602 N.E.2d 318 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1991
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *350 This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Athens County Court of Common Pleas which, inter alia, granted the motions of the Nelsonville-York School District Board of Education, board member Leif Hatlestad, and Superintendent Jacalyn R. Osborne, defendants-appellees, and dismissed the Section 1983 federal civil rights claims of teachers Robb Weinfurtner, Madge Dye, Jack Reichenbach, Karen Smith, Connie Dugan, Debby Shesky and Joe Malesick, plaintiffs-appellants.
Appellants assign the following error:
"The court below erred in holding that a court of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction over an action filed under
Appellants were employed as teachers by appellee Nelsonville-York School District Board of Education ("the board") under extended term/service contracts which provided appellants with additional compensation in excess of their normal salary schedule. At its July 29, 1987 meeting, the board suspended appellants' extended term service contracts and reissued contracts employing appellants for their regular nine-month terms at the normal salary schedule. On July 31, 1987, appellants' employee representative, the Nelsonville-York Education Association ("union"), filed an unfair labor practice charge with the State Employment Relations Board ("SERB"). The union alleged that the board had "unilaterally implemented cut-backs in staff and reduced positions and teaching staff" without engaging in collective bargaining concerning these changes, in violation of R.C.
On August 7, 1987, the union and appellants filed a complaint in the court below naming appellees as defendants and raising the following claims: (1) deprivation of their rights to freedom of speech, association and due process of law, as guaranteed by the
On October 26, 1987, the union filed a second unfair labor practice charge with SERB over the board's July 29, 1987 actions. The union alleged that the board's partial suspension of appellants' extended term service contracts "was in retaliation for [appellants'] union activities," in violation of R.C.
On February 16, 1990, appellees filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and a Civ.R. 56 motion for summary judgment. Appellees argued in their motion to dismiss that their alleged misconduct arguably constituted an unfair labor practice under R.C. Chapter 4117 and was therefore subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of SERB rather than the court below. On July 25, 1990, the common pleas court entered a judgment granting appellees' motion to dismiss as to appellants' breach of contract and Section 1983 claims and further granting appellees' motion for summary judgment on appellants' remaining claims.
Appellants' sole assignment of error asserts that the common pleas court erred in holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over an action filed under Section 1983 where there is a concurrent unfair labor practice proceeding before SERB pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117. Appellants contend that: (1) R.C. Chapter 4117 does not preclude concurrent or subsequent pursuit of an action under Section 1983, and (2) the decision of the court below is inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution because it permitted appellees to raise a jurisdictional defense in a Section 1983 action filed in state court which would be unavailable in an identical action filed in federal court.
The courts of common pleas were established by the Ohio Constitution as courts of original jurisdiction in Ohio, but the Constitution itself limits their jurisdiction to that which is expressly conferred by the General Assembly. Central OhioTransit Auth. v. Transport Workers Union of America, Local 208
(1988),
Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code provides in pertinent part:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. * * *"
In considering the propriety of state court jurisdiction over any particular federal claim, the court begins with the presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction. Congress, however, may confine jurisdiction to the federal courts either explicitly or implicitly. Elek v. Huntington Natl.Bank (1991),
In the case at bar, there is nothing to indicate that Congress affirmatively divested state courts of concurrent jurisdiction over federal civil rights actions under Section 1983. Indeed, our courts have acknowledged that Section 1983 claims may be brought in state courts. See, e.g., Schwarz v. Bd.of Trustees of Ohio State Univ. (1987),
The General Assembly enacted R.C. Chapter 4117, the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act, in an effort to establish a comprehensive scheme to facilitate the orderly resolution of labor disputes involving public authorities. Central OhioTransit Auth., supra,
"Pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117, unfair labor practice charges are first aired before SERB, one of its members, or a hearing officer. R.C.
Because of the similarity of the roles of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") and of SERB in determining unfair labor practices, Ohio courts have followed the federal courts' primary jurisdiction rationale and held that an act which constitutes an unfair labor practice under R.C. Chapter 4117 is subject to the sole jurisdiction of SERB to the exclusion of the courts of common pleas. Franklin Cty. Sheriff's Dept. v. Fraternal Orderof Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9 (1991),
In the instant case, the trial court relied upon the foregoing line of cases to hold that since the action complained of as violating appellants' Section 1983 rights, i.e., contract reduction in retaliation for union activities, was also arguably an unfair labor practice under R.C.
In Howlett v. Rose (1990),
This court has previously held that the Ohio Court of Claims Act, requiring that actions against state officers or employees be filed originally in the Court of Claims, has no application to federal claims, whether brought in federal or state court.White v. Morris (1990),
The dominant characteristic of a Section 1983 action does not vary depending upon whether it is litigated in state or federal court. Gibney v. Toledo Bd. of Edn. (1988),
The manifest import of cases like Gibney andFayetteville-Perry is that R.C. Chapter 4117, including the provisions that have been judicially construed as vesting SERB with exclusive jurisdiction over acts which arguably constitute unfair labor practices, does not preclude a state court of common pleas from exercising jurisdiction over a Section 1983 cause of action. See, also, Hicks v. Hocking Technical CollegeBd. of Trustees (S.D.Ohio, Aug. 29, 1988), Case No. C-2-87-1228, unreported, where Judge Holschuh rejected the cases cited by appellees in the case at bar and held that R.C. Chapter 4117 did not divest it, a federal court, of jurisdiction over a Section 1983 action; cf., also, Kingsbury v. Southeast Local SchoolDist. Bd. of Edn. (1989),
Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that SERB has exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters committed to it pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117. Franklin Cty. Law EnforcementAssn. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9
(1991),
Judgment reversedand cause remanded.
STEPHENSON, P.J., and PETER B. ABELE, J., concur.
"We see nothing inconsistent with [Section] 1983 in the offer the state has made in its Court of Claims Act. The Ohio statute gives claimants an option not otherwise available to them, and any claimant who does not like the statutory option is perfectly free to reject it and prosecute a [Section] 1983 action against the state's officials just as if the Court of Claims Act had never been passed. Such an action may be maintained either in federal court or in an Ohio court of common pleas, without necessity of filing an action in the Court of Claims." Leaman v.Ohio Dept. of Mental Retardation (C.A.6, 1987),