ORDER
The Court having considered the motion for reconsideration and the answer filed thereto in the above-captioned case, it is this 7th day of May, 2007,
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the motion be, and it is hereby, granted, and it is further
ORDERED that the reported opinion filed on March 13, 2007, be, and it is hereby, withdrawn, and the revised opinion attached hereto is filed today in place of the previously filed opinion.
We issued a writ of certiorari in this matter,
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On 20 June 1991, Alan and Sheri Neal 2 executed a “Maryland FHA Deed of Trust” with Margaretten & Company, Inc., to secure the purchase money loan for a dwelling located in Walkersville, Maryland. The mortgage was insured by the FHA pursuant to the provisions of § 203(b) of the NHA. 3 The deed of trust was assigned by Margaretten for servicing to Wells Fargo. Sometime in 2002 or 2003, Neal fell behind in *712 making the monthly mortgage payments when due. Wells Fargo initiated foreclosure proceedings in the Circuit Court, which proceedings were stayed when Neal filed a Complaint on 27 August 2003 that commenced the action that is the subject of this case.
Neal posited in his Complaint, and maintains in this Court, that Wells Fargo breached the terms of paragraph 9(d) of the deed of trust by failing to observe the various preforeclosure loss mitigation procedures set out in the HUD mortgage servicing regulations. Paragraph 9(d) of the deed of trust provides:
9. Grounds for Acceleration of the Debt
(d) Regulations of HUD Secretary. In many circumstances regulations issued by the Secretary will limit Lender’s rights in the case of payment defaults to require immediate payment in full and foreclose if not paid. This Security Instrument does not authorize acceleration or foreclosure if not permitted by regulations o f the Secretary.
Based on Wells Fargo’s purported failure to follow the HUD regulations before accelerating the mortgage debt and instituting foreclosure, Neal advanced two causes of action. First, Neal claimed that the regulatory violations constituted a breach of contract, entitling him to monetary damages. Second, he petitioned for declaratory relief 4 to prevent Wells *713 Fargo from pursuing foreclosure under the deed of trust. Wells Fargo responded with a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the HUD regulations relied on by Neal do not afford a borrower a private cause of action such as the one pleaded in Neal’s Complaint. Neal opposed Wells Fargo’s motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment advancing the same contentions asserted in his Complaint. After a motions hearing, the court entered summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo based on the premise that the HUD regulations were intended for the benefit of HUD enforcement of the FHA mortgage insurance program and did not grant a private cause of action for a borrower such as Neal.
Neal appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which vacated the summary judgment granted by the Circuit Court and remanded the matter for further proceedings on the contract claim asserted by Neal.
Neal v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.,
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review for the Grant of Summary Judgment
“In reviewing a grant of summary judgment under Md. Rule 2-501, we independently review the record to determine whether the parties properly generated a dispute of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Livesay v. Baltimore,
*715 B. A Private Right of Action?
At the outset, we note a distinction between Neal’s theory of this case and the more ubiquitous argument that violation of the NHA or the companion HUD regulations may support a private cаuse of action for individuals harmed by those violations. The parties agree that the weight of authority around the country roundly rejects the notion that either the NHA or associated HUD regulations support either direct or implied private causes of action for their violation.
See, e.g., Krell v. Nat’l Mortgage Corp.,
In the instant case, Neal does not plead a private action derived directly or impliedly from the NHA or its implementing regulations. At issue here, rather, is whether a paragraph in an FHA-approved form deed of trust alluding to a particular sub-set of HUD regulations is a bargained-for term between the mortgagor and mortgagee such that an alleged violation of the regulations may give rise to a private action maintainable by the mortgagor against the mortgagee for breach of contract under Maryland law. As principal support for this theory, Neal and the Court of Special Appeals rely on our decision in
Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B.,
Wells
involved a contract dispute between Chevy Chase Bank and certain of its credit card holders arising from the bank’s amendment of its cardholder agreement. The cardholders alleged that the amendment was ineffective because it was made contrary to the notice requirements prescribed by certain provisions of the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code, which were referred to expressly in the cardholder agreement.
Wells,
Chevy Chase Bank’s voluntary election, as the drafter of the cardholder agreement, to incorporate the provisions of the Commercial Law Article as the law governing the contract stands in contrast to the situation presented here where Wells Fargo was required to use a form deed of trust created by the FHA, 6 an agency of HUD, which form alluded, by way of notice, to certain of its regulations that might affect whether debt acceleration was proper. Wells Fargo and Margaretten & Company, Inc., unlike Chevy Chase Bank in Wells, did not author this provision of the contract entered into with the *718 mortgagor. Thus, the inclusion of paragraph 9(d) alluding to the HUD regulations regarding mortgage acceleration and foreclosure options was not an “undertaking [ ] voluntarily-assumed” by Wells Fargo such that it may be invoked by Neal in an offensive thrust, such as a private cause of action for damages. Given the primary purpose of these regulations, discussed infra, and the lack of language in paragraph 9(d) to support a conclusion that the parties expressly adopted the standards of the federal regulations as between thеm, Wells does not support Neal’s contentions or the Court of Special Appeals’s conclusion.
College Loan Corp.
similarly is distinguishable from the present controversy. In that case a student loan lender, College Loan Corporation, pursued, inter alia, a state law contract claim against a company, Sallie Mae, with which it contracted to service certain of College Loan Corporation’s loans.
College Loan Corp.,
Just as in Wells, the lynchpin of the College Loan Corp. court’s analysis was that the contractual term binding the parties privately to an otherwise statutory standard of conduct was the product of a negotiation yielding a freely-entered contract. In the matter before us, Wells Fargo did not participate in negotiations for or drafting of the deed of trust to which it became assignee. 7 Therefore, it could not have *719 bargained, in any sense that we are prepared to accept, for paragraph 9(d) with the Neals at the time the deed was executed.
This is not to say that Wells Fargo is not bound otherwise to Neal at all by the other terms of the deed of trust to which it is now a party. Rather, the question here is whether the mortgagor may recover damages for breach of a certain provision of the deed in a private cause of action. The answer to that question lies within the HUD regulations themselves. Section 203.500 of Title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides that noncompliance with the FHA mortgage servicing regulations empowers the Secretary of HUD to impose a “civil money penalty, including a penalty under § 30.35(c)(2), or withdrawal of HUD’s approval of a mortgagee.” This enforcement scheme comports with the notion that the regulations enacted pursuant to the NHA were intended to govern the relationship between the mortgagee and the government rather than, as Neal would have it, the mortgagee and the mortgagor.
The оverall purpose of the FHA mortgage insurance program is to encourage leading lenders, in exchange for a government guarantee of the loan, to extend mortgages to those carrying higher credit risks. The regulations setting forth the rules and procedures for the program, including the loss mitigation regulations pointed to by Neal and alluded to in paragraph 9(d) of the deed, address how participating lenders are to conduct their activities. Thus, the regulations do not control directly the relationship between the mortgagor and mortgagee and may not be invoked by the mortgagor as a sword in an offensive cause of action against the mortgagee.
See Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Prior,
*720 The language of the regulations bear this out. With respect to mitigating losses, “[mjortgagees must consider the compаrative effects of their elective servicing actions, and must take those appropriate actions which can reasonably be expected to generate the smallest financial loss to the Department.” 24 C.F.R. § 203.501. The emphasis on reducing the possible losses to HUD, rather than the mortgagor, demonstrates that the regulations exist primarily to govern the relationship between the government and the mortgagee. This is logical in light of the fact that HUD, by guaranteeing the mortgages under the program, has a considerable stake in the administration of the insured mortgages. Therefore, it uses the regulations to protect its interests and manage the program. Section 203.502(a) of Title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations also illustrates this point by declaring that mortgagees and servicers are “fully responsible to the Secretary for proper servicing.” Notably, the regulation does not address that the mortgagees’ and servicers’ are responsible to the mortgagors.
Although the HUD regulations provide for formidable consequences for lenders’ noncompliance, the fact that the HUD Secretary is the sole entity empowered to enforce affirmatively the regulations presents some unfortunate, but pragmatic, challenges to uniform and consistent enforcement. As
amici
here, Civil Justice, Inc., the Public Justice Center, and the National Consumer Law Center, point out that HUD’s limited resources, as a practical matter, prohibit it from prosecuting every potential violation of its mortgage servicing regulations. In an effort to enforce most effectively the regulations and prosecute the worst cases of noncompliance, HUD ranks mortgagees according to their loss mitigation strategies and foreclosure rates into different tiers ranging from one to four, with four representing mortgagees with the worst loss mitigation records. U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Development, HUD NSC Tier Ranking System,
at http://www.hud.gov/ojfices/hsg/ sfh/nsc/trsovrvw.cfm
(last modified 4 January 2007). HUD has indicated that, while no mortgagee is exempt, it “will focus on Tier 4 mortgagees for review purposes,” and “primarily
*721
concentrate on those mortgagees that engage in little or no loss mitigation.” Treble Damages for Failure To Engage in Loss Mitigation, 70 Fed.Reg. 21,573 (April 26, 2005). Considering this unfortunate reality, we are invited to examine alternative means of enforcement of the HUD regulations in light of one of the NHA’s prime objectives: to preserve home ownership and avoid the devastating financial consequences of foreclosure.
See Topa Equities, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles,
C. Asserting a Defense to Foreclosure via Injunction
Although we conclude that a mortgagor may not wield as a sword the HUD regulations alluded to in a mandatory FHA form deed of trust, there is ample support that aggrieved mortgagors may assert an allegation of regulatory noncompliance as a shield against unauthorized foreclosure actions. The statutory law is clear on the mortgagee’s duty to pursue loss mitigation efforts. The NHA requires that, in the event of a mortgagor default, 8 a mortgagee “shall engage in loss mitigation actions for the purpose of providing an alternative to foreclosure.” 12 U.S.C. § 1715u(a) (2000). The HUD regulation effectuating this mandate states that
[mjortgagees must consider the comparative effects of their elective servicing actions, and must take those appropriate actions which can reasonably be expected to generate the *722 smallest financial loss to the Department. Such actions include, but are not limited to, deeds in lieu of foreclosure under § 203.357, pre-foreclosure sales under § 203.370, partial claims under § 203.414, assumptions under § 203.512, special forbearance under §§ 203.471 and 203.614, and recasting of mortgages under § 203.616.[ 9 ]
24 C.F.R. § 203.501. The statutory and regulatory language frames participation in loss mitigation activities as a mandatory endeavor by the use of the terms “shall” and “must,” respectively.
State v. Green,
*723 Neal directs our attention to certain recent HUD policy initiatives with respect to the loss mitigation requirements in the FHA-insured loan program as support for his theory that HUD contemplated that individual borrowers be empowered to initiate private lawsuits against noncompliant lenders. Not only has HUD taken positions in other litigation contrary to Neal’s theory, 10 language contained in the sources cited by Neal further convince us that HUD envisioned that borrowers might invoke only defensively the NHA and associated HUD regulations.
Neal cites first to language contained in a “Notice of Policy” statement published by HUD in the Federal Register addressing the creation of mortgage instruments for use in the FHA mortgage insurance program. We reproduce the relevant portion of the Noticе with emphasis on the language Neal believes to be an indication that mortgagors may sue mortgagees for regulatory noncompliance:
A commenter made specific suggestions to eliminate language referring to regulations issued by the Secretary in the default section of the mortgage instrument as well as other similar references. The commenter noted that such language would create foreclosure proceedings that would be more time consuming and expensive. The borrower’s attorneys could commence exhaustive discovery to determine whether the lender met all of the servicing requirements. We rejected the commenter’s suggestions that the references to regulations by the Secretary will impair the lender’s ability to successfully defend a suit. HUD does not intend to create a cоnflict between the mortgage language and regulations, and there should be no adverse impact of informing the borrower that some regulations procedures exist which limit a lender’s rights to foreclose.
*724 Requirements for Single Family Mortgage Instruments, 54 Fed.Reg. 27,599 (June 29, 1989). While the highlighted language, standing alone, appears to support Neal’s contention, the context belies his argument. The Notice’s remarks regarding the defense of a suit were tied to a commenter’s suggestions that the inclusion in FHA mortgage instruments of references to certain HUD regulations would complicate foreclosure proceedings because it would allow borrowers to delay the foreclosure by raising the issue of regulatory compliance. This persuades us that the “defense of a suit” mentioned in the Notice wаs a reference to the lender’s ability to proceed with the foreclosure despite a borrower’s knowledge that HUD regulations limit a lender’s ability to accelerate or foreclose on a mortgage. Further, we note that the Notice frames the inclusion of the regulations in the mortgage instrument as a means to “inform [ ] the borrower” of the proper procedures, but does not mention anything about empowering mortgagors to maintain a private cause of action against noncomplying mortgagees.
More pointedly, the paragraph following the one containing the language cited by Neal twice states that mortgagors may assert a violation of the HUD regulations as a defense, presumably to a foreclosure action by the mortgagee. We recite below the Notice language:
We note that the proposed mortgage language does not incorporate all of HUD’s servicing requirements into the mortgage, but simply prevents acceleration and foreclosure on the basis of the mortgage language when foreclosure would not be permitted by HUD regulations. For example, 24 C.F.R. § 203.606 specifically prohibits a mortgagee from foreclosing unless three full monthly payments due on the mortgage are unpaid. As long as this requirement remains in the regulations, we do not expect mortgagees to violate it even though the mortgage fails to repeat the requirement, and we believe that a borrower could appropriately raise the regulatory violation in his or her defense. If a mortgagee has violated parts of the servicing regulations which do not specifically state prerequisites to acceleration *725 or foreclosure, however, the reference to regulations in the mortgage would not be applicable. HUD retains the general position recited in 24 C.F.R. § 203.500, that whether a mortgagee’s refusal or failure to complg with servicing regulations is a legal defense is a matter to be determined by the courts.
Requirements for Single Family Mortgage Instruments, 54 Fed.Reg. 27,599 (June 29, 1989) (emphasis added). This language is in accord with several court decisions holding that a mortgagor may invoke a mortgagee’s noncompliance with the HUD regulations as an affirmative defense in a foreclosure proceeding.
See, e.g., Williams v. Nat’l Sch. of Health Tech., Inc.,
Neal, however, counters that Maryland law renders ineffective the possibility of asserting regulatory noncompliance as a defense to a foreclosure action. He claims that the prominent cases recognizing the noncompliance argument are effective only as an equitable defense in jurisdictions utilizing judicial foreclosure.
See, e.g., Fleet Real Estate Funding Corp.,
Specifically, Neal asserts that our holding in
Greenbriar Condo
vitiates any defensive utility of the pre-sale injunction procedure in situations such as are alleged in the present case. He states that
Greenbriar Condo
limits to the pre-sale injunction procedure a mortgagor’s opportunity to present issues relating to the mortgagee’s entitlement to seek foreclosure, including matters of whether a debt is delinquent or amenable to acceleration.
Notwithstanding Neal’s protestations, we are of the opinion that the violations of the HUD mortgage servicing regulations alleged of Wells Fargo by Neal may be asserted effectively as an affirmative defense within the injunctive relief apparatus provided in Rule 14—209(b)(1).
11
As the Rule states, a movant must (1) either admit or deny that an amount of debt is due and payable, (2) if an amount is admitted, state that the amount has been paid into the court, and (3) provide a detailed statement of facts, demonstrating one of the following: (a) the debt and interest has been paid fully, (b) there is no default, or (c) the mortgage was obtained by the mortgagee through fraud. Both the Rule and our cases establish firmly the principle that if a default is admitted, the mortgagor must post a bond with, or otherwise pay into, the court for the full amount of the mortgage and any applicable interest.
Golds-
*728
borough v. County Trust Co. of Md.,
The foreclosure procedure in Maryland is equitable in nature.
Plaza Corp. v. Alban Tractor Co.,
The clean hands doctrine states that “courts of equity will not lend their aid to anyone seeking their active interposition, who has been guilty of fraudulent, illegal, or inequitable conduct in the matter with relation to which he
*730
seeks assistance.”
Hlista,
*731
The invocation and application of equity principles produces not only a process that is fundamentally fair to the parties and prevents the Court from rewarding inequitable conduct,
Adams,
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FREDERICK COUNTY TO CONSOLIDATE RESPONDENT’S ACTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF WITH THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING, DISMISS RESPONDENT’S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, AND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BY THE PARTIES.
Notes
. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (2000).
. The couple is now divorced. Sheri Neal is not, and never has been, a party to this case.
. 12 U.S.C. § 1709(b) (1988). Section 203(b) permits qualified borrowers to purchase mortgage insurance, which guarantees payment of the loan by the FHA in the event of the borrower’s default. This program allows low—and moderate-income borrowers to obtain financing from reputable lenders and, in turn, insulates those lenders from the losses associated with default and foreclosure.
. Nеal fashioned his second count as a request for “DECLARATORY RELIEF PURSUANT TO C & JP SEC. 3-403.” He asked the Circuit Court to declare that the "Defendant may not initiate any foreclosure proceeding until such time as the defendant has complied with all conditions precedents
[sic]
incorporated in the parties’ agreement.” As the Court of Special Appeals noted, such a request is of an injunctive nature.
Neal v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.,
. Wells Fargo asserted in the Circuit Court that it made several attempts, in compliance with the HUD regulations, to avoid foreclosure under Neal’s deed of trust. In the instant case seeking review of the grant of summary judgment, the sole legal issue is whether the HUD regulations may be invoked either to create a private contract action or, alternatively, provide a defense to a foreclosure action. Wеlls Fargo’s compliance or noncompliance with those regulations has no bearing on the resolution of this exclusively legal and sole question before us now. Whether Wells Fargo complied with the relevant HUD regulations may be resolved in the Circuit Court’s resolution of Neal’s request for injunctive relief, which, as explained infra, may proceed.
. The FHA requires that participants in its mortgage insurance program utilize the form deed of trust prepared by the agency.
See
24 C.F.R. § 203.17(a)(2)(i);
see also Warren v. Gov’t Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n,
. The original mortgagee-assignor also had no control over the substantive terms of the contract. Although the first page of the deed indicates that it was "prepared by Margaretten & Co., Inc.,” the deed neverthe *719 less was a prefabricated FHA form with blanks to be filled in with the аppropriate facts as applicable to the parties (i.e. names, addresses, purchase price, identity of the property, etc.). In that sense only was the deed "prepared” by Margaretten & Co., Inc.
. The applicable provision of the Code of Federal Regulations defines a "default” as a scenario where "the mortgagor fails to make any payment or to perform any other obligation under the mortgage, and such failure continues for a period of 30 days....” 24 C.F.R. § 203.331(a).
. Also included among the required loss mitigation efforts, and alleged by Neal not to have been attempted by Wells Fargo in this case, is a required face-to-face interview between the mortgagor and mortgagee before three months of delinquency accrues. 24 C.F.R. § 203.604(b).
.
See, e.g., Vaughn v. Consumer Home Mortgage, Inc.,
. The Rule provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Injunction to Stay Foreclosure. (1) Motion. The debtor, any party to the lien instrument, or any person who claims under the debtor a right to or interest in the property that is subordinate to the lien being foreclosed, may file a motion for an injunction to stay any sale or any proceedings after a sale under these rules. The motion shall not be granted unless the motion is supported by affidavit as to all facts asserted and contains: (1) a statement as to whether the moving party admits any amount of the debt to be due and payable as of the date the motion is filed, (2) if an amount is admitted, a statement that the moving party has paid the amount into court with the filing of the motion, and (3) a detailed statement of facts, showing that: (A) the debt and all interest due thereon have been fully paid, or (B) there is no default, or (C) fraud was used by the secured party, or with the secured party’s knowledge, in obtaining the lien.
. We are ill-equipped, on the current record, to assess whether Neal's allegations regarding Wells Fargo's noncompliance with the HUD loss mitigation regulations are sufficient. As we noted
supra
at 5, n. 5, Wells Fargo alleges that it acted to comply with its loss mitigation responsibilities. We leave for the trial court, on remand, to decide whether Neal, in his pursuit of injunctive relief, is able to substantiate his affirmative defense. As with all affirmative defenses, Neal bears the burden of proof.
See, e.g., Newell v. Richards,
