Weiler v. Osborn Eng. Co.Weiler v. Osborn Eng. Co.
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 2, 2023
Appearances:
Shawn Weiler, pro se.
Reminger Co., L.P.A., James O‘Connor, and Brianna M. Prislipsky, for appellee.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶ 1} This cause came to be heard on the accelerated calendar pursuant to
- The Court of Common Pleas erred in granting the defendants-appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleаdings.
- The Court of Common Pleas erred in denying plaintiff-Weiler‘s motion for reconsideration.
{¶ 2} After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we reverse the trial court‘s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
I. Procedural and Factual History
{¶ 3} In 2017, Weiler was employed by Osborn, an engineering firm located in Cuyahoga Cоunty, Ohio. For reasons undisclosed, Weiler‘s employment with Osborn was terminated in 2018. Thereafter, Weiler applied for other jobs in the architecture and engineering industry. Weiler listed Osborn as his former employer and, evidently, was unsuccessful in securing employment for a period of time. In October 2018, however, Weiler accepted a new job with an unidentified company. Weiler worked for this new company until he “lost his position in April 2020.” Weiler was subsequently hired by a second, unidentified company in October 2020. Again, for reasons undisclosed, Weiler lost his position with the company in December 2020.
{¶ 4} In 2021, Weiler began aрplying for new employment. In an application for employment with an unidentified company, Weiler used a pseudonym to refer to Osborn as his prior employer. Weiler obtained a phone interview with the unidentified company. During this interview, Weiler was asked to disclose the
{¶ 5} Following his phone interview, Weiler “attempted to obtain new employment many times using resumes with [Osborn]‘s name on it.” His attempts, however, provеd unsuccessful.
{¶ 6} On June 3, 2022, Weiler filed a civil complaint against Osborn, setting forth a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations. Weiler alleged that Osborn has prevented him from obtaining suitable employment by damaging his reputation with prospective employers, resulting in mental pain and economic loss. The complaint sought money damages in excess of $25,000, costs, and injunctive relief preventing further damage to Weiler‘s prospective business prospects.
{¶ 7} Osborn filed a timely answer on July 5, 2022. Subsequently, Osborn filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
In his complaint, Plaintiff concludes that he had certain prospective business relationships, but he does not identify any of them. Plaintiff аlso concluded that Osborn had knowledge of these prospective business relationships, but he makes no factual allegations identifying what Osborn allegedly knew. Finally, Plaintiff concludes that Osborn took intentional actions to interfere with his prospective business relationships, but he does not identify who Osbоrn allegedly contacted, or what Osborn did to interfere. * * * “[M]ere speculation, unsupported by operative facts, is not enough to state a claim.”
{¶ 8} Weiler did not respond to Osborn‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Rather, Weiler filed an amended complaint on August 2, 2022. The amended complаint added Osborn‘s chief executive officer, appellee Gary Hribar (“Hribar“), as a party defendant. The amended complaint reiterated many of the allegations contained in the original complaint. For the first time, however, Weiler alleged that Hribar, “acting in his capacity as CEO of [Osbоrn], damaged [Weiler‘s] reputation with those who would have otherwise employed [Weiler].” In an apparent attempt to address several of the issues identified by Osborn in its motion for judgment on the pleadings, Weiler further alleged that following his interview with an unidentified company in 2021, the prospective emрloyer had a phone conversation with Hribar. During this conversation, Hribar allegedly rendered an unfavorable opinion of Weiler that “damaged [Weiler]‘s reputation before the company.”
{¶ 9} On August 16, 2022, Osborn filed a motion to strike the amended complaint, arguing that it was impermissibly filed without leave of сourt or the defendants’ written consent.
{¶ 10} On August 30, 2022, Weiler filed a pro se motion, requesting the trial court to strike Osborn‘s motion to strike the amended complaint. Weiler argued that he was entitled to amеnd his complaint “once as a matter of course” after Osborn filed its answer on July 5, 2022. Weiler, therefore, asserted that Osborn‘s motion to strike the amended complaint, which was filed in lieu of an answer to the amended complaint, was a “sham” intended to cause unnecessary delays.
{¶ 11} On September 8, 2022, the trial court granted Osborn‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings, stating:
The motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted. The court hereby dismisses the complaint with prejudice as it fails to contain any plausible facts sufficient to sustain a cause of action.
{¶ 12} On October 3, 2022, Weiler filed a motion for recоnsideration, requesting the trial court to enter an order denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings as moot because the motion was filed before the complaint was amended. Weiler asserted that the pleadings were incomplete at the time the trial court‘s judgment was rendered. The motion was summarily denied on October 11, 2022.
{¶ 13} Weiler now appeals from the trial court‘s judgment.
A. Judgment on the Pleadings
{¶ 14} In the first assignment of error, Weiler argues the trial court erred in granting Osborn‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings. He contends the trial court‘s judgment failed to consider the contents of his amended complaint, which was filed after the motion for judgment on the pleadings was filed.
{¶ 15} “Motions for judgment on the pleadings are governed by
{¶ 16} “Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where, after considering the material allegations of the pleadings and all reasonаble inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id., citing Rayess at ¶ 18.
{¶ 17} On appeal, Weiler asserts that “regardless of its contents,” the trial court‘s dismissal of the original complaint constituted reversible error because the “amended complaint was filed within the requirements of
[I]t is clear under
Civ.R. 15(A) that [Weiler] had twenty-eight days - until July 1, 2022 - to amend his complaint as a matter of right. After that time period elapsed, the only proper means by which [Weiler] could hаve amended his complaint would have been with the consent from Osborn, which [Weiler] certainly did not have, or with leave from the trial court, which [Weiler] did not request. None of the other exceptions underCiv.R. 15(A) apply, as Osborn‘s answer did not assert a counterclaim and did not require a responsive pleading, nor did Osborn file a motion underCiv.R. 12(B) ,(E) , or(F) against [Weiler]‘s complaint. Thus, because [Weiler]‘s amended complaint was untimely, the trial court was not required to consider his amended complaint.
{¶ 18}
A party may amend its pleading once as а matter of course within twenty-eight days after serving it or, if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required within twenty-eight days after service of a responsive pleading or twenty-eight days after service of a motion under
Civ.R. 12(B) ,(E) , or(F) , whichever is earlier. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party‘s writtenconsent or the court‘s leave. The court shall freely give leave when justice so requires.
{¶ 19} Pursuant to the plain language of the rule, “a plaintiff may amend a complaint as a matter of course within (1) 28 days of service of the complaint, or (2) the earlier of 28 days of service of (a) a responsive pleading or (b) a motion to dismiss, to strike, or for a more definite statement.” Hunter v. Shield, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-244, 2019-Ohio-1422, ¶ 13, citing
{¶ 20} “The language of
{¶ 21} When leave is required to file an amended complaint, and a party files or serves the amended complaint without leave of court, the amended complaint is without legal effect. IBEW, Local Union No. 8 v. Kingfish Elec., L.L.C., 2012-Ohio-2363, 971 N.E.2d 425, ¶ 18 (6th Dist.); accord PNC Bank, N.A. v. J & J Slyman, L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101777, 2015-Ohio-2951, ¶ 20 (“Generally, where leave is required to file a pleading, and a party files its pleading without the requisite leave, a trial court may treat it as a legal nullity.“).
{¶ 22} In this case, Weiler filed his original complaint on June 3, 2022, and service was completed on June 15, 2022. Pursuant to the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, Weiler‘s original complaint constituted a pleading “to which a responsive pleading was required.” See Brenson v. Dean, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-584, 2022-Ohio-2228, ¶ 11; see also
{¶ 23} Significantly, Weiler‘s amended complaint was filed on August 2, 2022 - the final day of the 28-day period prescribed by
{¶ 24} Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court еrred as a matter of law by prematurely granting Osborn‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings. In this case, there is no indication that the trial court considered the amended complaint, which was timely filed after Osborn‘s
{¶ 25} Nevertheless, even if this court were to find the court considered the contents of the amended complaint, we note that the arguments posed in the
{¶ 26} The first assignment of error is sustained. Our resolution of this assigned error is not premised on the contents of the amended complaint or the sufficiency of the allegations raised therein. Rather, our judgment relies exclusively on the proсedural directives of
{¶ 27} Judgment reversed and remanded.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., CONCURS;
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCURS (WITH SEPARATE ATTACHED OPINION)
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCURRING:
{¶ 28} I respectfully concur with the majority opinion. I wholeheartedly agree that