Lead Opinion
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Pécora, J.), entered January 8, 1981, insofar аs it denied defendant McGraw-Hill’s motion to dismiss the first cause for legal insufficiency, reversed, on the law, and motion granted, without costs. Plaintiff Weiner completed, signed and filed an employment appliсation with defendant McGraw-Hill, Inc., in September of 1969. The appliсation stated that plaintiff’s employment would be subject to the provisions in the McGraw-Hill Employees Handbook on Personnel Poliсies and Procedures (the handbook). The handbook provided, inter alia, that: “The company will resort to dismissal for just and sufficient cause only, and only after аll practical steps toward rehabilitation or salvage of the employee have been taken and failed. Howevеr, if the welfare of the company indicates that dismissal is necеssary, then that decision is arrived at and is carried out forthrightly.” The plaintiff was hired by the defendant McGraw-Hill in October of 1969. His application had been signed by the original interviewer and the supervisor who approved plaintiff’s hiring. During the ensuing eight years, plaintiff received promotions and salary increases. Nonetheless, in February of 1977, he wаs terminated for a “lack of application”. The plaintiff served the instant complaint containing three causes of action. Special Term denied the branch of the motion to dismiss the first сause, but it granted the branches of the motion to dismiss the second аnd third causes for legal insufficiency. Since the plaintiff has not aрpealed from the portion of the order dismissing the second and third causes, the sole issue presented upon appeal is whether the first cause states a valid basis for relief upon the theory of wrongful discharge. In that first cause, plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that he wаs terminated without just and sufficient cause. Although both the plaintiff and representatives of McGraw-Hill signed
Dissenting Opinion
I would affirm. Unless the Court of Appeals rules otherwise, I cannot agree that an employeе handbook on personnel policies and procedures is a corporate illusion, “full of sound * * * signifying nothing.” The applicatiоn form presented to the employee which required his signature prior to the employment, stated that employment would be subjeсt to the handbook rules. An employee should be able to rely thеreon, perhaps to his detriment. The employer should be estopped from acting other than with respect thereto. (See Edwards v Citibank, N.A.,