan Brickley, Court Williams and Justices held: plaintiffs products liability action is barred The remedy provision of the workers’ act. exclusive injured employed by and was was the defendant acting employment. in the course of his while applied 1. whether the defendant The test to be determine injury plaintiffs employer is the on the of the date [1, 2, [2, [3, ^[4] Workers’ 81 Am Jur Workmen’s Modern status: "dual 5] 82 Am Jur by employer. 9 ALR4th 873. employee injured by product trolling recovery 4, 81 Am 18 Am Jur 5] 63 Am Jur compensation immunity interest in Jur Workmen’s 2d, Compensation 2d, References 2d, 2d, Workmen’s Workmen’s Corporations 2d, employer corporation. ALR4th 948. Products capacity for Points in Headnotes in tort. 23 ALR4th 1151. Compensation Act as Compensation Compensation § Liability 906. manufactured, doctrine” as basis for 13 et furnishing extending seq. §§ § § 288. §§ exclusive 53,152 51. sold, one or distributed et owning remedy employee’s seq. con- viewing requires test. The test economic statutory in relation to the scheme situation as a whole goal preserving act with the parties. securing rights privileges of all Control is considered, wages, authority payment of to to be as is factor fire, responsibility for the maintenance hire and controlling. discipline, no one factor is case, com- 2. the defendant maintained one workers’ stores, pensation policy all local retail insurance for of its voluntarily plaintiffs benefits. its insurance carrier paid separate There is no evidence that the defendant maintained a responsibilities corporation Muskegon evade its under the to compensation to workers’ act or that it did not consider itself plaintiff plaintiffs employer. rely did the on the be the Nor subsidiary distinction between the defendant and its when he employer petition that the defendant was his in his for asserted compensation workers’ benefits. corporate entity separate 3. The fiction of a distinct from the is a introduced in stockholders convenience the law subserve justice. Generally, corporation permit- the ends of a will not be pierce prove ted to its own veil in order to that it and However, subsidiary entity. respecting are. one where separate justice entities would subvert or cause a result con- trary clearly overriding public policy, ignored to a fiction case, the courts. In this entities must be disregarded important public policies underlying because of the compensation protects the act. The act workers and employers. Covered workers are assured of in the they employment-related injuries. By event that sustain assum- ing responsibility injuries, employers protected for such are potentially damage excessive awards. If liberal construc- applied benefits, tion is when a worker seeks the same con- applied employer struction should be when an asserts the provision remedy exclusive of the act as a defense in a tort rely applying action. The did not on the distinction permitted for deny benefits and should not now be relationship upon that he asserted and which the defendant assuming responsibility payment relied in of the benefits. argument remedy provision 4. The that the exclusive addi- tionally apply does not in this case because the defendant occupied plaintiffs employer a status other than that of the rejected. circumstances, must also be Under certain an em- ployer may However, capacity. act in a dual for the dual- capacity applied, employer doctrine to be must have identity distinct, completely from, second so removed and unre- v Firestone employer lated to the status established standards case, recognize separate legal person. it the law will as a In this plaintiffs injuries acting occurred while he was in the scope employment. course of and within the of his Affirmed. Levin, joined by Kavanagh Boyle, Justice Justices dis- senting, reality stated that economic is not determinative of Muskegon plaintiffs whether Firestone or Firestone was the purposes remedy provision actual of the exclusive case, applied of the workers’ act. As in this new, existing, test creates a rather than characterizes an employment relationship. By applying general principles, it Muskegon must be concluded that Firestone and not Firestone plaintiffs employer, plaintiffs was the and therefore the action against remedy provi- Firestone is not barred the exclusive sion. The economic test is a substitute for the control test characterizing employment which is a relationship means of determining and of whether was of a subcontrac- case, however, employ- tor or of a servant. In this there is no relationship ment between Firestone and Firestone. The issue is not whether the control test should be abandoned reality adopted, and an economic test but whether an economic reality test should be made determinative of whether subsidiary corporations single entity purposes are a for the remedy provision compensation of the exclusive of the workers’ reality analysis act. Economic would destabilize workers’ com- pensation corporate Generally, separateness law. the corporate respected by corporate entities is the courts and the pierced only prevent veil injustice. is to fraud or Total domina- by parent corporation tion a subsidiary justify of a does not piercing corporate question veil. The whether there is an employment relationship between Firestone and Wells should by be by implication. resolved consent and not App 790; (1980) 296 NW2d 174 affirmed.

Opinion op the Court Compensation Remedy. — 1. Workers’ Exclusive products A liability against product action a manufacturer was remedy provision barred the exclusive of the workers’ com- pensation where, viewing plaintiffs act employment by a subsidiary whole, of the manufacturer as a the manufacturer subsidiary entity were one and the manufacturer thus (MCL employer plaintiff 418.131; was the of the MSA 17.237[131]). 421 Remedy — Compensation — Real- 2. Workers’ Economic Exclusive ity Test. reality a whole must of an situation as The economic a defendant in a- order to determine whether be examined in employer date of the on the tort action was an remedy injury purposes applying plaintiffs the exclusive act; provision a factor control is of the workers’ considered, wages, authority payment hire and to to be as is fire, discipline, responsibility for the maintenance of and the (MCL 418.131; controlling MSA but no one factor 17.237[131]). Corporate Piercing Corporate Corporations — — 3. Entities Veil. corporate entity separate The fiction a from the distinct to stockholders is a convenience introduced the law subserve generally, corporation permit- justice; will not be ends of prove pierce corporate veil in to that it and ted its own order subsidiary entity, respecting are one but where justice contrary subvert or cause a entities would result to a clearly overriding public policy, ignored by the fiction is courts. Remedy Compensation Dual-Capacity — — 4. Workers’ Exclusive Test. employer may capacity applica- An act in a dual so as to defeat provision remedy compen- tion of the exclusive of the workers’ act; however, dual-capacity ap- sation for the doctrine to' be plied, employer identity completely must have a second so distinct, from, removed and unrelated to the status as recognize established standards the law will it as a (MCL separate legal person 418.131; 17.237[131]). MSA Dissenting Opinion Levin, Compensation Remedy — — '5. Workers’ Exclusive Economic Real- ity Corporations. —Test parent corporation subsidiary determination whether a and a single entity purposes remedy are a for the of the exclusive provision of the workers’ act should not made be test; on the generally, separate- basis of an economic corporate respected ness of entities should be and a pierced only prevent veil injustice merely fraud or and not subsidiary totally where parent corpora- dominated (MCL418.131; 17.237[131]). tion MSA Feldman, McCroskey, (by Cochrane & Brock J. Brock) Walter plaintiff. Firestone Opinion of the Court Haughey, Roegge (by Smith, Rice & R. Lance

Mather) for the defendant. appear in facts this matter Cavanagh, undisputed succinctly and were stated Appeals: of Court defendant, "The Firestone Company Tire & Rubber (hereinafter 'Firestone’), corporation is an Ohio with its Akron, principal headquarters Ohio. Firestone has country,

various retail stores around the some of which run of are as divisions Firestone while some are wholly majority-owned subsidiary corporations. owned or Muskegon, Michigan, outlets; Firestone two has one is Firestone, operated as a division the second is Stores, Muskegon Supply Firestone Auto and Service Street, Muskegon, at Michigan, located hereinafter Firestone was a the time 925 Terrace 'Muskegon Muskegon termed Firestone’. wholly subsidiary corporation owned at

plaintiff’s cause action arose. Muskegon "Plaintiff James Wells worked at 1971, 21, acting and on October while the course of employment changing his a tube and tire on a truck by Firestone, rim apart, manufactured the rim blew injuring seriously. him Muskegon origi- Firestone was nally dealership up Michigan corpora- was set as a purchased tion around 1930. Defendant Firestone most time, manager of its assets allowing at minority retain a has owned since around all stock interest. Defendant Firestone Firestone the stock in 100% accident, At plaintiff’s 1960. the time of subsidiary’s employees directors were of de- early corporation, Muskegon fendant. In Fire- stone, liquidated is now run a retail division of defendant. "Firestone carried worker’s cover- age for including Muskegon all of local branches compensation citing

Firestone. Plaintiff filed for Fire- receiving stone as his and commenced benefits carrier, insurance Liberty from Firestone’s Mutual In- paid surance which Company, continue to be at time. "Plaintiff, subsequent receiving benefits from Fire- 421 Mich 641 Opinion of the Court stone, third-party product liabil- the instant commenced against Firestone moved Firestone. Defendant ity suit plaintiff summary judgment that was on the basis for by bringing against Firestone the action barred Michigan provision of the Work- remedy the exclusive 1969, 418.131; Compensation MCL Disability Act er’s MSA 17.237(131). plaintiff was not an trial court found that "The employee corporate entity Firestone but of of defendant Summary judg- Firestone. appeal to this Court was was denied and leave to ment Tire & 18, 1979.”1 Wells v Firestone granted on June 790, 791-793; 296 App NW2d Rubber 97 Mich lia- plaintiff’s products whether must decide We remedy the exclusive action is barred bility Compensation Disability of the Worker’s provision2 turns on necessarily Act.3 That determination relationship existed be- an whether more di- Stated plaintiff tween and defendant. was defendant question is whether rectly, In an- of injury. on the date plaintiff’s must determine initially swering question, we We find direction employed. test is to be what Billot, Nichol decision from this Court’s (1979): 284, 293-294; 279 NW2d Mich Muskovitz, 695; 94 NW2d 354 Mich "Prior to Tata v determining (1959), whether only test for 71 person independent contractor or an was as one have been denominated note that the motion should We 1963, 116.1(2), it will be judgment, pursuant to GCR accelerated alleged apparent. prejudice or treated as one because no Inc, Engineering, See, Dagenhardt Special e.g., Machine & (1984); Motors 520, 525, v General Bednarski fn 345 NW2d 164 482, 484, App Corp, fn 276 NW2d properly parties also note that cited therein. We authorities stipulated could any defendant’s motion raised factual issues judge. 116.3. GCR the trial See be resolved 17.237(131). 418.131; MSA MCL 17.237(101) seq. seq.; et et MSA MCL 418.101 Wells v op Opinion the Court question centered on of control. The control theory is the traditional common-law test used to delineate the relationship. master-servant theory, in its delin- eation of concept, the servant purpose has for its scope definition and delimitation of the of the master’s respondeat liability under superior. the doctrine of Because most acts specific contain no definition of the term 'employee’, it generally taken granted that the employee, common-law definition of servant, purposes used for liability vicarious tort purposes to be used for of workmen’s laws. Muskovitz, supra, Tata v "In adopted this Court dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Talbot in Smith Employment Comm, Powell v Security 455; 345 Mich 75 (1956), NW2d 874 in which he set forth the economic reality test proper guide as the interpreta- relevant tion of See, also, workmen’s statute. Schulte v Co, American Box Board 21; 358 Mich 99 Erickson, (1959); NW2d 367 Goodchild v 289; 375 Mich Roberts, (1965); 134 Solakis NW2d 191 13; 395 Mich Macomber, 233 (1975); NW2d 1 Askew v 212; 398 Mich (1976).” 247 NW2d 288 Following our departure from the common-law test, control this Court has consistently utilized the economic reality test when questions have arisen relative to the existence of an employment relationship. While this Court’s earlier applica- tions of the economic reality test dealt with the distinction between an independent contractor and or, an employee as in Co, Farrell v Mfg Dearborn 416 Mich 267; 330 NW2d 397 with dual in employers situation, labor-broker we believe it to be appropriate and consistent to utilize the economic reality test determining in this case which of two corporations, subsidiary, was plaintiffs actual employer pur- poses of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act.

The economic reality test was succinctly de- Farrell, scribed in p 276: 421 Mich Opinion of the Court pur- employment exists "The issue of whether been fre- compensation law has poses of the workers’ to be standard by our courts. The quently addressed test, approach reality a broad economic used is the language Justice Talbot which, oft-quoted in the sur- totality of circumstances Smith, looks to the performed work. rounding the " wages, hiring factor, payment as is 'Control is a for the maintenance firing, responsibility reality views these test of economic discipline, but the whole, single assigning primacy to no elements as a Board 358 Mich v American Box one.’ Schulte (1959). 33; 99 NW2d Muskovitz, 695; "See, also, 94 NW2d 354 Mich 398 Mich Tata v Macomber, 212; (1959); 247 NW2d Askew v Bodine, 203; (1976); App McKissic v Billot, 284; 279 (1972); 406 Mich Nichol v NW2d 333 Roberts, (1979); 395 Mich Solakis v NW2d (1975); Employers Temporary Ser- Allossery NW2d vice, Inc, App 277 NW2d 340 to the "The economic test looks statutory scheme of workers’ situation compensation curing relation goal preserving and se- with the law parties. one rights privileges of all No controlling.” factor is case, utilized the Appeals In of the Court the trial court economic test and reversed because Muskegon Fire- evidence indicates that while

"[t]he stone was a plaintiffs entity the time at arose, operation was the of action its cause The local store same as the other retail divisions. managers belonged program whereby they branch to a losses; participated profits they in the store’s ordered pur- consignment on and inventory from defendant company chased items outside the resale. some Muskegon Firestone were both other retail store and of telephone directory in as divisions listed the local accounting by Firestone. All dollar was handled man- accounting of defendant. Local store central office Opinion of the Court agers company checks; deposited issue they did not all in money bank accounts in local defendant’s name. The managers monthly profit store received and loss state- regarding their ments individual stores. expenses "Defendant calculated the of each in store operating order to its profit determine annual or loss. charged

Expenses percentage to the stores included a for worker’s insurance rates and other rent, maintenance, expenses payroll, attributable to etc. "The evidence further that the employees indicated of Muskegon Firestone supervision were under subject regulations defendant and to the rules and however, practice, thereof. The common local was managers do hiring firing. to and Certain of employees defendant’s to ability had the hire and fire managers could, chose, the local fire and if they hire employees. manager other local The local store acted within the regulations. framework of defendant’s Employees belong of retail stores did not all fact, same union as employees of defendant. In personnel some retail not. In were unionized others were while cases, metropoli- some retail stores an entire organized tan area regardless were the same union they of whether separate corporations. were supervisor, "Defendant’s district who testified that at the time plaintiffs injury employees control, supervision Firestone were under his employees denied that retail store received different depending treatment sion or a on divi- whether the store fact, separate corporation. the retail all employees participate were entitled to on the same hospitalization basis in defendant’s and retirement ben- programs fringe efit and other benefits. "Muskegon separate corporate Firestone filed a in- tax come return and issued its forms to own W-2 plaintiff However, employees. and its other all of these processed forms were at depart- defendant’s tax central Employees Muskegon ment. pay- Firestone received through accounting checks defendant its central office. of employment relating Records kept other retail store employees were and adminis- personnel department tered of defendant Fire- stone. 421 Mich Opinion the of Court of purpose for the factors balancing all of these "In test, that defen- find reality we economic applying the the employer within plaintiff’s Firestone was dant Act Compensation Disability meaning of the Worker’s refusing to Therefore, in judge erred the trial 1969. of on summary judgment motion for

grant defendant’s remedy is under plaintiff’s exclusive ground that Wells, supra, Act.” Disability Compensation Worker’s pp 794-796. persuades factors balancing those same of

Our applied Appeals correctly of the Court us that of case. test to the facts economic However, is warranted because comment further result, effect, "reverse-piercing” a is veil. corporate defendant’s principle that in Mich- recognize general We Klager See respected. entities will be igan Co, 402; 329 NW2d Meyer v Robert 415 Mich Land Bank v Union Joint Stock Finley (1982), Detroit, 281 Mich 214; 274 NW2d Co, v Gledhill Fisher & NW (1935).

However, corporate en- of a distinct fiction is a conve- tity separate stockholders the ends nience in the law to subserve introduced is to subvert justice. When this fiction invoked the courts. Paul Univer- ignored it justice, is Co, 587, 602; sity Motor Sales Mich 278 NW (1938). that, general, This of course means though company even the parent Firestone, its be separate existence will respected, doing justice unless so would subvert to some contrary cause result that would be See, e.g., other overriding public clearly policy. The- Cinderella Detroit Theatre Inc United Corp, atres NW2d 825 Although "piercing traditionally doctrine of applied protect veil” has been 651 v Firestone Opinion of the Court creditors, outsiders, or other corporation’s where legal has been used to avoid entity obligations, People ex rel General v Attorney Co, Michigan Telephone Bell 198; 224 Mich Michigan recognized NW courts have it be may appropriate invoke doctrine for the equities benefit of a shareholder where the e.g., See, Montgomery v Central compelling. are Creek, National Bank & Trust Co of Battle (1934). Mich NW disregard Our separate corporate entities of Firestone and its wholly owned subsidiary premised upon recognition our important public policies underlying Michigan Worker’s Disability Compensation Act and our belief that a contrary determination would inequitable be un- der the facts of this case. The statutory workers’ compensation scheme was enacted for protec- tion of both employees and who employers work and do business this state. The system assures covered employees that they will be compensated in the event of employment-related injuries. addition, employers are assured of parameters of their for such liability injuries. By agreeing to assume responsibility for all employment-related injuries, employers protect themselves from the possibility of potentially excessive damage awards. In order to effectuate policies, these the statute has been liberally provide construed to broad cov- erage for injured See, e.g., Farrell v workers. Dearborn Mfg supra.

If the statute is to be construed liberally when an employee benefits, seeks it should not be con- strued differently when the employer asserts it as a defense to a tort action brought by the employee who claimed and accepted benefits arising from that employment relationship. There is absolutely no evidence that defendant maintained Muskegon op Opinion Court insulating purpose itself for the Defendant liabilities.

its workers’ supplied through benefits accepted responsibility company and its insurance injuries of its for the work-related employees. Indeed, and circum- under the facts permitted case, have of this we would stances wholly itself its owned to shield behind Firestone subsidiary compensation payment of workers’ to avoid order plaintiff. Cf. Williams benefits Remand), (After Lang NW2d rely plaintiff significant did not It that also is upon Firestone distinction between the fact, disre- Firestone. garded Fire- when he asserted that this distinction purpose employer obtain- stone ing his compensation payments. Plaintiff workers’ permitted deny to the relation- should not now be ship upon he which which asserted assuming responsibility payment of relied compensation benefits. argues is his cause of action Plaintiff also that provision remedy not barred exclusive Disability Compensation Act the his because Worker’s injuries did arise out relationship. than one maintains that more He type relationship existed between himself reject injured. We defendant at the time he was this attempt "dual-capacity apply the so-called to doctrine.”4_ 4 Michigan Appeals rejected capacity has several dual Court remedy found to avoid exclusive claims and them insufficient factually analogous provision to the instant case. See in situations Works, Inc, 273; App

Neal Iron Mich 238 NW2d 837 v Roura 66 (1975), (1976); Peoples Corp, Chrysler v lv den Mich (1980); App 277; Corp, App Mich NW2d Bourassa ATO 517; (1982); Handley v NW2d 669 lv den 414 Mich 966 Wyandotte Corp, App NW2d 447 Chemicals Mich v Firestone Opinion of the Court The dual-capacity recognizes doctrine that an can, circumstances, employer under certain occupy a status other than that of an employer with e.g., Mathis Inter- See, respect employee. his Freight System, state Motor (1980). However, 289 NW2d 708 is doctrine applicable only those situations where the em- has a second ployer identity which completely is distinct and removed from his status as employer.

This requirement fundamental applica- for the tion of dual-capacity doctrine is set forth in 2A Larson, Law, Workmen’s Compensation 72.81, p § 14-229: "An employer may person, become a third vulnerable suit employee, tort if—and only pos- if—he persona sesses a completely second so independent and unrelated to his employer status as estab- that recognizes lished standards legal person.” law it

The great of American majority jurisdictions have held an that who manufactured injury-causing device cannot be held liable to his Id., under a products liability theory. 72.83, p 14-239. Furthermore, § fact product injury-causing was also sold to the public unimportant: that, "What matters employee, to this the product was manufactured adjunct as an of the busi- ness, and furnished to him solely employee, anas not as consuming public. a member of the employer What the does with central rest output change of his cannot Id., 72.83, fact.” p (emphasis 14-246 origi- § in nal). We conclude that was employed by defendant and injured was acting while in the Mich 641 Levin, J. Opinion Dissenting his scope employment. of within

course and Appeals. of the Court of judgment affirm the We Ryan Brickley, JJ., C.J., Williams, and Cavanagh, J. concurred with Wells, (dissenting). Levin, Auto and Service Supply Muskegon Firestone Stores, employment by the course of injured was by Fire- rim manufactured tire explosion At time of the Company. Tire & Rubber stone accident, all the stock capital Firestone owned controlled substantially Muskegon of Ap- Court management operations. its of an "economic application peals Wells’ em- determined that Firestone was test” compen- of the meaning within the workers’ ployer act, products therefore lia- sation and that Wells’ remedy exclusive claim barred bility was provision1 act.2 of the

I is not reality” hold We would "economic of the two question of the which determinative subsidiary, corporations, exclu- purposes Wells’ actual general provision Applying sive act. remedy Firestone, conclude that principles we Firestone, employer, and there- and not was Wells’ does bar remedy provision fore exclusive against action Firestone. Wells’

A support application Prior law does not case 17.237(131). 418.131; MCL MSA App Tire Wells v Firestone & Rubber NW2d 655 Wells v Firestone Dissenting Opinion by Levin, of an economic test in reality this case. This Court Muskovitz, in Tata v 354 695; Mich 94 71 NW2d Billot, (1959), and Nichol v 284; Mich (1979), not, NW2d 761 did a by applying flexible approach aspect to a limited compensa of workers’ law, tion make "economic reality” the touchstone for other workers’ determinations. In Tata Court decided that the "control test” was an inappropriate measure for determining injured whether worker independent was an contractor an employee, who then be would entitled to benefits. In rea soning conclusion, to that this Court adopted the dissenting opinion of Justice Talbot Smith Comm, Powell v Employment Security 345 Mich 455; (1956), NW2d which stated an "eco Nichol, nomic test.”3 In reality a tort third-party question action where the again was whether worker was an independent contractor or an em ployee, this Court applied an reality economic test. that, The Court said as compared to the control test, the economic reality test achieved "a freer and more balancing realistic of all the relevant factors each case determine persons which are properly denominated . . . employees [and] persons which should be properly denominated independent contractors.”4

In Funk Corp, v General Motors 91; 392 Mich Dagenhardt Special (1974), NW2d 641 Ma & Inc, chine Engineering, Mich NW2d 164 this Court the general affirmed rule allowing an injured employee of a subcontrac tor to maintain against action third-party employer general subcontractor. That rule is not fully consistent with economic reality analy was, apparently, The term "economic test” first used in Roberts, Solakis 233 NW2d 1 4Nichol, supra, p 298. 421 Opinion Dissenting Levin, J. the sub of a subcontractor —or An

sis. employees if no other there are contractor himself goals employer —pursues of the subcon of the indirectly, employer paid, tractor, at least is questions and, of control of the subcontractor aside, employer generally of the as an functions 5 basis, On of the subcontractor. employers many subcontractors of states treat employees employers of the subcontractor’s provision.6 remedy purposes Nei of the exclusive Legislature Court, however, has nor this ther the adopted accepted, economically widely based rule. reality a test is substitute for

The economic of control is a means charac- control test.7 The terizing ing test relationship, employment of determin- employment a was of subcontrac- whether the however, case, tor of In the instant a servant. relationship Fire- between there is no stone and not The here Firestone. issue be control test should abandoned whether the adopted. reality The control and an economic test test has of whether never been determinative pierced corporate veil or which member should be corporate family aof of a is the "actual” The is whether an economic worker. issue here should reality made determinative test be parent subsidiary corporations are whether 5 (dissenting See, supra, opinion generally, Dagenhardt, p 559 fn J.). Levin, 6 J.), Levin, Dagenhardt, opinion supra, p (dissenting See Law, 72.31(a), Larson, pp citing Compensation if. 14-111 2A Workmen’s § Tata, contractor); supra (employee/independent v Schulte See (1959) (em Co, 21; Mich NW2d 367 American Box Board Smith, J., contractor; concurring, applied ployee/independent eco Erickson, test); 134 NW2d nomic Goodchild v (1965) (dual Solakis, 212; (employer/broker); supra employer); fn (1976) Macomber, (employer/ 398 Mich 247 NW2d Askew Nichol, contractor); broker); supra (employee/independent Farrell (dual (1982) Mfg em 330 NW2d Dearborn ployer/broker). Wells v Dissenting Opinion Levin, single more entity; specifically, of whether they single entity are for the of the purposes exclu- remedy provision sive compensa- tion act.

B majority vast states do not extend the reach of the exclusive remedy provision of a work- act treating parent ers’ and sub- sidiary corporations as a single entity. Courts in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, Carolina, New Jersey, Oklahoma, North Carolina, Tennessee, South Washington, Texas and refused to treat dominant and servient subsidiary corporations as a for single entity purpose.8 The Georgia intermediate appellate 8 Gigax Co, App 591; California: v Ralston Cal Purina 136 3d 186 (1982). (The Rptr being disputed, Cal 395 facts were it unclear whether the was an of a division of the defendant subsidiary or of a ployee of the defendant. The court stated that the em parent subsidiary corporation of a dominated could sue the on products liability theory. employee, a The court also stated that an injured working corporation while for one division of a main could tain an division that was an action based aon tort committed engaged separate enterprise. adopted in a The court enterprise liability standard based on the "hard realities” of intra corporation organization. Davis, compensation Using See Workmen’s — enterprise theory Party of to who determine is a third tort-feasor, [1971]). 32 U Pitt L 289R (D 1983). Inc, Colo, Trailways, Supp Colorado: Peterson v 555 F 827 (Employees wholly parent subsidiary of owned sued for failure to provide the App, workplace. thorough safe This case contains a discussion of issue.) (Colo Service, Inc, See also v Gaber Franchise 680 1345 P2d 1984). (SD Gregory Corp, Supp NY, Connecticut: v Garrett 578 F 871 1983). (Employee parent products subsidiary liability of sued on theories.) negligence Development Wilkerson, Corp Florida: Gulfstream Land & v 420 So 1982). (Fla, (Employee wholly subsidiary parent 2d 587 as a of owned sued property subsidiary owner. Parent and were insured under the compensation policy.) same workers’ insurance Gulfstream overruled Industries, (Fla 1978). Goldberg Inc, App, v Context 362 So 2d 974 Corp, Illinois: Supp McDaniel v Johns-Manville Sales 487 F 714 421 Mich 641

658 Dissenting Opinion Levin, 1978). (ND Ill, companies” (Employees sued other "various related of asbestos.) exposure injuries arising companies out of for related (CA Co, Boggs Kentucky: Blue 590 F2d 655 v Diamond Coal 1979) subsidiary parent negli- wholly (Employees owned sued . of safety gent performance influential case on the is the most maintenance contract. This of a issue.) 1965). Inc, (DC, Hycon, Supp Maryland: 244 F 151 Thomas v parent subsidiary (Employee wholly injuries sued truck-owner for of owned subsidiary brakes. Parent and had occasioned defective policy.) joint compensation v insurance See also Heinrich (D 1982). Co, Md, Supp Goodyear F 1348 Tire & Rubber 532 Williams, 775; Drilling Mississippi: 137 So 2d Index Co v 242 Miss (1962). brought wholly subsidiary (Employee action of first owned negligence against wholly subsidiary that was second owned Employee engaged received workers’ in same line of work. had subsidiary, probably wholly owned under a from a third theory.) borrowed servant (Mo Centers, Inc, May App, Boswell v SW2d 585 Missouri: 1984).(Employee parent subsidiary.) of sued Co, 148; Super Jersey: Mingin v 171 NJ New Continental Can (1979). wholly subsidiary (Employee one sued A2d 146 of owned products liability parent wholly subsidiary under a and second owned theory. pensation A2d corporations the same workers’ com- All were insured under Barrett, 294; Lyon policy.) 89 NJ also v insurance See (1982). Leasing 890; Corp, 75 New v Gatx AD2d NYS2d York: Samaras (1980). subsidiary brought products liability (Employee action 48 against NYS2d 106 of 754; parent.) Maigo Corp, v 37 AD2d See also Thomas (1971); Holding Corp, Co-Op 26 AD2d Daisernia v GLF 594; (1966); City Corp, Foley v York Omnibus NYS2d 542 New (1952). 112 NYS2d 217 Mills, Inc, Phillips App 5 NC North Stowe Carolina: (1969). wholly subsidiary parent (Employee sued SE2d 817 as owned owner.) building (CA 10, America, Love 647 F2d 1058 Oklahoma: v Flour Mills 1981). subsidiary parent. wholly (Employee owned sued Court action, duty appeared ready to this violated no allow but held had employee.) SC 124 SE2d 47 South Carolina: Brown Moorhead Oil uninsured, (Employee wholly subsidiary was not owned wholly allowed to collect workers’ owned benefits from insured work.) subsidiary engaged in that was same (ED Tenn, Technar, Inc, Supp v 390 F 1031 Tennessee: Latham 1974). wholly subsidiary parent (Employee sued for breach owned concerning dangerous nondelegable duty objects. Parent and of a subsidiary policy.) by were insured the same workers’ (CD Inc, Cal, Supp Ling-Temco-Vought, F 314 Texas: Stoddard v 513 1980) brought negli- products liability (Employee subsidiary . by against parent. subsidiary gence covered Parent and were actions compensation policy.) same workers’ State, 163; Washington: App P2d v 22 589 250 Peterick Wash 659 v Firestone Dissenting Opinion by Levin, split question.9 courts are the Only on Louisiana is employee bring- of a barred from subsidiary ing against parent, appears an action but unique to aby be mandated Louisiana statute.10 subsidiary brought (Employee against of 92%-owned action parent. parent duty employee.) Held: no had violated owed to this Co, Inc, 649; Harvey App In v Fine Products 156 Ga 275 SE2d Co, (1980), 739 corporations 490; App v Beck Flint Construction Ga 268 SE2d (1980), Georgia appellate against parent court barred actions brought by employees of subsidiaries. The court reasoned parent duty employee subsidiary that the was an "alter owed no to the unless the ego” parent. subsidiary of the And if the was an alter ego, parent immunity then the to was entitled to the same extent as subsidiary. argument support parent to Beck cites three cases its that the of an ego” subsidiary enjoys immunity, inapposite. "alter but all are In Green, Yancey App (1973), employee 129 Ga an SE2d suing of the board of education was from barred board members individually. Casualty Surety App 791; In Mull v Aetna & 120 Ga (1969), employee’s negligent inspec- 172 SE2d 147 an on action based Georgia tion the defendant insurer was barred because a statute protected insurers from such suits. court The stated that the insurer ego” Iron, employer. was the "alter Fowler, of the In Southern Wire & Inc 217 Ga 124 SE2d 738 the court would not allow employee employer’s president. an to sue his rely ego theory The cases on an alter not followed in Michigan. See fn 14. A applying Georgia United States District Court law had reached a contrary prior Harvey. result Beck In O’Brien v Grumman (SD Corp, NY, 1979), Supp rejected 475 F court the defendant parent corporation’s immunity subsidiary claim that of its should protect employee subsidiary. it from suit an 10 Louisiana, employee subsidiary may In of a sue parent corporation. result, however, This is mandated statute. In Welding Works, Inc, Braud v Dixie Machine & So Metal 2d (La 1982), App, prohibited the court noted that a statute an employee suing statute, employer. a stockholder of his That Ann, 23:1032, provides: La Stat Rev § rights granted employee "The and remedies herein to an his or dependent injury compensable on account anof or or sickness disease Chapter, which he is entitled under this shall be rights employee exclusive of all other and remedies of such . . . against officer, director, employer, any principal, any his or or stock- holder, partner employee principal.” (Empha- or of such added.) sis (La Industries, Inc, 1975), App, vCoco Winston So 2d employee subsidiary injured arguably pursuing of a was while he parent corporation. the business of the sued the principal. ego” immunity, The court discussed "alter decision rests on the above-mentioned statute. The discussion alter 421 Mich 641

660 Levin, by Dissenting Opinion exception state, of the instant with the In this employee uniformly suggest that an case, the cases subsidiary corporation may an ac- maintain of a corporation.11 parent against In the simi- the tion brings in which an lar situation against the and individual shareholder sole action corporation, employer of the courts this the exclu- extend the bar of have refused to state sive piercing corporate remedy protection the veil.12 reality analysis destabilize would

Economic corporate law. The separate respect generally state the courts corporate pierce corporate entities, and the ness of injustice.13 only prevent fraud or Total veil to parent corporation subsidiary by a of a domination piercing justify the As this veil. does Co, 272 v & Mich Court said in Gledhill Fisher 353, 358; 262 NW 371 (1935): statute, ego defendant, because, necessary the status was under the Louisiana only engaged principal, if it was would be immune injured employee. By the same business as (i.e., subsidiary) showing employee’s employer that (i.e., parent), merely court the same business as dant ego principal the alter of the defendant engaged proved principal necessarily was that the defendant Therefore, employee’s employer. defen- principal employee. See also was immune from suit (La 1981). Inc, App, Uniroyal, 751 Nichols v 399 So 2d 11 1980) (ED Mich, Co, (parent Supp v Tool 486 F 774 Choate Landis subsidiary’s immunity corporation nity); its immu not obtain based on does 1981) (ED (court Mich, Corp, Supp Rick v R L C F 39 535 parent subsidiary’s immunity, suggests that but court does not obtain particular employee); parent duty held that did not owe a to this Co, 242; App 206 NW2d 444 Oliver v St Clair Metal Products Mich entities). (1973)(court subsidiary as distinct treats Kantzler, App 414; v 296 NW2d 265 Robards Estate Mich (1980) (court give wholly immunity of his refuses shareholder the Smith, corporation); App 236; Elliott 47 Mich 209 NW2d 425 owned (1973) (employee’s may not survivors obtain workers’ proprietorship sole shareholder unin benefits from sole owned employer corporation). sured Co, Klager 402; Meyer Mich 329 NW2d 721 See v Robert (1935); (1982); Gledhill v Fisher & 262 NW Dawson, App NW2d Belen Wells v Dissenting Opinion by Levin, J. enough "It is not that the subsidiary organized is so it 'merely controlled as to make an instrumental- ity, adjunct’ conduit or of its stockholders. It must appear recognize further their entities would aid in the wrong.”14 consummation of a Klager, supra, p 411, See also fn 13 and Gottlieb v Arrow Door Co, 450, Michigan Mich 110 NW2d 767 Three cases suggest But on close justifies piercing corporate that "domination” alone the veil. reading, it is clear that more than domination is necessary. People Attorney Michigan In Telephone ex rel General v Bell Co, 198, 204-205; (1929), 246 Mich 224 NW 438 the Court held that a Michigan corporation by Telephone had been established American and Telegraph Company investigation by public "to avoid full and control the injury utilities also observed that public.” commission of the State to the of the The Court Michigan corporation separate was no more "carrying telephone AT&T in on ordinary a business than is the station agent engaged conducting carrying in on the railroad business of his employer.” corporation The Court organized concluded: "Where a is so and controlled and its affairs so conducted as to make it a mere instrumentality agent adjunct corporation, or of another its corporate entity ignored existence as a distinct will be and the two corporations regarded legal contemplation will be in as one unit.” only question presented case, however, The in that was whether the Michigan company could money paid claim a credit for the sum of services, AT&T for granted certain or whether the credit would be only according providing to AT&T’sactual cost of the services. AT&T’s Michigan domination company over the made the contract between them appear length and, to be therefore, less than an arm’s transaction an inadequate way providing to determine the actual "costs” of the services resulting and the credit. controversy present question The did not of whether AT&T legal would be held obligations liable for all Michigan of the corporation, opinion gives and the no indication that AT&T would be held liable. Casualty In Surety Western Birmingham Co, & Contracting Co v (ED Supp Mich, 1947), F corporation the court held that the was by not dominated an ego, individual shareholder as his alter without explaining type required what of domination would have been to hold personally corporation’s shareholder liable for the debts. All the "[w]here, here, plaintiff court said was that a claims individual personally defendant ego theory liable on an [is] alter for debts of a corporation partnership partner, of which he is a stockholder and plaintiff prove does recipi- not that such defendant was the real ent of the dominated or entity, assets or income entity of either nor that either was operated by ego, him as his alter such individual personally Id., defendant added). p is not (emphasis liable for such debts.” Shirley App 644; v Drackett Products 182 NW2d 726 421 by Dissenting Opinion Levin, disregard of the Court would opinion

The Fire- solely of the entities because corporate forms its subsidiary. dominated or controlled stone in this case corporate forms Respecting wrong.” of a in consummation would "aid Rather, corporate honor thereby we would Firestone. As the Court of established structure in the Sixth Circuit said a similar Appeals Co, Boggs v Blue Diamond Coal situation 1979): (CA 6, F2d range enterprise has of choice business "[A] controlling reciprocal own structure. But its obligations as a result of the choice it makes. arise dividing advantage may of the benefits of owners take parts, princi- separate corporate the business into recognize the reciprocity require courts also ples of separate identities by an enterprises when sued injured employee.”15_ product injured manufactured defective corporation. Because the defendant subsid- the defendant’s products, corporation only parent’s had no iary distributed the own, Appeals the separate identity subsidiary held that of its the Court of conclusion, parent’s reaching In this was for the tort. liable Co, Distributing Bathory the Court v Procter & Gamble relied on (CA 6, 1962), involving of a the distribution F2d 22 parent’s another case subsidiary. products wholly In and dominated a owned cases, considering however, the immu- courts retailers’ both the were negligent liability nity manufacture in cases for resale protected for from rule which distributors acquired product the in which the distributors knowledge responsible of its manufacturer without a danger. piercing reasons for Bathory the in terms of The court did not couch issue Rather, argued corporate that the court "[t]he veil. liability protecting for the or distributor from rule retailer Id., (emphasis p negligence not exist this case.” ... do in added). corporate veil; merely Bathory pierce not it court did involving corporations, in dominated held that retailers’ plied certain cases Shirley Bathory ap- apply. immunity would rule not immunity exception not create rule and did an to the retailers’ ground piercing corporate veil. novel for propo- Shirley authority Significantly, cited no court has finding pierced of veil without a that can be sition proposition, Shirley See does stand this To extent misconduct. the case corporate Petrella, Piercing the Comment: has been criticized. Michigan, U L 81 veil 61 Det J Urb quote Boggs point. See on this least either cite or At seven courts v Firestone Dissenting Opinion by Levin, reality analysis

Economic could be viewed as creating employment relationship newa between reality viewed, Wells and Firestone. So economic analysis concepts overturns traditional of consen- employment. sual In Schulte American Box 21, Board NW2d acknowledged relationship this Court that "the of employee, by statute, unless created relationship.” applied ais contractual As until reality now, the economic test has not violated this principle, only because the test been has used existing relationships. characterize contractual Here, however, the test would determine whether seemingly separate parties entity. two are one reality Economic would be used to characterize relationship, par- a contractual eliminate a subsidiary relationship. ent would, It in the in- case, new, stant create a rather than characterize employment relationship. existent, Trailways, Supp Inc, Peterson 555 F (D 1983), Colo, 831-832 a United States District aspect analyzed Appeals Court this of the Court noting case, and, decision reality that the economic developed indepen- test to decide the contractor/employee question impli- dent in cases cating coemployee employer immunity, criti- cized the extension of the doctrine: analysis independent

"Inasmuch as contractor distinction assumes the existence of a con- relationship among sensual extension parties, the relevant Wells’ raising of the 'economic test’ to cases question this initial seems unwarranted. Thus adher- ence to may the indicators 'economic reality,’ well threaten 'employee’ the economic interests since p 604; Peterson, Gigax, supra, supra, p 833; Gregory, fn 8 fn 8 8fn Gulfstream, supra, p 589; Love, pp 886-887; supra, supra, p fn 8 fn 8 1062; Stoddard, 326; Choate, supra, p supra, p 8fn fn 11 776. See also Daisernia, supra, p fn 8 594. Mich Dissenting Opinion Levin, analysis, conscious agreement receive no his consent implication.” a matter of at best are considered but by quoting this statement supported The court com- on workers’ treatise Larson’s from Professor law: pensation arrangement ... is mutual

"Compensation law employee under which both employer and between give up rights things. to be Since gain certain reciprocal rights employer and between adjusted are employee, it is not logical mandatory resort only but them to discover their rela- agreement between to the tionship. employee upon a worker an status To thrust ordinarily not would he has never consented to which stranger by a liability in a vicarious suit harm him might deprive it him of employer, well against his act, notably under the rights valuable employer common-law dam- right his own to sue ages.”16 remedy provi- the exclusive application becomes, under of economic real- any concept

sion "a and therefore sub- ity, implication,” matter Here, argues manipulation. employer an ject parent that a requires that "economic reality” result be treated as one with the subsidiary entity, that is from suit subsid- shielded Purina Gigax v Ralston iary’s employee. Rptr Cal in con- App 3d Cal trast, his an sued a division that alleging a tort committed corporation other than one which analysis worked. The court applied realities,” based on "substance” and "hard necessarily stated such actions were supra, 47.10, Larson, p 16 1C fn 6 cited for 8-233. Larson also § Gregory, supra, proposition p fn 8 876. Firestone Co Dissenting Opinion by Levin, by remedy provision barred exclusive proper could be maintained in circumstances.17 The abolition of the form "bright line” would unnecessarily complicate original of workers’ The injuries. application of the reality economic test did not create substantial administrative problems because the test replaced ambiguous test,18 the equally control and because contracting provision of the workers’ compen- sation act19 application made of the test unneces- Here, however, in sary some cases. a well-estab- lished, simple framework would be replaced amorphous provides "test” that courts with little guidance. Macomber, Askew v

The concern in expressed 212, (1976) (Wil- 398 Mich 247 NW2d 288 liams, J., dissenting), is on point: is, however, "There difficulty an inherent in deter mining the given 'economic realities’ of a relation. As our Appeals aptly Court of stated in Mc Bodine, App Kissic v 201 NW2d 333 problem 'the with reality economic is that it is a conclusion, and it is not a test the sense that there any are well-defined upon criteria objective which an ” determination can be based.’ Smith, Justice Talbot in his influential dissent Powell, supra, 471-474, pp emphasized the need for a standard with a "definite meaning.” Smith re jected the test, control in large part,20 because it

17Gigax, supra, p 607. See also fn 8. Powell, supra, pp J.). See Smith, (dissenting opinion 471-474 418.171; 17.237(171). 19 MCL MSA test, originally control employer’s which limited an vicarious liability, inappropriate was also because workers’ in volves different issues than explains: tort law. Professor Larson liability "This tort arose out of detailed activities carried on servant, resulting in person. some kind of harm to a third The extent right which the had a to control these detailed activities 421 Mich 641 Dissenting Opinion Levin, J. certainty.”' uniformity either achieve "failed to recognized of an act administration "[t]he He designed not be want should human

to relieve upon depend such verbal resolution of our made antics.” more certain proved no test has The economic application the control than its in its "freer may determination,” it be test, with not in this case We are of two evils. the lesser "corporate traditional evils. The two faced with predictable provides certain, test test21 status” plan parties permits affairs and to their which disputes. to resolve courts gives compensation act22 no indica- The workers’ Legislature the term intended for that the tion meaning "employer” normal other than its to have parent grant Legislature intended to the or that corporations Leg- remedy protection. The exclusive course, could, have done so. Workers’ islature compensation protec- legislation frequently accords employ- many particular parties. states, In tion to from third- immunized of subcontractors are ers party liability.23 Louisiana, anof shareholders employer ought question highly to the whether was thus to be relevant Larson, supra, legally 43.42. fn 6 § liable for them.” 1C however, compensation, issues that involves Workers’ make control irrelevant. injuries by not with law is concerned "[Workers’] activities, injuries a result to him as in his detailed but with details) (controlled employer by only as to not of his own activities co-employees, independent third contractors and other but of those of not). (some persons issue, employer, and others To controlled right direct of his work has no such of control of details Larson, liability.” fn tort 1C relation as it has to the issue of vicarious supra, 43.42. § Powell, (dissenting Nichol, supra, p 296; supra, pp 467-469 See also J.). Smith, opinion of Peterson, supra, p 832. See third-party provides the basis for this 1952 amendment that The (1952 418.827; 17.237[827]) and the PA now MCL MSA action exclusive central (MCL 418.131; 17.237[131]) provision remedy MSA are of analysis. importance to this 6. See fn Firestone Co Wells v Dissenting Opinion Levin, the exclu- protected by corporation are state, Legisla- In this remedy provision.24 sive no There is immunized insurance ture inspectors.25 intended, Legislature suppose reason protection provide express simply neglected, in Firestone’s corporations for parent position.26 thereby an intent not infer such We would action. As stated of his common-law deprive Wells Professor Larson: compensation policy strong is no reason "[T]here rights every . . . destroying law common [and] preserving those presumption should be on side protection has rights, once basic been assured.”27

C Wells from on relying This Court should bar forms of the and the separate corporate disregard on the basis that he chose to subsidiary compensa- applying those forms when record does not reveal payments. why tion Wells listed as his Firestone employer.28 has not claimed that his third-party Wells waived fn See 8. 17.237(131). 317, amending 418.131; 1969 PA MCL MSA independent contractor/employee employer/bro- Unlike the questions by ker occasions which have been considered this Court on numerous (see 7), ambiguities fn there are no inherent in the determi- Legislature readily nation involved in this case. The could have remedy protection wholly extended exclusive subsidiary the to the of a owned compensation policy insured under the same workers’ parent. 27Larson, 72.50, supra, p quoted point fn 6 14-95. § Larson is on this by Boggs, supra, 660, Choate, p supra, p fn 8 fn 11 776. may urged by Muskegon Wells have been to so file his claim Firestone, simply may Muskegon or he erred. have Firestone also employer. Muskegon may listed Firestone as Wells’ Firestone have done so because Firestone carried the workers’ insur- corporations likely ance for both and was therefore more be to compensation payments. involved in the administration of Wells and may Firestone both have been more concerned with com- 421 Mich by Dissenting Opinion Levin, employer. listing The as his

claim Firestone thereby question waive his Wells did whether question third-party fact, and not of claim is a law, raised and decided which must first be before by the WCAB.

D majority jurisdic- We would follow the vast reality hold that economic is not a basis tions and for piercing corporate veil. The economic real- inappropriate ity test was devised to avoid use of test, the control that concern is not relevant here control alone is not determinative of since corporate pierced, whether the which member of a worker. The ment should be resolved tion. context would veil should be

corporate family employs a question employ- there is an whether relationship Firestone and between implica- consent and not Applying in this the economic test

permit corporations to avoid the reciprocal obligations inherent their choice of corporate many deny employees of structure and would corporations right they

subsidiary Legislature undoubtedly had, at the time au- third-party by employees thorized actions who had compensation benefits, received workers’ to main- third-party tain a action.

II disposition which correct we believe be pleting paperwork initiating payment and with than with observ- ing the formalities. rate, any representations necessarily controlling. At these are not accident, employee Muskegon At the time of the Wells was an subsequent representations operate Firestone. The tively would not retroac- relationship to eliminate this or to create a new appear representation one with Firestone. It does not that Wells’ necessary misled disregard such a manner it now justice. form to secure Firestone has alleged that Wells acted in bad faith. v Firestone Dissenting Levin, Opinion it unnecessary makes to consider the capacity dual In question. this connection we note that opinion of the Court extends the bar of the exclu- provision sive remedy by disregarding determining which of two enti- forms ties is the "real” employer, nevertheless unimpeachable treats the form as purpose deciding whether the bar of the exclusive rem- where it edy provision applies alleged is that acting is in a dual capacity. opinion go The of this Court further than may necessary preserve policy exclusive case, remedy provision. the instant a customer of Muskegon supplied Firestone the defective Fire- product. stone Suppose a Firestone or Muskegon Firestone employee was in the injured course of consequence as a of the blowout of a tire on a rented automobile. It is ques- tionable whether the bar of the remedy exclusive provision preclude should prod- maintenance against ucts action liability Firestone.

This Court has recognized the bar of the exclusive provision be remedy may superseded by other statutory policies.29 products liability provides statute30 statutory prod- for a authority action, ucts liability suggests an inquiry Legislature whether intended products that a action be liability barred the exclusive remedy provision.

Kavanagh Boyle, JJ., concurred with Levin, J._ Freight System, See Mathis v Interstate Motor (1980) (no-fault benefits); Boscaglia NW2d 708 automobile insurance (1984)

Michigan Telephone Bell 420 Mich See also 2 362 NW2d 642 (sexual/ethnic discrimination). Larson, supra, 68.10, p 13- § torts). (intentional seq.; seq. MCL 600.2945 et MSA 27A.2945 et

Case Details

Case Name: Wells v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court

Date Published: Feb 11, 1985

Citation: 364 N.W.2d 670

Docket Number: 65372, (Calendar No. 1)

Court Abbreviation: Mich.