The sole issue presented before this court is whether an action which alleges that a woman has conceived, during wedlock, an illegitimate child by a man other than her husband may be maintained by the husband in the court of common pleas as an action for past necessaries furnished, against the alleged natural father of such child.
The appellant relies on our decision in Franklin v. Julian (1972),
“Proceеdings upon a complaint filed by a married woman alleging that she has delivered a bastard сhild by a man other than her present husband will be arrested from the operation of R.C. 3111.01 et seq. (bastardy proceedings), but may be maintained in the Court of Common Pleas as an action for necеssaries furnished the child or for future support or both. (Baston v. Sears,
Appellant argues that he should be allowed to enforce the appellee’s pur
We disagree, and hold that the dismissal of the present action must be affirmed since the appellant has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Civ. R. 12(B)(6). In addition, we agree with the trial court that the appellant has shown nothing to indicate that he has any standing whatsoever to establish appellee’s paternity under either R.C. Chapter 3111 or thе common law.
In reviewing the statutory framework and pertinent case law concerning this subject, we find that R.C. 3111.01 et seq., as it existed at the institution of the present action, permitted an unmarried womаn, inter alia, to maintain an action against the putative father for past necessaries furnished the illegitimate child and for future support.
In Franklin, supra, we held that the common law permitted a married woman to maintain an action for necessaries provided to the bastard child against a man other than her present husband for past support, or future support, or both. This decision also marked the rapid erosion of the archaic distinctions between legitimate аnd illegitimate children.
Finally, in Johnson v. Norman (1981),
Conspicuously absent from this line of precedent and the controlling statutes, including the 1982 amendments to R.C. Chapter 3111, is the authorization for a husband to maintain an action against the alleged biological father to obtain reimbursement for past necessaries furnishеd, along with establishing paternity. With respect to the controlling precedent as it existed аt the institution of the instant action, we find that our paramount concern in interpreting and expanding the relevant law was to insure that the welfare of the children involved was properly attended to. The present action does not attempt to advance this paramount concern, and thus we find it ill-advised to carve out another potential cause оf action, as appellant proposes, which does not benefit or concern the interests of the children involved.
The equal protection claim so ardently advanced by appellant is not comparable to the equal protection violation we found and remedied in our decision in Franklin. In sum, we find no equal protection violation involved in thе case at bar. Even if we were to apply the 1982 amended provisions of R.C.
For thе foregoing reasons, we find no statutory basis or common-law right for the maintenance of this аction, and hereby affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
In part, newly amended R.C. 3111.04 states with sufficiеnt clarity:
“(A) An action to determine the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship may be brought by the child or child’s personal representative, the child’s mоther or personal representative, a man alleged or alleging himself to be the child’s father, or the alleged father’s personal representative.”