OPINION & ORDER
Respondents Reagan Tucker (“Tucker”), Benjamin Dooley (“Dooley”) and Marvin Glasgold (“Glasgold”) (collectively the “Respondents”) commenced an arbitration proceeding before the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) against their former employer, Wells Fargo Advisors, L.L.C. (“Wells Fargo”), raising class-wide and collective claims for unpaid overtime. In response, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. (“FAA”), Wells Fargo filed a Petition to Dismiss or in the Alternative Stay the Pending Arbitration and Compel Individual Arbitration in Accordance With the Binding Arbitration Agreements (“Petition”). For the following reasons, Wells Fargo’s Petition is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
I. Respondents’ Arbitration Action
Respondents are former Wells Fargo financial advisors who were employed at Wells Fargo branch offices in New York and Texas between July 2011 and August 2013. Petition ¶¶ 10-12. In connection with their employment, each Respondent signed a “New Financial Advisor Training Agreement” (the “Agreement”), pursuant to which each agreed to arbitrate “any controversy or dispute” with Wells Fargo. See Declaration of Kenneth J. Turnbull in Support of Petition (“Turnbull Deck”), Exs. AC.
Paragraph 14 of the Agreement provides in pertinent part:
you agree that any controversy or dispute, including but not limited to, claims of wrongful termination, breach of contract, discrimination, harassment, retaliation, infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with business or contract, federal, state or local statute or ordinance and/or other theory, arising between you and Wells Fargo Advisors, shall be submitted for arbitration before FINRA. If the FINRA does not accept the controversy, dispute or claim, or any portion thereof, then the nonaccepted controversy, dispute or claim shall be submitted for arbitration before the American Arbitration Association pursuant to its Securities Arbitration Rules, effective May 1,1993.
On July 23, 2015, Respondents initiated identical putative class actions with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) and the AAA, asserting, inter alia, claims for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”). See
Because Rule 13204 of the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes prohibits class action claims from being arbitrated by FINRA, see Memorandum in Support of the Petition to Dismiss or in the Alternative Stay the Pending Arbitration and Compel Individual Arbitration in Accordance With the Binding Arbitration Agreements (“Mem.”) at 4; see also Cohen v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc.,
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
The Federal Arbitration Act “is an expression of a ‘strong federal policy favoring arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.’ ” Ross v. Am. Express Co.,
“[Disputes about ‘arbitrability’.... such as ‘whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause,’ or ‘whether an arbitration clause in a con-cededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy’ ” are presumptively “gateway” issues for the court to decide. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, — U.S. —,
narrow circumstance where contracting parties would likely have expected a court to have decided the gateway matter, where they are not likely to have thought that they had agreed that an arbitrator would do so, and, consequently, where reference of the gateway dispute to the court avoids the risk of forcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well not have agreed to arbitrate.
Howsam,
As to the scope of an arbitration agreement, the court’s determination generally “depends on whether the agreement is a broad agreement or a narrow one.” Edwards v. Macy’s Inc., No. 14CV-8616(CM)(JLC),
Here, the parties do not dispute that the arbitration clause included in Respondents’ Agreements is valid and binding. Nor do the parties dispute that Respondents’ underlying FLSA and NYLL claims fall squarely within the scope of the arbitration clause. The parties’ dispute focuses instead upon: (1) whether, under the terms of the applicable arbitration clause, Respondents are entitled to (or precluded from) arbitrating on a collective or class-wide basis, and, (2) who, as between the Court and the arbitrator, must make that determination in the first instance.
I. The Arbitrator Should Determine Whether Respondents May Proceed on a Collective or Class-wide Basis
While the Supreme Court and Second Circuit have yet to issue binding precedent, the weight of authority among district courts in this Circuit is that the arbitrator, rather than the Court, should decide questions regarding the availability of class arbitration. See, e.g., Rossi v. SCI Funeral Servs. of New York, Inc., No. 15CV473(ERK)(VMS),
In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,
[T]he relevant question here is what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to. ... Arbitrators are well situated to answer that question. Given these considerations, along with the arbitration contracts’ sweeping language concerning the scope of the questions committed to arbitration, this matter ofcontract interpretation should be for the arbitrator, not the courts, to decide.
Id. (emphasis omitted). Justice Stevens did not join the plurality opinion, but commented in a separate opinion that “[arguably the interpretation of the parties agreement should have been made in the first instance by the arbitrator, rather than the court.” Id. at 455,
The plurality opinion in Bazzle has since been qualified, but not rejected, by the Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,
In AT&T Mobility LLC, the Supreme Court invalidated,' as preempted by the FAA, a California Supreme Court decision that “classified] most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable.”
Finally, in Oxford Health Plans LLC, the Supreme Court affirmed an arbitrator’s decision to permit class arbitration where the parties agreed to submit the issue to an arbitrator but noted that it “would face a different issue if [the petitioner] had argued below that the availability of class arbitration is a ... ‘question of arbitrability ” for the courts to decide.
In the wake of Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and Oxford,'the Third, Fourth and Sixth Circuits
In particular, the Court finds the decisions in In re A2P SMS Antitrust Litig., No. 12 CV 2656,
Similarly, in Edwards, Judge McMahon granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration but held that “it is clear that the issue of whether the [applicable arbitration language] authorizes class-wide arbitration is for the arbitrators in the first instance, not for the court.”
Petitioner’s attempt to distinguish those cases is unavailing. With respect to In re A2P SMS, Petitioner encourages the Court to reject Judge Nathan’s holding based on her acknowledgment that the availability of class arbitration is an issue that contracting parties could conceivably expect a court to resolve. Reply at 5 n.2 (quoting In re A2P SMS,
With respect to Edwards, Petitioner argues that the court’s holding was conditioned on its finding that the applicable arbitration agreement was “not silent” on the issue of class arbitration because it permitted multiple parties to “consolidate their claims.” Reply at 6 n.3 (citing Edwards,
Here, as in Edwards, the Court finds that this conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the governing AAA rules in operation at the time the Agreements were executed, and at the time arbitration was sought, grant the arbitrator authority to resolve all questions of contract interpretation, including gateway issues. Although AAA’s Securities Arbitration Rules, effective May 1,1993 (the “1993 Rules”), do not expressly address who decides questions of class arbitration, Section 1 of the 1993 Rules states: “These rules and any amendment of them shall apply in the form obtaining at the time the demand for arbitration ... is received by the AAA.” Turnbull Decl., Ex. G at 8. In 1999, the 1993 Rules were replaced by the Securities Arbitration Supplementary Procedures and the Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, which provide that an arbitrator has the “power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.” Resp. Opp. at 9 (citing AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures). Without deciding whether the incorporation of the 1993 Rules, and in turn the Supplementary Procedures and the Commercial Arbitration Rules, demonstrates that the parties “clearly and unmistakably” delegated the question of class arbitration to an arbitrator, Howsam,
Petitioner also argues that this case must be dismissed or stayed on “first-filed” grounds based on the Williams Action. See Mem. at 14.
For the first-filed rule to apply, the two cases at issue must be substantially similar, but they need not be identical. See Castillo,
Here, apart from Respondents’ claim for unpaid overtime wages as to the “Trainee” class, the Court finds there to be little factual or legal overlap between the two suits. Whereas the Williams Action focus
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Wells Fargo’s Petition is DENIED, and the case shall proceed to arbitration; the arbitrator shall determine the availability of class or collective arbitration in accordance with the operative AAA rules.
Respondents have requested that the Court order Petitioner to show cause why this action should not be dismissed. Resp. Opp. at 15. The Second Circuit has held that district courts lack discretion to dismiss fully-referred arbitration cases when at least one party has requested a stay. See Katz v. Cellco P’ship,
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The Ninth Circuit has also issued an unpublished opinion endorsing the same view. See Eshagh v. Terminix Int’l Co., L.P.,
. Respondents attempt to distinguish Anwar by arguing that there, the court relied entirely on its authority to interpret its prior order compelling arbitration, and, as a result did not fully consider whether class arbitration is a "gateway” issue. See Resp. Opp. at 4; see also Anwar,
. The Court also notes that the interlocutory appeal in that case was subsequently withdrawn. See Order, In re A2P SMS Antitrust Litig., No, 15-758, Dkt. 15 (2d. Cir. Apr. 3, 2015).
. In addition, given that the concept of contractual ''silence’’ arose in the peculiar circumstances present in Stolt-Nielsen, where the parties had specifically agreed that the governing arbitration language did not address class arbitration, see Oxford, — U.S. —,
In any event, the Court need not decide whether courts "should decide the issue of silence” because here, as in Edwards, “there is language that is capable of being construed in one of several ways on the issue.” Edwards,
. While Petitioner argues that other authority from this Circuit militates in support of its position, its cited' cases are inapposite because they do not reach the threshold question of “who decides” the question of class arbitration. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP,
. Prior to this action being filed and prior to the Respondents initiating their arbitration proceedings, on March 20, 2014, former Wells Fargo employee Erika Williams filed a putative class and collective action complaint against Wells Fargo in the Northern District of Illinois' (the "Williams Action”). See Mem. at 4 (citing Turnbull Deck Ex. F. (the “Williams Compl.”)). Williams asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, FLSA, Illinois labor law and state common law, Williams Compl, ¶ 1, challenging Wells Fargo’s practice of recouping "training costs” from financial adviser trainees’ wages if such trainees subsequently leave Wells Fargo or are terminated, Williams Compl. ¶¶ 7-8. Williams further alleged that Wells Fargo discriminated against her and other African-American financial adviser trainees. Id. ¶¶ 22-27. She sought class certification of her claims under Illinois law and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and collective or class certification of a' sub-class of African American trainees who were forced to execute agreements requiring repayment of so-called "Training Costs” in the event of separation from the firm. Id. ¶ 20.
