290 S.W. 1017 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1927
Lead Opinion
The slander charged is as follows: "I went to Hampton Weller's store and saw Miss Anna Weller sitting on John Burrell's lap with her arms around his neck. When she saw me she jumped about ten *1287 feet, and he jumped about that far the other way. I like Mrs. Hampton and think she is a lady, but Anna Weller is a mean woman."
The answer admitted the use of the alleged slanderous language except the expression, "Anna Weller is a mean woman," and pleaded the truth of the language admitted to have been used. The answer also denies that the language used was spoken with malice and pleads in mitigation current rumor to the effect that plaintiff and John Burrell "were very affectionate and attentive to each other." A reply put in issue the new matter pleaded in the answer.
Plaintiff's evidence tended to prove the falsity of the alleged slander and defendant's evidence tended to support the allegations in the answer.
Error is assigned (1) on the refusal to strike out that part of the answer pleading current rumor in mitigation; (2) on the admission of evidence as to specific acts of alleged wrongful conduct on the part of plaintiff; (3) on the rejection of evidence; (4) on the instructions; (5) on the argument of counsel; and (6) on the ground that the trial judge was absent for a time during the argument. The first and second assignments are so related that they may be considered together. Plaintiff contends that evidence of specific acts of alleged misconduct on her part admitted in mitigation as we understand the record was error and prejudicial. The answer does not plead that defendant at the time of the alleged slander had knowledge of specific acts, and no specific acts were pleaded. Evidence of specific acts, under the issues, was incompetent on any theory. [Rose v. Tholborn,
No particular harm came to plaintiff because the motion to strike was overruled. The harm, if any, came by the admission of evidence of specific acts on the issue of plaintiff's general reputation for virtue and chastity. Such evidence was incompetent and prejudicial and should not have been admitted.
The assignment that error was committed by rejecting evidence relates to certain evidence sought to be offered by plaintiff in rebuttal. If the cause is retried there will likely be no occasion for such complaint as here presented, hence it would serve no useful purpose to deal further with this assignment. Also the same may be said of defendant's Instructions 1 and 2. These may be so framed as to leave no room for complaint as here made against them. We do not deem it necessary to say more of the instructions.
It is not necessary to consider other assignments. The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded, and it is so ordered.
Cox, P.J., and Bailey, J., concur.
Addendum
In Hess v. Gansz, the court, after reviewing the authorities said: "But we think it will appear, from the adjudicated cases which we have cited, that the great preponderance of authority is to the effect that in actions of libel and slander, the defendant should be permitted to introduce evidence that the plaintiff's general reputation was bad, in reference to the matters wherein he alleges he is libeled or slandered; and that general rumors, or general report or suspicion of the truth of the libel or slander charged, may be given in evidence by the defendant in mitigation of the damages. And the reason for this is that the action is for injury to the position and standing of the plaintiff among his fellows, by the utterance or publication of *1289 slanders tending to degrade him in their estimation and perhaps expose him to punishment; and the defendant may show that the plaintiff's general reputation is already bad, with a view of showing that no serious injury can have been inflicted upon him."
We find nothing in the two cases above cited or any other to sustain the contention that evidence of specific acts, facts and circumstances pertaining to other indiscretions is competent to prove the truth of the slander charged. No matter how many acts of indiscretion may have been committed by plaintiff, evidence of such acts would not be competent to prove that she sat on Burrell's lap with her arms around his neck. But it is argued that evidence of specific acts, facts and circumstances would be competent to prove that plaintiff was a "mean woman." In Yager v. Bruce,
It is also urged in the motion for rehearing that plaintiff is not in position to complain of the evidence of specific acts, facts and circumstances because timely objection was not made. It is true that while plaintiff and Burrell, as her witness, were on the stand they were asked on cross-examination without objection relative to some matters incompetent, but we do not think that such, in the state of the record here, should be construed as a waiver of the right to object to any of the incompetent evidence, respecting specific acts, facts and circumstances, offered by defendant.
The motion for rehearing should be overruled and it is so ordered. Cox, P.J., and Bailey, J., concur. *1290