Case Information
*1 Filed: 12/17/2014
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., B253861 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC522081) v.
THE BEST SERVICE CO., INC.,
Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Terry A.
Green, Judge. Dismissed.
Law Offices of Clark Garen, Clark Garen and Rachel Zwernemann, for Defendant and Appellant.
Carroll, Burdick & McDonough LLP, Daniel H. Wu, Nathaniel K. Fisher and Molly K. Madden, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant, The Best Service Co., Inc., appeals from a December 20, 2013 order denying its motion to stay the action pending arbitration. Defendant did not concurrently file a petition to compel arbitration. We dismiss the appeal because the trial court’s denial of the stay motion unaccompanied by any motion or petition to compel arbitration or a pending arbitration is not an appealable order.
II. BACKGROUND
On September 20, 2013, plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., filed a declaratory and injunctive relief complaint. On September 30, 2013, defendant sent plaintiff a demand for mediation and arbitration pursuant to a dispute resolution provision in a February 27, 2008 servicing agreement between the parties. On October 9, 2013, plaintiff rejected defendant’s mediation and arbitration demand. On October 24, 2013, defendant moved to stay the action pending compliance with the arbitration demand. No petition or motion to compel arbitration was filed. No petition to compel compliance with the mediation provision of the parties’ servicing agreement was filed. In its reply, defendant stressed the stay motion was not a petition to compel arbitration. Defendant argued: “[Plaintiff] seeks to mis-characterize this [m]otion as a [m]otion to [c]ompel [a]rbitration. This [m]otion is not a [m]otion to [c]ompel [a]rbitration. [Defendant] has never asked this [c]ourt to [c]ompel [a]rbitration. All [defendant] has asked this [c]ourt to do is issue a stay of the within civil case until the parties have completed mediation followed by arbitration in accordance with the contractual terms.”
III. DISCUSSION
The right to appeal is statutory. (
Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v. Superior
Court
(2010)
Defendant asserts its appeal of the order denying a stay is an appeal from an order denying arbitration. This is despite the fact defendant never filed a motion or petition to compel arbitration. Defendant contends the trial court in effect ruled on a motion to compel arbitration by ruling plaintiff’s claims were not arbitrable. At the December 20, 2013 hearing, the trial court expressed its doubts that the complaint’s declaratory and injunctive relief claims were not subject to the arbitration provision. But the trial court never ruled the plaintiff’s claims were arbitrable. At the outset of the hearing, the trial court stated defendant’s motion was for a stay of the action pending arbitration. Moreover, the December 20, 2013 minute order states, “The [c]ourt, having read and considered the documents filed and all oral argument, denies the [m]otion of [d]efendant to [s]tay [a]ction [p]ending [a]rbitration.” Neither the trial court’s oral statements nor written ruling purported to resolve the arbitrability issue.
Defendant contends the order denying a stay pending arbitration is the equivalent
of an order refusing to compel arbitration. At the outset, we emphasize there is no
pending arbitration nor was any effort made to compel such. In any event, defendant
*4
relies on
Henry v. Alcove Investment, Inc.
(1991)
The Court of Appeal discussed the benefits of arbitration and why there is a right
to appeal from an order denying a petition or motion to compel arbitration: “We note the
advantages of arbitration include ‘a presumptively less costly, more expeditious manner’
of resolving disputes. (
Keating v. Superior Court
(1982)
Here, unlike Henry , there is no pending arbitration. Nor did defendant file a motion or petition to compel arbitration. Thus, there is no oral or written order dismissing or denying a petition or motion to compel arbitration. There is no functional equivalent of an order dismissing or denying a petition or motion to compel arbitration. This is because no arbitration is pending nor was any effort made to compel plaintiff to arbitrate its claims. Henry is not controlling authority.
Likewise, this case is distinguishable from
MKJA, Inc. v. 123 Fit Franchising,
LLC
(2011)
Here, defendant is appealing from the trial court’s refusal to stay the litigation. But, the defendant’s stay motion was not not made in conjunction with a denial of a petition to compel arbitration or its functional equivalent. In its stay motion, defendant stated, “No previous [p]etition to [c]ompel [a]rbitration has been made, granted or is under consideration, or is being made concurrently with this motion.” In its reply, defendant asserted the stay motion is not a petition to compel arbitration. As noted, the December 20, 2013 minute order from which defendant appeals from stated, “The [c]ourt, having read and considered the documents filed and all oral argument, denies the [m]otion of [d]efendant to [s]tay [a]ction [p]ending [a]rbitration.” Sections 1294 and 1294.2 do not provide a basis for appellate jurisdiction under these circumstances.
Finally, the trial court’s order denying the stay of action pending arbitration is not
reviewable pursuant to section 1294.2. Section 1294.2 permits an appellate court to
review an intermediate ruling or order upon appeal from an order or judgment under
section 1294. Because there was no separate appealable order under section 1294,
subdivision (a), the trial court’s order denying the stay pending arbitration is a
nonappealable interlocutory order. (
Valentine Capital Asset Management, Inc. v. Agahi,
supra,
IV. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., shall recover its costs incurred on appeal from defendant, The Best Service Co., Inc.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION TURNER, P. J.
We concur:
MOSK, J.
KRIEGLER, J.
Notes
[1] Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
