22 Conn. App. 552 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1990
The defendant appeals from the judgment rendered following a hearing in damages. He claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied his motion to open the default, (2) denied his request for a continuance, and (3) denied his right to contest the amount of damages at the hearing in damages. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff commenced this action alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The defendant filed an answer and special defenses, including fraud and breach of contract. On November 16,1987, the defendant was served with a request for disclosure and production. A notice of this request was filed with the court. During the course of the trial court proceedings, the plaintiff filed several motions for default based upon the defendant’s failure to comply fully with this request for disclosure and production.
On December 21,1987, the plaintiff moved to default the defendant for his failure to comply. On February 26, 1988, the court indicated that a default would enter if the defendant did not file his compliance by March 18, 1988. On March 17,1988, the defendant filed a notice of compliance with discovery requests, but failed to respond to the plaintiff’s interrogatories. On April 28, 1988, the plaintiff filed a second motion for default. Once again the defendant responded only to the plaintiff’s discovery requests. On May 11, 1988, the plaintiff filed a third motion for default. Pursuant to Practice Book § 21, this motion also requested sanctions because of the defendant’s failure to respond fairly and adequately to the request for disclosure and production. On March 20,1989, the court, Berdon, J., granted the
On May 19,1989, the parties were ordered to appear before a trial referee, Hon. Harold M. Mulvey, and to proceed with the hearing in damages. After this hearing, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $10,685.45.
The defendant first claims that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to open the default. He asserts that he was prevented from opposing the motion for default on March 20,1989 due to a clerical mistake in his counsel’s office. He also contends that he complied with the plaintiff’s request for production and discovery on May 5, 1989.
“ ‘The determination of whether to set aside the default is within the discretion of the trial court.’ . . .” Voluntown v. Rytman, 21 Conn. App. 275, 283, 573 A.2d 336 (1990). “The action of the trial court is not to be disturbed unless it has abused its broad discretion, and in determining whether there has been such abuse every reasonable presumption should be made in favor of its correctness.” Pool v. Bell, 209 Conn. 536, 541, 551 A.2d 1254 (1989). “In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.” DiPalma v. Wiesen, 163 Conn. 293, 298-99, 303 A.2d 709 (1972).
The defendant next claims that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting the continuance he requested, and then rescheduling the hearing in damages for the following day. He argues that the parties informally agreed to a two week extension before going forward on the hearing in damages. The defendant does not contend that such an agreement binds the court. Rather, he argues that the court should have at least inquired whether the defendant was available to appear on the following day, whether a hardship would be caused if he did appear, or whether he would still be engaged in a deposition. The defendant overlooks the obvious, that is, that the court need not have given the
It also bears noting that the defendant was present at the hearing in damages and could show no prejudice from the denial of his request for a two week continuance.
The defendant’s final claim is that he was prevented from submitting evidence regarding the amount of damages. He claims that during the hearing in damages he “attempted to offer a draft notice of defense as an exhibit,” and that evidence was offered as to damages but was not permitted. The defendant’s motion for articulation on this point was denied. No motion for review of the denial of the motion for articulation was filed before this court; and the brief presented to this court by the defendant is insufficient for us to give a proper review of this claim. It is the obligation of the defendant, as appellant, to supply this court with a record adequate to review his claim. State v. Anderson, 209 Conn. 622, 633, 533 A.2d 589 (1989).
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.