{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal, we review an opinion of the Ninth District Court of Appeals that interpreted Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald,
II. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On April 19, 2010, plaintiff-appellant, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., filed a foreclosure action against Brian and Carol Horn for allegedly defaulting on a promissory note. The complaint’s caption named the plaintiff as: “Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. successor by merger to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. fka Norwest Mortgage, Inc.” The complaint alleged that the Horns were immune from liability on the note because they had gone through bankruptcy. Consequently, Wells Fargo sought to foreclose against only the mortgage that provided a security interest in the note. Attached to the complaint were several exhibits. One purports to be a copy of a promissory note endorsed in blank, identifying Norwest Mortgage as the lender and the Horns as the borrowers. The other purports to be a copy of a mortgage that secured the note, again identifying the Horns as the borrowers and Norwest Mortgage as the lender.
{¶ 3} Acting pro se, appellee, Brian Horn, filed a “Response to Complaint.” Wells Fargo then filed a motion for summary judgment. Horn hired counsel, who filed a formal answer that asserted numerous defenses, including that Wells Fargo “may not be the real party in interest and lacks standing to bring said claim against [Horn].”
{¶ 4} Wells Fargo filed an amended motion for summary judgment that included the assertion that as the holder of the note and mortgage at the time the complaint was filed, it had standing to bring the action. In support, Wells Fargo submitted the affidavit of Adam Seeman, a Default Litigation Specialist for Wells Fargo, who averred, among other things, that Norwest Mortgage, Inc., had changed its name to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., in 2000, that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., had later merged into Wells Fargo, and that Wells Fargo was the holder of the note and mortgage prior to the filing of the complaint. Accompanying the affidavit were a “Certificate of Amendment to Foreign Corpo
{¶ 5} Horn, again acting pro se, appealed, asserting four assignments of error, none of which challenged the conclusion of the magistrate and the trial court that Wells Fargo had standing to bring the foreclosure suit.
{¶ 6} However, rather than considering Horn’s assignments of error, the court of appeals sua sponte considered the issue of standing. The court of appeals, relying on Schwartzwald,
{¶ 7} We initially declined to accept Wells Fargo’s discretionary appeal.
III. Analysis
A. Standing Generally
{¶ 8} Generally speaking, standing is “[a] party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1625 (10th Ed.2014). “It is an elementary concept of law that a party lacks standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the subject matter of the action.” State ex rel.
Standing is certainly a jurisdictional requirement; a party’s lack of standing vitiates the party’s ability to invoke the jurisdiction of a court — • even a court of competent subject-matter jurisdiction — over the party’s attempted action. But an inquiry into a party’s ability to invoke a court’s jurisdiction speaks to jurisdiction over a particular case, not subject-matter jurisdiction.
(Citations omitted and emphasis sic.) Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta,
B. Schwartzwald’s Requirements for Standing
{¶ 9} Because the Ninth District Court of Appeals relied on our holding in Schwartzwald,
{¶ 10} In Schwartzwald, the Schwartzwalds executed a promissory note and a mortgage granting a security interest to Legacy Mortgage when they purchased a home. Id. at ¶ 5. Legacy Mortgage later endorsed the note as payable to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and also assigned the mortgage to Wells Fargo. Id. More than two years after they purchased the home, the Schwartzwalds defaulted on the loan and agreed with Wells Fargo to a short sale of the property. Id. at ¶ 6. Subsequently, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“FHLMC”) filed a foreclosure action against the Schwartzwalds. FHLMC attached to its complaint a copy of the mortgage that identified the Schwartzwalds as the borrowers and Legacy as the lender but did not attach a copy of the note. Id. at ¶ 7. It was only after FHLMC filed its foreclosure complaint that Wells Fargo assigned the Schwartzwalds’ note and mortgage to FHLMC. Id. at ¶ 10. Because FHLMC did not have an interest in the note or mortgage at the time it filed the foreclosure action, it was undisputed that FHLMC was not
{¶ 11} The only question before this court was whether a plaintiffs lack of standing can be cured after the foreclosure complaint is filed. In answering that question, we held:
[Standing is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court, and therefore it is determined as of the filing of the complaint. Thus, receiving an assignment of a promissory note and mortgage from the real party in interest subsequent to the filing of an action but prior to the entry of judgment does not cure a lack of standing to file a foreclosure action.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 3.
{¶ 12} The import of our holding in Schwartzwald is that the plaintiff in a foreclosure action must have standing at the time that it files its complaint. But nowhere in the opinion did this court indicate that the plaintiff must also submit proof of standing at that time. Thus, we agree with the observation that “Schwartzwald does not stand for the proposition that a foreclosure plaintiff must definitively prove in its complaint that it has standing.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Hafford, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-13-021,
C. Allegations in a Complaint and Standing
{¶ 13} To require a plaintiff to attach proof of standing to a foreclosure complaint would also run afoul of Ohio’s notice-pleading requirements. Civ.R. 7(A) provides that a civil action may be initiated by filing a complaint. Civ.R. 8(A) states that a pleading, including a complaint, shall set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief.” Civ.R. 8(E)(1) states that “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” “The purpose of ‘notice’ pleading is clear: ‘to simplify pleadings to a “short and plain statement of the claim” and to simplify statements of the relief demanded, Civ.R. 8(A), to the end that the adverse party will receive fair notice of the claim and an opportunity to prepare his response thereto.’ ” Anderson v. BancOhio Natl. Bank, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-840913,
[W]hile a foreclosure plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in its complaint to demonstrate that it has standing, Schwartzwald does not stand for the proposition that a foreclosure plaintiff must definitively prove in its complaint that it has standing. Indeed, such a requirement would run counter to our established system of justice. See York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol,60 Ohio St.3d 143 , 144-145,573 N.E.2d 1063 (1991) (“Under [the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure], a plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case at the pleading stage”).
Hafford,
D. Civ.R. 10 Is Inapplicable
{¶ 14} While the court of appeals’ opinion did not address Civ.R. 10, Wells Fargo addresses it in its brief, and both parties addressed it at oral argument. Consequently, we address Civ.R. 10(D) in our analysis to clarify that it has no role in resolving whether Wells Fargo has standing in this case.
{¶ 15} Civ.R. 10(D)(1) states that when a claim or defense is based on an account or other written instrument, a party must attach a copy of the account or written instrument to the pleading. And some appellate courts have held that Civ.R. 10(D) requires a plaintiff seeking foreclosure to attach documentation regarding the loan. See, e.g., Beneficial Mtge. of Ohio v. Jacobs, 2d Dist. Clark No. 01CA0080,
{¶ 16} However, failing to attach documents to a complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 10(D)(1) does not equate to a lack of standing. A defendant’s recourse for such a failure is to file a motion for a more definite statement under Civ.R. 12(E). Fletcher v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland,
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 17} Accordingly, we hold that although the plaintiff in a foreclosure action must have standing at the time suit is commenced, proof of standing may be submitted subsequent to the filing of the complaint.
{¶ 18} At oral argument, Horn asserted that there were no allegations in Wells Fargo’s complaint asserting that it was the successor in interest to Norwest Mortgage, Inc. However, the complaint needed only to set forth a short and plain statement of the claim showing that Wells Fargo was entitled to relief. Civ.R. 8(A). The complaint’s allegation that Wells Fargo was the holder of the Horns’ note was sufficient to show for pleading purposes that Wells Fargo was the real party in interest and that it was arguably entitled to a decree of foreclosure. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, Natl. Assn. v. Fallon, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 13CA3,
{¶ 19} After filing the complaint, Wells Fargo submitted proof of standing regarding the fact that it was the real party in interest through an affidavit and other documents attached to its motion for summary judgment. Its affiant, a Default Litigation Specialist for Wells Fargo, averred that in 2000, Norwest Mortgage, Inc., changed its name to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., and in 2004, Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., merged into Wells Fargo, the plaintiff here. Documents attached to the motion for summary judgment confirmed the name change and merger and the timing of each event. These materials verified that Wells Fargo had standing to file the foreclosure action against the Horns at the time that it filed the complaint in 2010.
{¶ 20} Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, reinstate Wells Fargo’s foreclosure action, and remand the cause to the court of appeals to resolve Horn’s assignments of error, which were never addressed.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Notes
. “ ‘Subject-matter jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear and decide a case upon its merits’ and ‘defines the competency of a court to render a valid judgment in a particular action.’ ” Cheap Escape Co., Inc. v. Haddox, L.L.C.,