Weitzel v. State

863A.2d 999 Mark Edward WEITZEL v. Maryland.

STATE of 44, Sept. No. Term 2004. Appeals Maryland. 21, 2004.

Dec. (Jennifer Lyman, Anne K. Community Olesen P. Legal George Washington School, Clinics of University Law Wash- DC, brief), ington, on petitioner. for (J. Cole, Curran, Atty. Jr., Michelle W. Asst. Joseph Gen. Gen., brief), Atty. respondent. on for BELL, C.J., Argued RAKER, WILNER, before CATHELL, HARRELL, GREENE, BATTAGLIA and JJ.

RAKER, J. case, In this we revisit the “tacit-admission” rule and the issue of admissibility silence in aof law enforcement officer as guilt. substantive evidence of We shall hold that a defendant’s presence Maryland inadmissable under evidence law as guilt. direct evidence of

I. to a paramedics responded police and March On apartments East Baltimore Holabird 911 call from the lying unconscious and Darla Effland County. They discovered only public of a stairwell. injured at the bottom severely petitioner Thomas Crabtree persons present were other investigation, on-scene Balti- Following brief Mark Weitzel. placed Johnson Weitzel County Police Officer Frederick more arrest. under by Jury for Baltimore indicted the Grand

Weitzel was degree attempted murder and first County for the offenses trial, that it intended to Prior to the State indicated assault. as a “tacit admission” that Weitzel at trial evidence introduce silently as told Officer Johnson had sat Crabtree Effland down the stairs. had thrown At a motion in limine to exclude the evidence. Weitzel filed he, Weitzel, motion, testified that hearing a on the Crabtree Effland, purchased had and smoked cocaine the and others fall, had of Effland’s and that he observed Weitzel afternoon preced- within the two hours and drink vodka smoke cocaine also that arrival. Crabtree testified he ing Officer Johnson’s face, in to times the and that punched had Weitzel two three floor,” up in a ball on the where he had “curled Weitzel police until ar- approximately for ten minutes remained Crabtree, approximately According to Weitzel was four rived. the time told away from Crabtree at he Johnson feet stairs. had his had thrown Effland down the Weitzel Weitzel conscious, nothing eyes open appeared but had said since and precisely did not remember what he being punched. Crabtree Johnson, pointed that he had had told but remembered that “he” had thrown Effland down the Weitzel and indicated name, think had did not he used Weitzel’s stairs. Crabtree looking was in his direction did not know whether Weitzel and pointed. when he that he had interviewed Crabtree

Officer Johnson testified had remained silent as presence, and Weitzel Weitzel’s throwing him of Effland down the stairs. Crabtree accused Johnson, stairs, was on he According sitting Weitzel cognizant, display signs and and he did not appeared conscious (not looking of intoxication. Johnson remembered Crabtree Weitzel, him referring at and as “Mark.” Johnson pointing) that he “advised he was under arrest [Weitzel] testified pushing for the victim Effland down degree for first assault stairs,” response no and that Weitzel “made comment” apparently difficulty had no to this statement. Weitzel around, up, commands to stand turn and following Johnson’s station, handcuffing. at Weitzel did submit to Once understood his Miranda rights, asked if respond he questions. provide booking did oral answers to routine but statement, “just a if he wanted to make Weitzel When asked a stare.” also testified that gave blank Johnson [Johnson] swollen,” lips “a little and that Crabtree had Weitzel’s were in the mouth. striking admitted to Weitzel once motion to exclude the The Circuit Court denied Weitzel’s awake, alert, evidence, had reasoning Weitzel been happening. The court ruled that the cognizant of what as a tacit admission the defendant. evidence was admissible trial, At offered evidence of Weitzel’s silence State objected. Weitzel was convicted of the lesser included years degree assault and sentenced to ten offense second incarceration. timely appeal Special to the

Weitzel noted unreported opinion, In an that court affirmed. Appeals. We granted petition for writ of certiorari to consider the Weitzel’s following questions:

(1) law, Whether, a police as matter of officer unlaw- together participation with the defendant’s recent investigation distinct from the offense ful conduct under admissible; ambiguous too to pre-arrest renders silence be (2) Whether, law, as a matter of officer together possibility impairment with the of mental on the ambigu- of too part the defendant renders silence admissible; ous to be

455 (8) its discretion admit- court abused the trial Whether a admission as tacit of Mr. Weitzel’s silence ting evidence his explanations for equally plausible there other were silence. (2004).

Weitzelv. Md. 851 A.2d 596 381 inher- court, argues that his silence was this Before to jury only speculate as ambiguous, in that a could ently assault, guilt as it an admission of to whether reflected drug illegal of attempt than an to avoid detection his rather head merely of intoxication recent or effects use that, not if his were He also contends even silence trauma. law, its abused as a matter of the Circuit Court inadmissable person when it concluded that a reasonable discretion to accusa- position responded would have Crabtree’s Weitzel’s if false. tion argues ambiguous, was that Weitzel’s silence not

The State capable a that Weitzel was supports that the record conclusion responding to accusa- understanding Crabtree’s both any harmless suggests further error tion. State a doubt. beyond reasonable

II. trial permitted court the State use Weitzel’s guilt. as evidence of his This evidence silence substantive silence, i.e., commonly “pre-arrest” to as refusal referred yet a has been person or answer who not speak questions Miranda rights usually and is not under arrest.1 read Ohio, 610, 619, Doyle v. S.Ct. 49 L.Ed.2d In 426 U.S. use, (1976), Supreme any States Court held adverse United impeachment, post-arrest, post for -Miranda whether substantive or rights. v. process violates In Jenkins silence a defendant’s due Anderson, 231, 239, U.S. S.Ct. 65 L.Ed.2d (1980), may be cross- the Court admitted on held credibility. impeach The Court com- examination defendant's Weir, U.S. mented further on the use of silence in Fletcher 1309, 1312, (1982), holding the use 102 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 490 pre-Miranda not post-arrest, impeachment purposes does for process. yet has of the offend due The Court addressed the issue guilt. pre-arrest, pre-Miranda substantive evidence of use of silence as 456 matter,

As á threshold by State, Weitzel is Key-El met v. 811, 349 (1998), Md. 709 A.2d 1305 Court, in which this in a 4- decision, 3 pre-arrest held that silence be admissible against a defendant if it prerequisites satisfies the for use as a 818, tacit admission. Id. at 709 A.2d at 1308. Petitioner in that case contended that pre-arrest evidence of in police of a officer should be se per inadmissible as a or, matter of evidentiary-law, alternative, in the that it should be inadmissible as a violation of right against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 709 A.2d at 1306. We sur- veyed the views of our sister states on the issue of whether pre-arrest give silence can ever rise to a tacit admission accused a police present, officer is recognized split in authority in both the state courts and federal circuits. A majority of the considering federal courts the issue had ruled that pre-arrest silence could not be used as substantive guilt evidence of government’s case chief. Since Key-El decided, more courts around the country have held that inadmissible, such evidence is either it because is too ambiguous probative, to be or because it violates the Fifth (6th Amendment. Coyle, See Combs v. 205 Cir.2000); F.3d 269 People v. Rogers, 68 P.3d 486 (Colo.Ct.App.2002); State v. Moore, (1998); Remick, Idaho 965 P.2d 174 State v. (2003); Leach, N.H. 829 A.2d 1079 v. State 102 Ohio (2004); St.3d 807 N.E.2d 335 Commonwealth, v. Hartigan 31 Va.App. (1999); Clark, S.E.2d 406 State v. (2000); Adams, Wash.2d 24 P.3d 1006 v. State 221 Wis.2d (1998); N.W.2d Spinner 75 P.3d 1016 (Wyo.2003).

We think the better view is that the evidence is too ambigu- ous to be “pre-arrest when the silence” is in the officer, of a join increasing number of jurisdictions that have so held.2 To the extent that Key-El view, inconsistent with this it is hereby overruled. Therefore, we do not reach the constitutional issue of whether admis- sion of a proof defendant's as substantive above, As courts country noted around the have taken paths analyzing different substantive use silence, relying evidentiary analysis relevancy, some on an and employing analysis. and others a constitutional The United Supreme has probative States commented on the value of past silence on several occasions over In decades. Hale, 171, 176, 2136, 2133, United States v. U.S. S.Ct. (1975), in considering post-MU L.Ed.2d 99 an accused’s during police interrogation, randa silence an initial the Court held evidence related to the defendant’s silence should admitted, noting not have been that the defendant’s silence just “easily could as to right be taken indicate reliance on the to support remain silent as to explanato- inference that the ry testimony a later fabrication.” Id. at 95 S.Ct. at Finding 2139. ambiguous, the Court noted as follows: “In most circumstances is so ambiguous that it is probative little example, force. For silence is commonly thought probative to lack question value on the of whether a person expressed has agreement tacit or disagreement with contemporaneous statements of Wigmore others. See 4 § gains 1071. Silence more weight it where persists in accusation, face it since is assumed in such circumstances that the accused would be likely more than dispute not to an untrue accusation. to Failure contest an assertion, however, is considered of acquiescence evidence only if it would have been natural under the circumstances object to the question. assertion in Wigmore § 3A States, The Raffel Court United 271 U.S. [Raffel (1926) S.Ct. 70 L.Ed. 1054 ] found that the circum- stances the earlier naturally confrontation called for a reply. Accordingly, the Court held that evidence of the prior silence of the accused was admissible. But the situa- tion of an very different, arrested is for duty he under no and, speak case, as in this has ordinarily been advised violates Fifth Amendment privi- to the United States Constitution's lege Stine, against self-incrimination. See Nationsbank v. 379 Md. (2003). 839 A.2d a that he has only moments earlier authorities government say can silent, anything he does and that right to remain him in court. against and will be used interrogation, during custodial of arrest and At the time the inno- particularly guilty perhaps innocent and alike— they may intimidating that situation so may find the cent— may influence variety A of reasons mute. choose to stand confusing cir- In these often emotional that decision. fully or under- cumstances, may not have heard suspect was no need may or have felt there question, stood the Process Criminal Traynor, Devils of Due reply. See Trial, L.Rev. Detention, 33 U. Chi. Detection, or (1966). out of fear maintained silence may have He another. Or the arrestee to incriminate unwillingness hostile and response to the with silence simply react his detention. surrounding atmosphere unfamiliar perhaps in-custody interrogation sum, pressures inherent In the and com- grand jury questioning before those exceed for silence.” identifying the reason difficulty of pound the Id. silence, country the have reasoned courts around

Other post- pre-Miranda, or itself, pre-arrest, in and of whether as an value ambiguous to have arrest, simply is too outweighed would be any probative value indicator of parte In Ex at trial.3 to the defendant prejudice the Sixth, First, pre-arrest, pre- hold that and Tenth Circuits Seventh guilt. as substantive evidence is not admissible Miranda silence 269, Cir.2000); (6th v. Coyle, United States F.3d 283 Combs v. 205 Cir.1991), Burson, 1196, (10th 503 U.S. cert. denied 1200-01 952 F.2d Powell, 1702, (1992); 997, Coppola 878 v. 118 L.Ed.2d 411 112 S.Ct. 418, Cir.1989), (1st 110 S.Ct. denied 493 U.S. cert. F.2d 1568 Lane, (1989); Savory F.2d rel. v. 832 United States ex 107 L.Ed.2d 383 Fifth, (7th Cir.1987). Eleventh Circuits Ninth and 1017-18 as substan- pre-Miranda is admissible pre-arrest, silence have held that Oplinger, F.3d 1066 guilt. States v. evidence of United tive Zanabria, Cir.1996); (5th Cir.1998); (9th 74 F.3d 590 States v. United Cir.1991). Rivera, (11th 944 F.2d United States v. issue, holding that with courts split the some courts are also on State evi- is not admissible as substantive pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence Welsh, (Colo.2003); People v. People P.3d 296 guilt. dence of See Marek, (Ala.1989), Supreme Alabama So.2d an is legal reasoning that when accused rejected the accusation, who an individual considers confronted with an court deny such accusation. The innocent will an himself rule, that the rule admission to the extent abolished tacit with accused’s when confronted permits evidence of an accusation, post- as as as to situations well an both court as follows: arrest situations. The reasoned person always “That that an innocent underlying premise, accusation, inap- with is objects when confronted a baseless for the it does account propriately simple, because when, have con- manifold motivations that accused accusation, silent. fronted with an he chooses remain crime, might an accusation of a the accused Confronted with frightened, or angry, he or well remain silent because is that the right he thinks he has the to remain silent because Furthermore, publicized. without mass media have so well premise face of an accusation means tacit admission rule guilty, that the thinks he accused that the scrutiny, cannot withstand because the observation to the necessarily accused could not lead remained silent guilty; without inference that the accused knew that he necessarily premise that silence the face of accusation merely guilt, results from the tacit admission rule describes silence, events, giv- without two accusation and concurrent of the ing the reason for the concurrence two events. Rogers, (Colo.Ct.App.2002); Landers v. 270 Ga. 68 P.3d Moore, 814, 189, 637, (1998); 638 v. 131 Idaho 965 508 S.E.2d State 425, 174, Dunkel, (Minn. (1998); N.W.2d P.2d 180 State v. 466 428-29 Rowland, 846, 758, 763 Ct.App.1991); 234 Neb. 452 N.W.2d State v. 614, 11, (1990); People DeGeorge, 73 543 N.Y.S.2d 541 v. N.Y.2d 135, 11, Leach, (N.Y.1989); N.E.2d 13 State v. 102 Ohio St.3d 807 Commonwealth, 243, 335, (2004); Hartigan Va.App. 31 N.E.2d 342 v. 873, 406, (1999), Va.App. en S.E.2d 522 S.E.2d 410 banc 32 531 aff'd Easter, 228, 1285, (2000); 922 P.2d 1292 63 State v. 130 Wash.2d Fencl, 224, (1996); (1982); 703 Tortoli State v. 109 Wis.2d 325 N.W.2d 387, (Wyo.1995). 901 to v. P.2d 390 pre-Miranda impli- pre-arrest, Other courts hold that silence does not Leecan, the Fifth State v. 198 Conn. 504 A.2d cate Amendmenl. Kinder, (1986); (Mo. 1996); v. 326 State State S.W.2d (N.D.1981). Helgeson, v. N.W.2d Accordingly, logic neither nor common experience any long- rule, if, er supports indeed, the tacit admission either ever supported it.”

Id. at 381.

In People DeGeorge, 73 N.Y.2d 543 N.Y.S.2d (1989), N.E.2d 11 the New York Court of Appeals held that officers is inadmis- sible at trial because silence is the natural many reaction of people of law enforcement officers. The court noted as follows:

“Silence these is ambiguous circumstances because person may innocent many have reasons for speaking. not Among those a person’s identified are awareness that he is obligation speak under no or to the natural caution that from his knowledge anything arises says might he later against trial, be used him at belief efforts at exonera- tion circumstances, would be futile under the or because of explicit instructions not speak from an attorney. More- over, there are individuals who mistrust law enforcement officials and speak refuse to they them because are guilty crime, of some but they rather because simply are fearful of coming into contact they regard with those whom antagonists. as In most it impossible cases to conclude speak a failure to is more consistent with than with innocence.

Moreover, despite its lack of value the evidence undoubtedly Jurors, affects a credibility. witness’ who not be sensitive to variety the wide explana- alternative silence, tions for a defendant’s pretrial may assign much weight more to it than is warranted and thus the evidence may create a substantial prejudice.” risk of at Id (Quotation N.E.2d marks and internal omitted). citations

Similarly, the Appeals United States Court of for the Sixth Circuit found that the use of silence as substantive evidence of guilt, unlike for impeachment the use purposes, does not reliability enhance the process of the criminal held guilt of is silence as substantive evidence the use of privilege of the impermissible upon burden the exercise Combs, Quoting at 283. F.3d against self-incrimination. “every post- at at 96 S.Ct. Doyle, U.S. insolubly ambiguous,” the court noted that arrest silence is many why may a remain silent there are reasons defendant arrest, of Miranda knowledge as a his or her before such may not rights or a fear that the statement be believed. Combs, proba- at 285. court that the 205 F.3d concluded is minimal. tive value of such silence therefore with ignore ubiquity depictions cannot which We entertainment, particular- in police procedures appear popular warnings,” consequent ly the “Miranda understand- in ing any presence police statement made “can against you Although and will in a court of law.” be used Supreme required only warnings given Court has that such be police engaging interrogation, in custodial are the aver- age certainly any spoken citizen is almost aware that words in police presence peril. are uttered at one’s While silence in the non-threatening bystanders of an or accuser accusation, signify acquiescence in the truth of a indeed police presence ambiguous defendant’s reticence at best. We hold that is not guilt Maryland admissible as substantive evidence of under evidence law.

III. argues any beyond The State error is harmless harmless, doubt. In for reasonable order the error to be we convinced, doubt, beyond must be a reasonable that the error State, in way no influenced the verdict. Archer v. See 383 Md. 329, 361, (2004); 859 A.2d Dorsey 276 Md. (1976). 638, 659, 350 A.2d only presented direct evidence Weitzel’s eyewitness testimony. Crabtree’s According to Crabtree’s account, he, Effland, Weiztel, and others had smoked cocaine apartment and imbibed alcohol Crabtree’s within the two had He recalled preceding the incident. hours kissing, that and and Effland Weitzel discovered Crabtree Weitzel, slapped Effland had arguing, that begun Effland had apartment the two out of his that had ordered and Crabtree that as he was noise. Crabtree testified because the stairs, Effland down the Weitzel escorting and and the lower the shoulder blades grabbed Effland “[b]etween flight the last jacket” and threw her down gripping back her into basement. steps the they memory had no testified that Both Effland and Weitzel as a result of in the stairwell —Effland of what had occurred a of the “blackouts” he trauma and Weitzel as result her head and alcohol. mixing after cocaine experienced sometimes guilt implied indication of Weitzel’s The circumstantial corroborat- only significant evidence was therefore the only person account. As the other eyewitness ing Crabtree’s fall, was the obvious at of Effland’s Crabtree present the time and thus had a clear motiva- in her assault suspect alternative testimony. the corroborative his Without tion fabricate silence, jury easily have con- could of Weitzel’s evidence insufficiently trustwor- testimony cluded Crabtree’s doubt. guilt beyond reasonable thy to establish argued as follows: closing argument, prosecutor In his thrown Darla accusation that he had heard the “[Weitzel] Gentlemen, us, Any one of Ladies steps. down the is, if it was way. That’s not true. That would have said no says that. law that is respond to not true. He didn’t basically adopts tacit admission where the Defendant true, if it would have because wasn’t he the statement made That is to it. That is corroborative evidence. objected telling that Tom evidence Crabtree circumstantial Defendant is the That is direct evidence truth. responsible.” person record, beyond a reasonable we cannot conclude

On this influ- way in no of Weitzel’s silence doubt the evidence was admitted in that evidence the verdict. Because enced error, for a new trial. we reverse remand APPEALS THE COURT OF SPECIAL JUDGMENT OF REVERSED; THAT REMANDED TO COURT CASE VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF TO WITH INSTRUCTIONS AND BALTIMORE COUNTY THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FOR A NEW REMAND THE CASE TO THAT COURT THE AND COURT OF IN THIS COURT COSTS TRIAL. BE BY BALTIMORE APPEALS TO PAID SPECIAL COUNTY. BATTAGLIA, JJ., dissent.

CATHELL and Dissenting by BATTAGLIA, Opinion J. majority Key-El overrules our decision (1998) 818-19, pre-arrest, A.2d

Md. may police in the of a officer be pre-Miranda silence guilt. majority as of admissible substantive evidence of preclude concludes that the better view is to the admission officer a tacit police in the of a as pre-arrest silence to Maryland ambiguous law it is “too admission under because 456-57, A.2d I maj. op. at 863 at 1002. probative.” be See of of disagree and affirm the the Court judgment would quite Special Appeals because we should not overrule the reaching of Key-El recent decision in avoid the issue admitting in judge whether the trial abused his discretion evidence this case. on majority Supreme opinion relies Court’s Hale, 2133, 171, 422 U.S. 95 45 L.Ed.2d

United States v. S.Ct. (1975), for proposition that a defendant’s silence is thus, at ambiguous, guilt. maj. op. of See Hale, 458-59, Supreme 863 A.2d at 1003. The howev- er, explained during that an accused’s initial silence interrogation had been warnings given after Miranda pressures in-custody unclear because the “inherent of interro- gation questioning grand jury exceed of before a those of compound difficulty identifying the reason for silence.” Hale, 177, 2137, at 45 L.Ed.2d at 108. U.S. S.Ct. at Certainly, good Key- Hale was law considered and was

El was inapposite decided in 1998. It is because in this case dealing we are not with a in-custody, post-Mi- defendant’s randa silence.1

Also, numerous courts proba- sister have commented on the pre-arrest tive value of silence and held such evidence admissi- ble. Courts that an have ruled accused’s silence offered as evidence of represents piece but one of circumstantial evidence that is a natural component adversarial of the overall Beckman, (9th Cir.2002) 788, trial. See U.S. v. 298 F.3d (affirming trial pre-arrest court’s use of silence as factor one guilt); determine the defendant’s U.S. v. 150 F.3d Oplinger, Cir.1998) 1061, 1066-67 (9th (upholding pre- admission of arrest part silence as substantive as jury evidence of determi- nation); Zanabria, (5th Cir.1996) U.S. 74 F.3d (allowing pre-arrest be used as substantive evidence Rivera, (11th guilt); U.S. v. 944 F.2d 1569-70 Cir. 1991) (admitting pre-arrest as component one of sub- Case, stantive guilt); evidence of State v. 140 S.W.3d 86-87 (Mo.App.2004) (permitting jury to pre- consider defendant’s guilt); Lee, arrest silence as evidence State v. 15 S.W.3d (Tex.Crim.App.2000) 924-25 (holding si- by jury lence guilt); be considered as evidence State v. Richards, (La.1999) 750 So.2d 941-42 (affirming trial court’s admission of defendant’s silence as one guilt).2 factor to assess view, Contrary majority’s concurring to the Justice Stevens in a Anderson, opinion in Jenkins v. 447 U.S. 100 S.Ct. J., (1980) (Stevens, concurring), L.Ed.2d 86 construed the silence, pre-arrest, pre-Miranda value of a defendant’s as evidence of guilt: right The fact that a citizen has constitutional to remain silent when questioned bearing he is probative significance had no on the of his any police. silence before he contact has with the We need not hold every duty report every that citizen has a infraction lawof that he justify drawing witnesses in order the of a reasonable inference from silence in a ordinary situation in which the citizen would normally speak out.

Id. at 100 S.Ct. at 65 L.Ed.2d at 98. opposing 2. Several of the pre-arrest courts the admission of aas tacit admission have conceded that the admission of such is harmless conjunction error when viewed in with all the other evidence that the following an clearly proposes Key-El of a by party accusation a third while the by trial court as to carefully officer should be considered the impact of the officer’s would deter a whether the or accusation. person denying explaining reasonable from the principles A.2d at 1308. Key-El, See 349 Md. at silence, concerning pre-arrest provide in Key-El, established adequate safeguards any prejudice, to overcome unfair wheth- deter- present bright-line er an officer is or not. The rule majority permit use of deliberative mined the does the part judge, of trial but rather reflects a discretion on the pre- acknowledge any probative wholesale refusal to value silence, by this recognized arrest which was Court within the years. last six

In overruling Key-El majority fails to determine wheth- properly er Weitzel’s silence this case was admitted under exception hearsay the tacit admission to the rule. Special Appeals did so and held that the admission

Weitzel’s silence was not abuse of discretion. The trial custody court had not determined been taken into drinking or ingesting Mirandized and that his alcohol and him cocaine did not render unable to understand the officer’s Indeed, questioning about trial court the incident. deter- mined: person A reasonable position

[COURT] Weitzel’s who disagree anything would with that Mr. said Crabtree had certainly spoken up would have to contradict it. Certain- ly gives him opportunity the officer and asks if anything say regard he has with to Mr. Crabtree’s fact-finder must use to determine or innocence. See Ouska v. (7th Cir.2001) Cahill-Masching, (stating 246 F.3d error); admission of silence was harmless United States v. Burson, (10th Cir.1991) (explaining 952 F.2d against overwhelming evidence the defendant was and that the defen- Lane, Savory component); dant’s silence was but one ex rel. U.S. (7th Cir.1987) (noting F.2d that the defendant’s silence was evidence). weight included in the overall of Ihe statement, opportuni- of that advantage not take he does ty. controlling precedent Key-El, not abandon

We should recently. Deciding to by this Court so which was decided recent, has conse- especially one so serious reject precedent, mentor, Reynolds: by a former William as noted quences, paid: loss of overruling requires price be “[ejvery sys- confidence, efficiency of the damage stability Reynolds, L. tem, predictability.” William reduction [and] ed.2003). (West Publishing 3rd Process Judicial dissent. respectfully I joins in to state that he

Judge authorizes me CATHELL this dissent.

863A.2d 1007 Maryland STATE Jacqueline Mae GARNETT. Term, Sept.

No. Maryland. Appeals 22, 2004.

Dec.

Case Details

Case Name: Weitzel v. State

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Maryland

Date Published: Dec 21, 2004

Citation: 863 A.2d 999

Docket Number: 44, September Term 2004

Court Abbreviation: Md.