275 Pa. 82 | Pa. | 1922
Opinion by
Plaintiff sued to recover damages for malicious prosecution, the result of his arrest on a charge of larceny, by Campbell, one of defendants, a police officer in the employ of defendant railroad company. At the trial of the case the court gave binding instructions in favor of defendant, on the ground that plaintiff failed to prove want of probable cause for his arrest.
The above recited facts are practically undisputed. During the course of the trial plaintiff offered to prove he purchased the goods at different places, or otherwise acquired them in a proper manner; the offer was properly refused. In cases of this character the question is not whether the person charged with crime is guilty of the offense, but what were the indications of his guilt at the time the arrest and prosecution took place. The test is the prosecutor’s belief in the existence of probable cause, based on reasonable grounds existing at that time; accordingly the. inquiry must relate to the facts then known and as they then appeared: Robitzek v. Daum, 220 Pa. 61; Stratton v. Jordan, 77 Pa. Superior Ct. 596, and cases cited. In view of the fact that losses of goods from trains on which plaintiff was employed had occurred shortly before plaintiff’s arrest, that a number of articles similar to those lost were found in his possession, and the quantity of such goods was larger than the average person in plaintiff’s circumstances would purchase and have on hand for his personal use, together with the suspicious circumstance that plaintiff removed the goods from his home at night, immediately following the visit of defendant railroad company’s officer, whom plaintiff knew to be a police officer in its employ, the court below was fully justified in concluding the circumstances were ample to warrant the inference that plain
In the first assignment of error complaint is made of the action of the court in sustaining an objection to a question whether there was produced at the hearing before the justice of the peace evidence that the goods in question were stolen. The refusal to admit this testimony was proper. The question sought to set up the opinion of the witness against the conclusion of the committing magistrate, whose record shows that, after hearing the testimony of several witnesses named, the accused was held in bail for court. The opinion of the Avitness, if permitted, would have furnished no legitimate basis for determining whether probable cause for the arrest existed.
Under the second assignment, plaintiff contends error was committed in receiving evidence of facts learned through declarations or acts of plaintiff’s wife, on the ground that she would not1 have been a competent witness against him, and, consequently, statements made by her were incompetent. While the wife would not have been a competent witness against her husband, there is no rule of law which prevents a third person from instituting criminal proceedings based on facts learned through information given by the wife of the accused. The admission of such facts in evidence is not permitting the wife to testify against her husband: Com. v. Johnson, 213 Pa. 432.
The judgment is affirmed.