79 Mo. App. 401 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1899
Counsel for defendant Clark have fairly stated the substance of the petition: Plaintiffs allege that in November, 1895, Tindale was the owner of certain hotel furniture used by him in the hotel in the city of Carthage, of the value of two thousand dollars; that Tindale was renting the building from the defendant; that on November 9, Tindale executed to the First National Bank of Carthage his note for $900, due ninety days after date, with eight per cent interest per annum, which note was signed by defendant Clark as security for said Tindale; that for the purpose of securing said Clark, as such surety, Tindale made and delivered to Clark a chattel mortgage on said hotel furniture, etc.; that during the time Tindale was carrying on said hotel, he contracted debts with plaintiffs, for the amounts set forth in the petition; that afterwards Tindale and Clark connived together, for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding the creditors of Tindale; and that said Tindale transferred to Clark all the aforesaid furniture, etc., owned by said Tindale and used by him in said hotel, without actual consideration; that the possession of said furniture, etc., was delivered by Tindale to Clark, and since that date that Clark had sold the same and converted the same into cash. The petition then set forth the amount due to each one of the plaintiffs and averred that
The answer of the defendant Olark was a general denial.
At the commencement of the trial the defendant Olark objected to the introduction of any testimony, on the ground that the action was one purely for a money demand, and that a court of equity had no jurisdiction. This objection was overruled, and after hearing the testimony, the court rendered a decree, finding the issues in favor of the plaintiffs, and finding, upon accounting: “That there is in the hands of defendant, T. J. Clark, $889.43, which in equity the plaintiffs as creditors of defendant, J. S. Tindale, are entitled to have applied to the payment of their judgments.”
Judgment was thereupon rendered in favor of plaintiffs against defendant T. J. Olark for the several claims, aggregating $389.43, and for costs. In due time defendant Olark filed his motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment,
The question is, whether or not, under the facts stated in the petition, plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law. If so, then clearly they should have pursued that remedy and had no right to resort to equity and thereby deprive defendant of a trial by jury. In our opinion plaintiffs had, on the facts stated, a clear and undoubted legal remedy by garnishment, and the trial court erroneously overruled defendant Clark’s objection to the introduction of any evidence as well as his motion in arrest of judgment.
Conceding the facts to be as alleged in thfe petition and then each of said plaintiffs may have prosecuted a garnishment against defendant Clark for the amount of their respective claims against the debtor Tindale. The case made by the facts alleged was one of an ordinary fraudulent transfer by a failing debtor to one participating in the design to hinder, delay and defraud the creditors of such debtor. The petition alleges, “that said Tindale and said Clark connived together for the purpose of hindering and delaying and defrauding the creditors of said Tindale” and made the sale and delivery of the property “without any actual consideration;” that said Clark took possession of said goods and thereafter sold and “converted the same into cash.” In that case we have held that such proceeds of the fraudulently assigned property may be reached by garnishment sued out by the defrauded creditor. Epstein v. Clothing Co., 67 Mo. App. 221. It was there, as here, contended that the proper way to reach and subject such proceeds arising from the sale of property fraudulently transferred, was by a suit in equity. But, after a full review of the statutes and decisions, it was said: “The personal property, while held in kind by the fraudulent vendee, is clearly, as to creditors, the property
Since, then, under the allegations of the petition, plaintiffs had a legal remedy for the satisfaction of their claims out of the property fraudulently transferred to defendant Clark, it must be held that the petition failed altogether to state a cause of action in equity. In other words the court, sitting in equity, had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.