146 Iowa 320 | Iowa | 1910
-The premises in controversy consist of a house and lot in the- town of Andrew, in Jackson County; the house being so arranged that a portion of the lower story may be used for business purposes. Plaintiff claims fee-simple title under a conveyance from his mother, who had by remarriage become the wife of defendant. There is no question as to the record title being in plaintiff’s mother at the time of the conveyance to plaintiff for a valuable consideration in 1905, but it is the claim of defendant that the premises constituted the homestead of his wife and himself, and that her deed to plaintiff was void on account of the failure of defendant to join therein. As against this contention, plaintiff relies upon an antenuptial contract entered into between defendant and plaintiff’s mother in 1898, in which it was stipulated that: “The said Lena Weis may and shall during the continuance of said marriage and after separation by death or otherwise separately own, use, possess, convey and dispose of all property of every kind, both real and personal, - belonging to her before said marriage and all the rents, issues and profits thereof to whomsoever she may choose, and in the same manner and to the same extent that she now can or then could have done, had süch marriage not taken place and that at the death of said Lena Weis all property separately owned by her, both real and personal, shall pass and vest in her heirs 'and assigns in the same manner and to the same extent that it would, had such marriage not taken place.” It is further stipulated that, if Lena Weis shall outlive said Peter
As bearing upon the interpretation of this contract, we may say, however, that there is every reason to believe that both parties understood that it related specifically to the premises in controversy, and that the intention was to reserve to Lena Weis the right to convey these premises after marriage, regardless of any right which defendant would have otherwise acquired therein by the marriage. It appears that these premises constituted the only real property which Lena Weis had or claimed at the time the antenuptial contract was made. She was then occupying the premises as her homestead. A few years after the marriage, when the homestead seems to have been in
The decree of the trial court is affirmed.