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Weimer v. Hetrick
525 A.2d 643
Md.
1987
Check Treatment

*1 525 A.2d Stanley R. WEIMER Jody et Ann HETRICK al. Term, Sept. 1986. No. Appeals Maryland. Court

28,May 1987. *2 Franch, David R. B. Jr. and Thompson (Roy Cowdrey, P.A., brief), Easton, appel- Earnest & on the Cowdrey, lant. Anderson, &Coe Plante, and A. King, F. Jeanette

John and Medical curiae the brief, for amicus Baltimore, on King, Maryland. of State Faculty Chirurgical Piper Marbury, H. Mark and & Magee, E. Fremont Stichel brief, Baltimore, Physi- curiae Chesapeake for amicus cians, P.A. Semmes, Jr., DeVries, Mitchell and

Donald L. J. Lambros Baltimore, Semmes, on brief for amicus curiae & Bowen Cen- Greater Baltimore Medical Square Hospital, Franklin Inc., Hospital, Dorchester Gen- ter, Baltimore General South University Maryland Systems Medical Hospital, eral Management Healthcare Risk Society for Corp., Maryland R.I.S.C., Inc. Robinette, (Gilbert H. Robinette Dugan, Jr. Henry E. Baltimore, Jakubowski, P.A., brief), on the Dugan, Seiden & for appellees. COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH before

Argued McAULIFFE, JJ., MARVIN H. SMITH and CHARLES *3 ORTH, Jr., Judges Appeals Associate Court E. and W. (retired), Specially Assigned Maryland MENCHINE, Judge of the Court of Associate ALBERT (retired), Specially Assigned. Appeals Special MENCHINE, Assigned. Specially Judge, W. ALBERT Hetrick, Cary and Michael Ann Hetrick Jody Appellees, Care claim, to the Health pursuant malpractice filed a Proceedings (Courts and Judicial Act Malpractice Claims Health Claims 2A, with the Article, Repl.Vol.) Subtitle Office, alleging Appellant, August Arbitration Moeser; R. Dr. John S. Weimer; Dr. Thomas R. Stanley Dr. Hos- Anne Arundel and the Harris;1 Hospital;2 Agnes St. of Jason and treatment in the care negligent were pital attending the 1. Drs. Moeser and Harris were obstetricians mother during pregnancy. against claims The settled them contended that they cholecystitis life-threatening misdiagnosed had condition eclampsia. known as Eclampsia etiology, occurring during is a of uncertain condition pregnancies, compromises placenta, through some which the passes through body blood of the mother to fetus through purification. returns stream of it the blood the mother for life-threatening and child. condition mother Agnes Hospital joined party 2. St. was not as a defendant in the circuit court. Hetrick, son, Michael their who was delivered caesarean section but died who hours after birth.

The Health panel Claims Arbitration found no liability part of the Health Care against Providers whom the litigated, claim was liability part but found on the of Dr. Moeser, although he had settled the claim him against prior hearing. Appellees rejected panel pursuant decision judicial provisions (Cts. to the review of the Act & Jud.Proc. for Anne 3-2A-06) filed suit in the Circuit Court Art. § Weimer, and Anne against Dr. Dr. Harris County Arundel Appel- Dr. Harris settled with Hospital. Arundel General Anne Arundel to trial in the Circuit Court for prior lees directed as to Anne Arundel County. Motion for verdict of- granted was at the end evidence Hospital General proceeded against The case then plaintiffs. fered I and III. alone, to the under Counts going jury Dr. Weimer Anne County The mother had been admitted to Arundel September on the of Dr. Thomas Moeser on Hospital service versus diagnosis gastroenteritis 1978 with a of “severe September Her condition and on choleeystitus.” worsened It was exploratory laparotomy. 1978 she underwent normal but she gall completely noted that bladder great had a deal of edema of the liver and it was felt that The incision was very early pre-eclamptic. she was a severe stormy done. A cholecystectomy being very closed without operation. Within twelve exploratory course followed the hours, could not pre-eclampsia it was felt that the severe be pregnancy was neces- controlled and that termination *4 section, agreed delivery by The mother to caesarian sary. gestation might only infant knowing that the 32-week lb., boy A 3 6 oz. was delivered poor chance of survival. Drs. Moeser and procedure performed by operative operative no role in either occupied Harris. Dr. Weimer operating in the room received the infant procedure but p.m. at 6:43 delivery after the Dr. Kenneth L. Harkavy, physician neonatologist, testified that Dr. Weimer’s medical services for the infant (1) were not in keeping required with standard care: efforts; (2) inadequate improper resuscitative use and dos- (3) age bicarbonate; premature removal of the umbilical venous line only that was the route for administration of medicines and nourishment—removal should not have oc- I.V.; prior starting (4) flushing curred to an the umbilical (5) venous line with an of Heparen; excessive concentration progressive failure to observe the from baby’s fatigue his (6) trying lungs expanded; to his to keep failure monitor Dr. sugar Harkavy the infant. conceded that blood by history hospital symptoms shown many for ec- original findings admission were classic record concluded, however, He lampsia. birth, are able baby you

“Given the condition of the this say probability with reasonable medical whether if had the resuscitation baby would have survived inadequate?” been weight “I can tell that at the birth you

Answer: that baby’s an of two that survival chances Apgar with fact, the likelihood of good. still considered would be talking is 80 Per- still that we’re about survival 90%. from the pre—slightly prejudiced average haps somewhat not significant.” survival rate but autopsy after was as follows: expressed The conclusion anoxia this case is un- “The cause of intrauterine are examined. Some certain when the clinical events during eclampsia, blood flow authors have indicated would, course, lead is decreased which placenta to the a long to the fetus. Over oxygen supply a decreased time, growth retardation may toxemia lead to period in this case possibility fetal size. Another and decreased of surgery the fetus occurred at the time is that anoxia to course, the mother administration. Of from anesthesia and caesarean section cholecystectomy underwent both during which intrauterine anoxia periods presenting two history supportive There no might have occurred. placen- fetal as abruptio main causes of anoxia the other infarct, shock, placental ta, placenta previa, maternal Thus, probable it most would seem interruption. cord eclampsia general anesthesia plus that a combination changes observed. pathologic to fetal anoxia and the led *5 eclampsia in of has mortality presence fetal Although a cause of it still remains substantial greatly improved, to the frequently secondary necessity This is fetal death. delivery these mothers.” premature of Gieske, the course pediatrician, tracing after Dr. Judith death, that Dr. delivery life from concluded baby’s Weimer met the standard him expected nothing and did that caused or contributed to the death. baby’s I, Jody Count Ann Hetrick had as personal sued Hetrick, representative the estate of Jason Michael de- ceased, pursuant provisions to the of Annotated Code of Article, Maryland, Proceedings Courts Judicial Subtitle Practice, 6-401(a) General, Survival Actions3 § (1984 Article, Repl.Vol.) and Estates and Trusts Subtitle 7-401(x) Personal Representative Powers General § (1974).4 Powers III, Jody Hetrick, In Count Ann Hetrick and Cary Michael father, Hetrick, respectively, mother and of Jason Michael deceased, pursuant had sued to the of Courts and provisions Article, Proceedings Judicial Subtitle 9 Wrongful death 3-902(a) jury 3-904.5 The returned verdicts in § § Weimer, defendant, under favor of the Dr. both counts. Special Appellees appealed Appeals. the Court court, rights That distinguishing respective between Ann., 6-401, actions, part 3. Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Survival here § "(a) law, pertinent, reads as follows: At law—A of action at cause real, mixed, slander, personal, except whether or survives the death of party.” either Ann., 7-401, Powers, part 4. Est. § & Trusts Code General here "(x) pertinent, litigation.—He may prose- reads: Prosecute or defend cute, defend, actions, claims, proceedings or submit arbitration any jurisdiction appropriate protection or for the benefit of the estate, including personal the commencement of a action which the ” might prosecuted.... decedent have commenced or 3-902(a) Liability notwithstanding 5. Section death reads as follows: "(a) against causing may person Action another.—An action against wrongful person be maintained whose act caused the death of another.” 3-904(a) "(a) wrongful Section Action death reads as follows: Primary action under this subtitle shall be for the Beneficiaries.—An wife, husband, parent, benefit of the and child the deceased person.” litigants III, under Count and under Count affirmed *6 (Hetrick Weimer, in part. and reversed part (1986)), holding 508 A.2d 522 that the trial Md.App. plaintiff the that instructing jury court erred was a prove by preponderance to the evidence required of the negligence of the decedent caused death was case a new trial. The court remanded the defendant. below, decision the court said: In the “Thus, had plaintiffs prove, instruction that the to evidence, the physician’s of the preponderance primary probable was the or most cause negligence an them. imposed improper death burden patient’s not Weimer case was that Dr. theory appellants’ death; it Dr. that Weimer’s failure their son’s was caused reasonable, necessary and proper, appro- what was to do child deprived the sub- priate to resuscitate Jason (footnote omitted). possibility survival” stantial 541, 508 A.2d at 531. Md.App. and causation was charge court’s The trial as follows: liable, the have to show plaintiffs Dr.

“To hold Weimer medically clearly recognizable not as that his conduct was chargeable no is with the pediatrician And acceptable. of skill degree if he has applied of his efforts results in the pediatrician of a required expected to be ordinarily required. you And of the services performance at the they as existed mind the circumstances keep and complexity and the nature time of the treatment time. pediatrician at that problems facing the medical Weimer, those circumstances Dr. under If find that you exercised by hindsight, than they then existed rather skill, you then must degree of care that reasonable find in of the doctor. favor cause of only likely the most prove

Now need plaintiffs that I’ve everything else addition baby’s exclude negate required are not plaintiffs said. The However, if there are two or possible other cause. every in the causes, have resulted either of which could more death, pediatrician for which one which baby’s and the others for responsible, not, which he is then the have to prove by evidence plaintiffs more likely so than that the acts for which the pediatrician is responsible in fact caused the death. baby’s Now there I’ve used that phrase by evidence more so likely than not. case, strictly an and it is this example

Take are the infer that these mean to don’t example, just I’ve doing clarify this to what only I’m Again, facts. if you are. But the facts to decide what You have said. lack for the responsible Dr. Weimer was find that should cause of the death and that was oxygen 50% the cause of prematurity if feel that the 50% you got two causes again. We death, that’s the standoff then *7 that causes of death possible two There are of action. case, hasn’t plaintiff If that’s the equal. are both in favor of must find requires you the law done what that the act for has to show plaintiff The the doctor. 50%, is than better responsible the doctor is which That’s better.” 51%. as charge was of the court’s part to that exception

The follows: the, to Honor, give failed you in the instructions

“Your it, on Thomas v. I the instruction least didn’t hear or at is plaintiff prove need that all that to the effect Corso away a substantial of Dr. took the actions Weimer appro- have survived with baby that this would possibility Honor, I And, object Your thirdly, resuscitation. priate for that Cowdrey Mr. asked giving to instruction said example you where your that and with 50% said resuscitation, I don’t of appropriate lack prematurity, 50% I plaintiff. upon that’s think that that is the burden plaintiff prove need that the think all that the burden—all away a sub- resuscitate took properly is that to failure survived. child would have that this possibility stantial Corso, even case, as in specific Thomas So this probability, as to we offered evidence though we have which was less possibility prove substantial only need Honor.” Thank Your you, than 50%. grounded holding court had its intermediate in Hicks v. Judge the late Sobeloff used

language Cir.1966) (4th that had States, F.2d United quoted by Judge Barnes our decision Thomas v. been 84, 102, (1972). Corso, 389-90 265 Md. negligent action or inaction has “When defendant’s survival, it person’s terminated a chance effectively to conjectures lie the defendant’s mouth raise does not put beyond that he has to the measure the chances any of realization. If there was substan- possibility the defendant has de- possibility of survival and tial it, possible it Rarely he is answerable. stroyed certainty to an absolute what would have demonstrate did wrongdoer in circumstances that the happened existing to come The law does not pass. allow to a plaintiff to show require certainty circumstances hospital- had lived she been patient that the would have operated promptly.” ized and granted We certiorari to consider the question public importance.

I as it Relates Count Appeal representative personal (Survivorship action § 6-401 and Cts. & Jud.Proc.Art. under § 7-401(x)) Art. Trusts Est. & *8 recovery in the circuit court that contention was made No chance of survival for the loss a substantial damages count of declaration. permissible under that in the testimony taking that while the record shows witness, of a awaiting arrival suspended court was circuit court’s counsel discussed the plaintiffs’ judge the trial survivorship action. The in the given instructions be in the record: following colloquy appears Estate? do have for the damage you “COURT: What Pain— JAKUBOWSKI: MS. suffering—

MR. Pain and DUGAN: suffering baby. Pain and JAKUBOWSKI: MS. Oh, COURT: as to the individual but as to other than the itself, child there’s no evidence any medical ex- penses—

MR. Right. put DUGAN: didn’t any any bills

that. Right. MS. JAKUBOWSKI: All right, COURT: so there’s no misunderstanding as to that.

MR. DUGAN: It’s just pain and suffering.

COURT: As the child. MR. DUGAN: As to the child.” discussion, Pursuant to that the court in its charge to the said: jury,

“One is for the Estate. Now that is Mrs. [verdict] Hetrick, mother, but she’s not here as the mother in this first claim. representative She’s here as words, Estate. other standing she’s in the baby’s shoes, speak. so to It could anyone. personal be representative is what she’s commonly referred to. She happens to be the mother. But this first dollar award is to compensate for the pain conscious and suffering of the baby. Just like anyone that may injured have been in an automobile happen accident. We dealing to be with a so, death here we don’t obviously, have the party front of us. That is personal where the representative, which happens Hetrick, to be Mrs. comes in. So talking we’re about the pain conscious and suffering of the Not baby. the mother. Not the father. Only baby and for period whatever of time it may have survived.” No exception was taken charge given to the court under I. question Count Accordingly, whether Maryland recognizes the loss of a substantial chance of survival as a measure of damages separate or as a tort was not raised or decided under this count of the declaration. *9 546 the question shall not consider under that Count.6 Md.

We Rule 885.

II III as it Relates to Count Appeal (Action wrongful for death under Cts. & Jud.Proc.Art. 3-904(a)) 3-902(a) and

§§ (a) under such proof Burden actions thus general negligence rule cases is stated 1984): Torts, (5th Keeton on at 239 ed. Prosser & § is proof “The of the defendant’s burden uniformly asking since he is quite upon plaintiff, relief, and must if his case does not court for lose omitted). (footnote that of the defendant’s” outweigh 12.1, at Speiser, Wrongful In 2 Death Recovery S.M. § (2d 1975), 288 it is said: ed.

“The the existence of person pleads rule that the who applicable such fact is proving fact has burden wrongful actions, statutory death and thus the plaintiff has that the decedent would proof the same burden omitted). (footnote if he have had had lived” (2d In F.B. Act Tiffany, by Wrongful Death § 1913), also makes clear this rule of law ed. the author involving death: application negligence causing has cases actions, “As in other the burden case, including the fact that the plaintiff establish his wrongful neglect act or caused (footnote defendant, by preponderance of evidence” omitted). recovery of a to seek for loss substantial

6. Plaintiffs’ decision may produced by our possibility under have been of survival Count Fisher, (1961). any Rhone 224 Md. decision in case, no circuit such issue was raised below under count court. *10 288-89, the rule is In Am.Jur.2d Evidence 30 § thus stated: a the causal connection

“The must leave evidence more than something must be conjecture; matter of it the accident theory as to how plaintiff’s consistent with equal- connection is proof the of causal occurred. Where theory as consistent with one balanced, or the facts are ly another, has not met the burden which plaintiff as with that an him. If the evidence shows upon law casts the causes, but resulted from one of several may have injury can be attributed to the defend- one of the causes only (footnotes must fail” omit- negligence, plaintiff the ant’s ted). recognized applied and long

That courts Maryland cavil. In v. Consol Gas beyond Brady this rule of law is 637, 641, (1897), Co., 37 A. 263 it was said: 85 Md. agree good “All that to constitute a cause the cases on action, proved there should stated and the right be part and a on the the part plaintiff, duty the right, to that and a of that respect defendant breach defendant, was alleged injury duty whereby negligence injury and the there produced. Between effect. must the relation cause and Maenner v. be 212; State, Carroll, 46 Md. Tel. v. use W.U. Co. Nelson, 310; Compa- 82 Md. v. Boston Gas Holly Light 123; case, Md. 33 A. 763. Trainor’s ny, Gray, view, legal principles Having these well-established proof, facts in proceed to a consideration of the we now is to show bearing plaintiff mind that onus right elements of the to recover. It affirmatively all the (1) prove for in this case to necessary plaintiff was (2), negligence Miss of the Brady; the death of defendant, (3), the cause of and that such was (emphasis original). death” Brady’s Miss 641-42, 85 Md. at 37 A. at 264. rule to Maryland cases applicability above malprac- medical

negligence causing grounded State, settled. equally tice is well Use Janney (1889), Housekeeper, 70 Md. 16 A. 382 said: we duty “It was the men to exercise professional skill, being and this ordinary duty imposed by care law, it will that the presumed operation carefully be in the skillfully performed absence to the As all contrary. persons presumed duly are to have them, imposed on performed any duty negligence cannot proved. must be presumed, affirmatively but Best on be 68; Presump. R.R. Co. v. Fla. 175. Chappell, This principle especially applicable against suits surgeons injuries sustained reason physicians *11 and alleged of unskillful careless treatment. The burden plaintiff the to show a of proof proper of is on want 119; knowledge skill. v. 31 N.H. Leighton Sargent, and 29 la. Baird v. 531. Morford, error in that determining court below committed no plaintiff prove affirmatively it was on the incumbent performed operation that the without the consent of patient, by the and also her death was caused unskill- ful and treatment the Nor did the physicians. careless of court commit error in the sec- any granting defendants’ if death prayer, proposition ond which enunciates the not by meningitis was caused tubercular or other disease produced operation, the the defendants are not liable.” by 171, Md. at A. at 384. 70 16 rule continuing applicability imposing plaintiff of proof upon malpractice burden medical Genda, cases, is 255 by Hospital shown Johns v. Hopkins 616, 621-22, 595, (1969). Md. 258 598-99 approved following

“The in Housekeeper Court also prayer by submitted defendant: by ‘That and skill to exercised degree care be physicians surgeons performance opera- and in the of an degree tion care and known to highest skill profession degree but that care and reasonable skill exercise physicians surgeons ordinarily which and in the their patients; treatment the burden of

549 plaintiffs is on the in this case to establish evidence a preponderating want such care ordinary skill in the performance operation attendance the said Matilda C. Janney’ (emphasis supplied)____ State, Fishel, Use Solomon v. 189, also

See 228 Md. (1962); State, 203, Use v. 179 A.2d 349 of Shockey Wash Sanitarium, 554, 558, 223 Md. ington 165 A.2d 764 Diener, Bettigole v. (1960); 537, 210 Md. 124 A.2d 265 (1956); State, Use Kalives v. Baltimore etc. Hospital, Steele, 517, 526, Fink v. (1940); 177 Md. 10 A.2d 612 166 Hallar, 354, (1934); 171 A. Angulo 227, Md. 137 Md. Leib, 232, 233, (1920); Miller v. 414, 112 A. 179 Md. (1909); Dashiell v. 72 A. 466 Griffith, 84 Md. U.S., 380-81, (1896). See also Riley v. 35 A. 1094 (D.Md.1965). F.Supp. Kalives, supra, this Court stated:

‘Before the equitable plaintiffs against can recover any defendants, it must shown evi- be affirmative dence that they negligent were either unskilled or their respective capacities, and that such want of skill or care resulted the death of Mr. Kalives. If either of the in the no lacking proof, above elements is then case for presented____’” the consideration of the has jury been *12 The the governing proof rule law burden of medical Pierce v. Johns-Ma malpractice cases was reiterated Corp., ville Sales (1983). In 296 Md. 464 A.2d 1020 case, actions, involving wrongful that survival and Davidson, Court, the Judge speaking late for this said: “In Maryland, recovery damages based future if consequences injury may only of an be had such consequences reasonably probable reasonably are cer- if future conse- damages tain. Such cannot be recovered quences possibilities.’ Probability are ‘mere exists when there more than proposition is evidence favor of (a against greater it than chance that a future 50% occur). possibility when consequence Mere exists the will 550 Miller, less. is Davidson v. 276 Md. anything

evidence (1975).” 54, 62, 427-28 A.2d at 1026. 296 Md. at no from rules of the We see deviation these law either issues or the Thomas decisions. basic for deci- Hicks Thomas, supra, were identical and sion in both Hicks distinguished the similarly judges stated who au- were opinions respective in the courts. thored the Sobeloff, Hicks, after supra, Judge his review of the below, the issue of the record defendant said: therefore, scrutiny, careful ex- government’s

“On demonstrated did pert is seen that the examiner required Coupled standard of care. not conform to explicit testimony plaintiff’s experts, with government’s testimony leads us to the con- inevitably negligent clusion that the doctor was as matter of added). (emphasis tow” at 631-32. F.2d question

On the whether the evidence at trial established diagnosis that erroneous concededly “[the doctor’s] death,” Judge treatment cause of her proximate was said: Sobeloff government negli-

“The further contends that even if established, gence is there was no that the errone- treatment cause of diagnosis proximate ous death, if had been asserting surgery per- even speculation say it is mere that it immediately, formed government’s would have been successful. conten- tion, however, unsupported by the record. Both of plaintiffs experts categorically operat- testified if survived, ed on Mrs. Greitens would have promptly, government and this is nowhere contradicted added). (emphasis expert” 632. F.2d at *13 added, He in fail- sum, dispensary negligence the physician’s

“In omitting and in thorough examination ing make to tests, diagnosis. led to an erroneous diagnostic standard home instruc- this, patient he sent the with Because hours, eight rather than immedi- not to return for tions Since the uncontra- admitting hospital. her to a ately prompt surgery was that with she testimony dicted survived, the that the conclusion would have follows whatever negligence doctor’s dispensary nullified had the recovery might have and was she chance of ” added). the death cause proximate (emphasis F.2d at 633. Thomas, supra, Barnes, noting Judge after in Similarly, evidence favor all conflicts the that must resolve “we reasonable give them the benefit all plaintiffs evidence favorable derived from the inferences to be 389, them,” examined 265 Md. at 288 A.2d and said: then this Court on the record before evidence stated, could already jury “From what we have reasonably concluded that under have circumstances duty his performed Thomas had this case that if Dr. telephoned he was personally shortly after attend Corso have able to might Dr. well been p.m., at 11:30 Thomas negligent conduct was his life and that this saved death, causes Corso’s proximate one of direct the nurses.” negligence concurrent with A.2d at 265 Md. at 390. the Court Hicks found short, that the record showed a matter of law and proven been as negligence had negligence such evidence showed that

that uncontradicted in Thom- death; this Court proximate cause was legally sufficient the record evidence found that showed proximate cause establish death. State our decision appellees take comfort

Fabritz, (1975) Chief Md. 348 A.2d 275 wherein principles for this Court on Judge Murphy spoke *14 multiple contributing causes in death cases. The reliance apt appellees would be if the had succeeded in obtaining favorable Under jury verdict. the instructions given by court, trial such a contention not only permissible, was argument made actually by plaintiffs’ counsel but was rejected by Appellees the jury. manifestly have misread Thomas, our decision in supra. state in their They brief at 27: page judge if a

“Obviously, grants verdict, a directed as Corso, occurred in Thomas v. the case does not even get to the jury—so any time the Plaintiff has not produced (met sufficient proof) evidence burden of as a matter law, there no jury are instructions. All (and the plainest Thomas Corso said in most consequently the beautiful language possible) was judge applied wrong in proof burden granting the directed verdict.” Such was not the status of Thomas v. Corso at the appeal (with to this Court. The trial judge Thomas one excep- pertinent held, tion not that appeal) correctly, we denied for defendants’ motion a directed verdict. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. Our decision in required Thomas v. Corso us to determine “whether the court declining grant trial erred in motions for directed judgments verdicts n.o.v. in favor of appealing [the Id. at 382. We defendants].” Md.] [265 concluded that it not err. did accept

We decline to appellees’ suggestion that such careful and analytical jurists Judges Sobeloff Barnes quoted language Hicks, alter, intended the supra, discussion, rule of governing without law the burden of so uniformly formed and so anciently applied wrongful under the Maryland cases statute.

Indeed, the circuit court for the Fourth Circuit itself has rejected such interpretation those words. Clark v. States, (4th Cir.1968) United 402 F.2d 950 that court said: laid no “Certainly respect Hicks down new rule of law with ” n. Id. at 953 proximate cause.... to either Dept. v. U.S. Health & court same 4. That Waffen (4th Cir.1986) Services, said: 799 F.2d Human govern negli- ordinarily which principles “The general claims malpractice medical apply to cases also gence A of medical law. case prima Maryland under facie (1) which of evidence establishes must consist malpractice care, that this (2) demonstrates standard of applicable (3) violated, develops a causal has been standard *15 harm com- and the the violation relationship between 341, F.2d 346 Manning, v. 679 Fitzgerald of. plained upon negli- Cir.1982). case founded any As other (4th conduct, malprac- in medical of a the burden gent Annapolis v. plaintiff. Shilkret tice claim rests 245, 187, Ass’n, 276 Md. 349 A.2d Emergency Hospital 621, Manuzak, Md.App. 57 471 (1975); Paige 247 7 (1984).” 758, 766-67 (b) on Causation Charge The Court’s plowed by been Hicks ground having no new perceive We Thomas, Judge philosophical supra. Sobeloffs both Thomas, Hicks, quoted supra and cited paragraph in nor additional basis for a new tort an created neither tort. Whether it existing of an damages determination tort or burgeoning a new prove augury to be an of will damages in tort a for consideration of introduce new factor for day are issues another injury cases or death producing citing Waffen, below the decision It is true that court in 7. (67 (1986)), Md.App. Special Appeals A.2d 522 Court 508 case, declared, explicit ordering subject make “[W]e retrial circuit, particular the State of the law of this and in under cognizable Maryland, is a loss of a substantial chance survival Waffen, supra, For reasons to be stated 799 F.2d 917. harm." infra, question the loss of a substantial we do not reach the whether say, cognizable We do is a harm this State. chance survival Thomas, however, give recognition supra, this not in Court did damages. new or as a new element such a doctrine either a tort recognized legal principle. such We have never 554

in another cause. doWe not reach those issues. This is so it is clear crystal because that determination of ques- such impermissible tions is in an action wrongful death under statute. Maryland Maryland statute is in derogation of the common such, and as law should be strictly construed. McKeon v. State, Conrad, 437, 443, Use Md. 127 A.2d (1956) and cases plain, cited therein. unambiguous lan guage, provided statute a cause of action unknown to the common law for the benefit of described beneficiaries “against person whose wrongful act caused the death of added). (emphasis another” In such circumstances, there judicial is no room for interpretation. Trimper v. Porter- 31, 36, Hayden, (1985). Md. 501 A.2d The commencement date for the determination of damages allowable to primary beneficiaries under the stat (both pecuniary solatium) ute and for is the date their decedent. No damages for injuries losses sustained their prior decedent to his death are provided for the statute. enlargement requested statute by the

appellees recognition for of a tort or for new consideration of a new measure of damages “cannot be accomplished guise the of statutory construction.” Trimper v. Porter- Hayden, supra, 305 Md. at 501 A.2d at 449. The respective charge Thomas, to the jury and in supra, the case, subject words, while couched different recog both nize the legal principle plaintiff that a beneficiary in an action under the wrongful death statute must show a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct of a defend ant negligent and that such negligence proxi was a mate cause of the death of the decedent.8 Corso, charge supra: 8. Court’s in Thomas v. you preponderance find a “[I]f of the evidence that the doctor’s duty patient, you conduct was a violation of the of care owed to the determine, evidence, again by preponderance must a of the whether charge no trial court’s to the jury. error the There was Special Appeals Court of is reversed. judgment THE OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF COURT JUDGMENT REMANDED TO THAT COURT CASE REVERSED. THE TO AFFIRM JUDGMENT OF DIRECTIONS WITH ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY. THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR TO PAY THE COSTS. APPELLEES McAULIFFE, concurring. Judge, of this agree particular that under circumstances refusing did err in to instruct judge case the trial not of a chance of on the of loss substantial theory jury for substantial damages A claim for loss a survival. with the inherently is inconsistent possibility survival of death required for element of causation wrongful of a death action. the successful maintenance patient personally shown to a to the has been this failure to attend certainty Mr. Corso’s probability or to have caused reasonable medical bringing death. In a factor in about death or to been substantial word, likely you it was more so than so must decide whether physician would have led disclosure Mr. attendance of a way appeared to that which Corso’s condition in a different from measures, remedial with nurse the time and would have led to prevented patient certainty, that would have reasonable medical falling which was the ultimate cause into the condition shock from Corso, Term, (Records Sept. No. 201 and Briefs to Thomas death." added). pointed (emphasis Judge As out in pp. 475-76 Barnes proxi- negligent was one of the direct Thomas: conduct “[T]his death, negligence with mate causes of Corso’s concurrent 103, 288 at 390. nurses.” 265 Md. at may question of causation that is not to be confused with the 1. This produce a combine to condition arise when two or more tortfeasors negligence probably of a not resulted death. that more than condition, produce people may such a combine number proximate cause of was a each be liable if his her will Here, however, identifying the we are concerned with the condition. death, people number of who not with the condition that caused If, example, the that condition. occurrence of contributed fifty preceding physicians than left the child with less actions *17 survival, negligence that on the percent it could be said chance of treating physician of death. The part subsequent cause of the situation is that most that could be said out, as the Additionally, majority points neither allega proof supported tion nor the a claim for loss of a substantial (the of survival in Count I action). chance survivorship separately I write because I am concerned that the major- that we ity suggests rejected concept of a claim for loss of a substantial chance of survival when in fact we only presented hold the issue is not by this case. I agree can with much of the dictum in the majority our earlier cases opinion—that have not modified the ordi- requirements nary proof burden of and causation to the theory accommodate of loss of a substantial chance of it, however, survival. As view a claim under that theory tort, does not the creation of involve a new but rather a redefinition of damages involves involved in the claim. principles breach, Traditional of law relating duty, causa- tion, and burden of remain the same—what changes is the acceptance concept that damages may be recovered for the loss of a chance of survival where that chance is substantial and can be identified quantified (and valued) thus without resort to conjecture specula- that neither Hicks v. United tion. I am unwilling say States, Corso, (4th Cir.1966), Thomas 368 F.2d 626 nor (1972) 265 Md. 288 A.2d 379 suggests a favorable inclination toward a claim for damages resulting from the loss a substantial chance of holding survival. Our today is simply that these interesting questions must await resolu- tion on another day.

subsequent survival, treating physician deprived patient of a chance of wrongful and that claim cannot be made in a death action.

Case Details

Case Name: Weimer v. Hetrick
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Date Published: May 28, 1987
Citation: 525 A.2d 643
Docket Number: 99, September Term, 1986
Court Abbreviation: Md.
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