Weiss v. WeissWeiss v. Weiss
I
In early February of 1967, defendant gave plaintiff an engagement ring, and afterwards an engagement party was held and a wedding was plannеd for the following summer. Around this time, defendant spoke to his mother about buying a house from her which she had recently inherited. Defendant also spoke to plaintiff about the house, asking whether “we want to go on a nice honeymoon or buy the house.” The parties agreed to buy the house. Defendant and his mother had the house appraised and established an $18,000 purchase price based on that appraisal. A contract of sale was entered into on February 10, 1967 and a closing was held on April 25, 1967, four months before the parties’ marriage on August 26, 1967. Defendant made a $5,000 down pаyment on the house and executed a note and mortgage with a bank for the balance of the purchase price. Plaintiff testified that she understood the house would be jointly owned because defendant described it as “their house.” However, plaintiff did not attend the closing and title was рlaced solely in defendant‘s name. Plaintiff moved into the house in June 1967, two months before the parties were married. Defendant moved into the house immediately after the marriage, and the parties continued to reside in the house until they separated in October of 1985.
The parties made substantial repairs and improvements to the house both before and during the marriage. Before the
The trial judge found that there was implied contract between the parties that the house, although acquired in defendant‘s name while the parties were engaged, would be a marital asset. Therefore, he concluded that “[d]esignation of the title in the name of one of the parties should not bar a detеrmination of the property‘s intended and active status as a marital asset.” The trial judge also concluded that the house should be valued as of the date of trial, that its value was $155,000, and that the property should be divided equally between the parties. Accordingly, he gave defendant 60 days from the entry of judgment to purchase plaintiff‘s share in the house, and further directed that if defendant did not avail himself of this opportunity, the house should be sold and the proceeds divided equally.1 We affirm the trial judge‘s conclusion that the marital home is subject to equitable distribution, but conclude that his valuаtion of this marital asset was not adequately explained.
In Painter v. Painter, supra, the Court observed that “[r]eading [
We conclude that the Court‘s approach to the interpretation of
In the present case, the trial court properly concluded that the marital home acquired in defendant‘s name during the parties’ six month engagement is subject to equitable distribution. The record amply supports the trial judge‘s findings that plaintiff participаted with defendant in the decision to purchase the marital home, that the parties intended it to be their marital home at the time of purchase, and that plaintiff was actively involved in making improvements to the home both prior to and after the marriage. These facts provided sufficiеnt support for the trial judge‘s conclusion that there was an implied contract between the parties that the home would be a marital asset. Thus, the trial judge properly concluded that this implied contract should be enforced.
The trial judge also properly concluded that the marital home should be valued as of the date of trial rather than the date the complaint was filed. Plaintiff continued to reside in the marital home and to participate in its maintenance for more than a year after the complaint for divorce was filed. Moreover, the inсrease in value of the home between the filing of the complaint and the trial resulted from market factors rather than from any improvements or other contributions made by defendant. Under these circumstances, it would be inequitable
However, the trial judge failed to provide an adequate explanation for his finding that the value of the marital home was $155,000. Although the judge stated that his finding was based “on the evidence presented by the respective parties by way of expert testimony,” the only expert testimony on this issue was provided by defendant‘s expert, who valued the home at $124,000. Although the trial judge was not required to accept this opinion, he should have explained how he arrived at a different figure. Consequently, the case must be remanded for a rеconsideration of the value of the marital home and for adequate findings of fact relevant to this issue.
II
The other major asset which the trial judge found to be subject to equitable distribution was the enhancement in value during the marriage of defendant‘s interest in a family business. The business primarily involves thе retail sale of insurance. Defendant works in the business with his mother and father. The only other employees are clerical and secretarial. Defendant‘s father made series of gifts to defendant in 1972, 1974 and 1981 of 45% of the shares of stock of the two corporations through which the business is conducted.
The trial judge concluded that the value of defendant‘s interest in the family business as of the date he was given the stock was not subject to equitable distribution, because a 1980 amendment to
[A]ny increase in value [in a closely held corporation] occurring after the marriage should be considered eligible [for equitable distribution] to the extent that it may be attributable to the expenditures of [sic] the effort of plaintiff wife. See Painter v. Painter, supra, at 196.
The theory is that a homemaker‘s contribution cannot be given a monetary worth and its value may be gleaned from the earnings of the employed spouse. [136 N.J. Super. at 401].
Plaintiff contributed to defendant‘s business by her efforts as a homemaker and as the caretaker of their child, thereby enabling her husband to work 60 hours per week, and she also worked part timе in the business herself. These efforts entitle her to share in any enhancement in the value of defendant‘s interest in the business which occurred during the marriage.
However, we find no support in the record for the trial judge‘s finding that the value of defendant‘s interest in the business was enhanced by $95,000 during the marriage. A cоurt appointed expert valued defendant‘s total interest in the family business at $82,154 and defendant‘s expert valued his interest at approximately $60,000. But neither of these experts expressed any opinion concerning how much the business increased in value following the gifts of stock to defendant. Moreover, it is clear from the testimony of defendant and his father that the business had substantial value when defendant was given his interest. Thus, the enhancement in value of defendant‘s interest during the marriage had to have been substantially less than $95,000. Accordingly, it is necessary to remand the matter for reconsideration of the amount of the enhancement in value of defendant‘s interest in the family business during the marriage and for a redetermination of plaintiff‘s equitable share of that enhanced value.
Defendant also argues that his interests in the stock of two publicly traded corporations and in savings accounts were improperly subjected to equitable distribution, and that the trial court improperly fixed his obligations under various pendente lite support orders. These arguments are clearly without merit.
Accordingly, we remand the case for reconsideration of the value of the marital home and of the enhancement in value of defendant‘s interest in the family business during the marriage and a redetermination of plaintiff‘s interests in those marital assets. In all other respects the judgment of divorce is affirmed.