Wells Eddleman v. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWells Eddleman v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
George Paul Bollwerk, III, Office of the Gen. Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com‘n (William C. Parler, Gen. Counsel, William H. Briggs, Jr., Sol., E. Leo Slaggie, Deputy Sol., Edward J. Shawaker, Jr., Asst. Chief, Appellate Section, Land and Natural Resources Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Vicki L. Plaut, on brief), Thomas A. Baxter (Delissa A. Ridgway, Wilbert Washington, II, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, Richard E. Jones, Dale E. Hollar, Carolina Power & Light Co., on brief), for respondents.
Before PHILLIPS, and CHAPMAN, Circuit Judges, and BRITT, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
CHAPMAN, Circuit Judge:
This petition for review concerns the approval by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of a licensing board‘s decision to grant the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant a full operating license. The petitioners contend that they were wrongly denied fair notice and a full opportunity to address the Commission at its “immediate effectiveness” review, that they were wrongly denied a full adjudicatory hearing on the merits of their “2.206 petition” alleging various safety defects, and that they were wrongly denied a hearing on their objection to the granting to the power plant of an exemption from the literal requirements of
Section 185 of the Atomic Energy Act establishes a two-step regulatory procedure for the construction and licensing of nuclear power plants. The first stage entails the issuance of a construction permit to an applicant whose application meets with the Commission‘s approval; the second involves the issuance of an operating license after the Commission determines that all relevant requirements for the construction and operation of the facilities have been or will be satisfied.
In order to minimize delays in enabling a completed nuclear power plant to commence operation, operating licensing proceedings are conducted simultaneously with plant construction. Often plant construction is completed by the time the licensing board renders its initial decision authorizing the license, but prior to the completion of the Commission‘s formal internal review of the licensing board‘s decision. In order to prevent costly delays following the licensing board‘s initial approval, the Commission has instituted procedures under which a non-merits determination is made by the Commission as to whether the “operating license shall be effective immediately upon issuance....”
The Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant had obtained an operating license from the licensing board on October 24, 1986. Although the formal appellate procedure was ongoing, the Commission pursuant to its practice decided to review the licensing board‘s approval so that the power plant could become immediately effective. The petitioners argue that they were denied adequate notice and an opportunity to present arguments at this January 8, 1987 immediate effectiveness review. The petitioners’ position contains the assumption that the full panoply of procedural rights and protections pertinent to a full adjudicatory hearing attached to this immediate effectiveness review. We find this assumption to be unwarranted. The court in Oystershell Alliance v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 800 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam), held that the Commission is within its discretion in providing in
The petitioners also argue that, even assuming that the Commission was correct in resolving the allegations made in the 2.206 petition without a formal hearing, the Commission was in error in examining facts that were not part of the formal adjudicatory record. It is well-established in case law that the Commission has the right to investigate the substance of a 2.206 petition in order to decide whether the petition raises a substantial health or safety concern justifying an evidentiary hearing. See Porter County, 606 F.2d at 1369. In making this preliminary investigation, there seems to be no reason why the Commission should be limited to the adjudicatory record arising from the licensing hearings, for the simple reason that 2.206 petitions can involve matters unrelated to any issues before the licensing board; indeed, such was the case here.1 The resolution of 2.206 petitions is not part of the licensing procedure, and petitioners’ attempt to limit the scope of the investigation to adjudicated facts misperceives the nature of the inquiry. We hold that the Commission was not in error in examining facts outside the formal record.
Finally, the petitioners argue that the Commission had an obligation to hold a hearing to resolve the power plant‘s exemption requests.
On April 3, 1986, petitioner Eddleman requested from the Director of the NRC a hearing on the nuclear plant‘s exemption request. Because both Eddleman and the defendant apparently were in agreement that the exemption request was outside the ongoing licensing proceedings, the NRC staff referred the hearing request to the Commission for appropriate disposition. On September 12, the Commission advised the parties that it had decided to determine whether there were any contentions that would warrant an evidentiary hearing before it addressed the legal question of whether the Atomic Energy Act granted interested persons any hearing rights on an exemption request. The Commission requested briefs on the issue of whether there were any material issues of fact relative to the exemption request.
The Commission utilized
The petitioners raise several issues regarding the Commission‘s disposition of the exemption request. First, the petitioners state that the Commission utilized the incorrect regulatory provision to determine whether the exemption should be granted. Second, the petitioners argue that the Commission‘s determination was incorrect on the merits. Third, the petitioners argue that a hearing should have been conducted, or in the alternative, the matter should have been referred to the licensing board for resolution.
Regarding the argument that the Commission used the incorrect regulation, it appears that the Commission in resolving exemption requests can use either
Regarding the petitioners’ argument that the exemption should not have been granted on its merits, we find this contention without substance. The petitioners’ arguments primarily concern the merits of the May 1985 ERP and the fact that the ERP took place beyond the one-year limitation. We see no basis in the record to dispute the Commission‘s judgment as to the adequacy of these safety procedures.
Concerning the lack of a hearing, the petitioners note that the exemption request was granted formally by the Commission in its authorization to the NRC staff to issue a full-power operating license to the power plant, and to include, if appropriate, an exemption from the requirement for an exercise of the ERP within one year prior to commencement of operation. The petitioners argue that this event had the effect of amending the license, and they argue that amendments to the license can not be performed absent a hearing. We find this contention premature, because the Commission‘s determination that the complaint did not set forth a contention that could be litigated has the effect of rendering the procedural prerequisites for a Sec. 189(a) formal hearing unmet. We likewise do not find error in the Commission‘s decision not to refer this matter to the licensing board. The licensing board did not have this issue, or any related issue, before it, and thus no advantage could have been gained by such a referral.
The actions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are thus
AFFIRMED.