248 N.W. 536 | Mich. | 1933
An automobile driven by defendant Longyear and a truck driven by defendant Slonim collided at the intersection of Clairmount avenue and Fourteenth street, Detroit. The automobile was thrown upon the southwest corner of the intersection, where Rose Gottfried and her sister, Mrs. Jule (Rae) Weil, were standing, both of whom were injured, Mrs. Weil so seriously that she died later. Jule Weil, Rose Gottfried, and the administrator of the estate of Rae Weil, deceased, each commenced a suit against both defendants. Tried together, without a jury, each plaintiff had judgment. Defendant Longyear has appealed in the case of Jule Weil and in the case of Rose Gottfried, contending that on the record he should not be found guilty of actionable negligence.
At the place Fourteenth was a through street, there being stop signs on Clairmount, although there *24 were also street car tracks on Clairmount. Longyear was driving south on Fourteenth at what we find to be a moderate, or as one witness said, a normal speed. He slowed somewhat for the intersection, but not quite enough to comply with the city ordinance. When he was near the center of the intersection the truck crashed into the side of his car with the result stated. Slonim drove the truck past another moving truck, past a moving street car, and to the left of another truck waiting on Clairmount at the northeast corner of the intersection, without noticing the stop sign, without stopping, and at high speed into the intersection and into the side of the Longyear car.
Longyear was not required to stop at the intersection. He was required by the ordinance to proceed there at reduced speed, that he might be prepared to stop quickly. Had he observed the truck as it approached Fourteenth street he would have had the right to assume that it would come to a full stop.Townshend v. Reader,
The plaintiff administrator of the estate of Rae Weil, deceased, has also appealed, complaining of damages, denial of compensation for loss of earnings *25
of the deceased. The action is under the survival act (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 14040), to recover the damages as if the deceased were living and prosecuting the action in person. Love v.Railroad Co.,
"We think the statute (3 Comp. Laws 1929, 13061) means that all earnings acquired or service performed by her as the result of her personal efforts in any separate business carried on by her in her own behalf, or any services performed by her for others than her husband, belong to her; but that her husband is entitled to her labor, companionship, society, and assistance in the discharge of those duties and obligations which arise out of the marriage relation, and that these belong to him. Where she has a separate business the wife may recover for loss of time as if she were sole."
And from Lincoln v. Railway Co., supra:
"In the Walker Case (Walker v. Traction Co.,
See, also, Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co.,
Progress, or perhaps merely change, in the law will appear upon comparison of cases above cited with Hyatt v. Adams,
The amount found for pain and suffering is urged to be inadequate. As remarked by the trial judge, evidence of pain and suffering is scant. The award is equally so. There is no rule by which such an award can be measured. It rests in the sound judgment of the trier of the facts. We are not moved to disturb it. Judgment in favor of the administrator is affirmed, with costs to defendant.
This disposes of all questions presented.
McDONALD, C.J., and POTTER, SHARPE, NORTH, WIEST, and BUTZEL, JJ., concurred. FEAD, J., did not sit. *27