10 Or. 519 | Or. | 1883
By tbe Court,
Tbis is an action on a promissory note made and delivered to tbe respondent by tbe appellant’s intestate. Tbe statute of October 11, 1862, Gen. Laws, 1874, p. 188, sec. 373, provides that, “an action may be commenced against an executor or administrator at any time after tbe expiration of six months from tbe granting of letters testamentary or of administration, and until tbe final settlement of tbe estate and discharge of such executor or administrator from tbe trust, and not otherwise.” Tbe complaint alleges, “that on tbe 3d day of November, 1879, at Boseburg, Douglas county, Oregon, an order or determination of tbe county court for Douglas county, state of Oregon, was duly made, appointing tbe defendant administrator of tbe goods, chattels and credits of said Chas. Applegate, and that be is now such administrator.” Tbe pleader seems to have followed tbe form in 1 Estee’s PI, 312, without noting that the form
The word appointment, generally, may signify such actual installment in the administration office. It is so used in section 1080. But the complaint does not use the word in this general sense. Had it done so, it is doubtful whether such a form of allegation of the fact that letters of administration had been granted would have been good pleading. (Beach v. King, 17 Wen., 97.)
The instruction that the promissory note of a married woman was absolutely void, was not entirely correct. The rights of property secured to married women by the state constitution necessarily imply a power, under certain circumstances, to make contracts. (Starr v. Hamilton, Deady, 268; Cooksen v. Toole, 59 Ill., 515.) But when the respondent pleaded her coverture, the appellant should have set up matter, if any such there was, in avoidance of the plea. The burden was on the appellant to show an adequate consideration for the note set up by him in his counter claim. (West v. Laraway, 28 Mich., 464; Nash v. Mitchell, 71 N. Y., 199; Broome v. Taylor, 76 N. Y., 564; Way v. Peck, 47 Conn., 23.) He could not, in the absence of such proof of the validity of the note, make out that the instruction was error. However, since the case must go back, with liberty to the respondent to amend her pleadings, the appellant will have an opportunity, if the case comes to a second trial, to show, if the facts are with him, that the note is supported by a valid consideration.
Judgment reversed.