113 Ark. 1 | Ark. | 1914
(after stating the facts). Counsel for defendant made a motion to compel plaintiff to elect upon which cause of action he would proceed to trial, and assigns as error tile action of the court in refusing to require plaintiff to make such election. An act of the General Assembly of 1905 provides, in effect, that when causes of a like nature, or relative to the same question, are pending in any circuit court in this State, the court may consolidate said causes when it appears reasonable to do so. Acts of 1905, page 798. If separate actions had been brought, we think the court could have consolidated them under this statute. Therefore, no prejudice could have resulted to the defendant by the court refusing to require plaintiff to elect upon which cause of action he would proceed. See Mahoney v. Roberts, 86 Ark. 130; Ashford v. Richardson, 88 Ark. 124; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Shofner, 87 Ark. 303.
It is next contended by counsel for defendant that the court erred in giving instructions on the measure of damages. He claims that the error consists in the court not telling the jury, in specific terms, that their finding as to the amount of damages must be based on the evidence, and insists that the instructions left it to the jury to find for the plaintiff in any amount that, in their judgment, should be proper. We have condemned instructions similar to the one now under consideration in several cases. See St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Steed, 105 Ark. 205; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Dallas, 93 Ark. 209. However, we have never held that such an instruction is reversible error. In the case of St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Hydrick, 109 Ark. 231, 160 S. W. 196, the court said:
“While it is always better form, and the better practice, for the court to tell the jury that its findings on every issue of fact in the case must be based upon the evidence, yet where it is plain from the charge of the court, taken as a whole, that the jury were told that their findings must he based upon the evidence, the jury could not be misled nor feel authorized to make a finding that was not based upon the evidence because some separate or particular instruction omitted this precaution. The jury were sworn, in the first instance, to try the case and a true verdict render according to the law and evidence. Kirby’s Digest, § 4530. That being true, it is not likely that any man of sufficient intelligence to be a competent juror would feel authorized to wander beyond the evidence to find matters upon which to predicate his findings in the case. The conscientious juror would necessarily feel restrained by his oath to base his findings upon the evidence.”
It is also' insisted by counsel for defendant that the verdict of the jury on the cause of action for false imprisonment is excessive; and in this contention we think he is correct. A pardon is effective upon delivery and acceptance. See Redd v. State, 65 Ark. 485; Hunt, Ex parte, 10 Ark. 284. The plaintiff was lawfully in the custody of the defendant as lessee of the county prisoners under a contract made by him with the county court. While this is true, when the time for which a convict has been sentenced has expired, or when he has been pardoned by the Governor, he is in law no longer a convict, and can not be held as such. The defendant himself did not remain with the convicts and have direct charge of them. He delegated that authority to a warden who was appointed by him with the approval of the county court. It was the duty of Kankin, who procured the pardon for the plaintiff, to deliver the pardon first to the warden in order that he might examine it and see that it was issued by the Governor and ascertain that it was what it purported to be. It was then the duty of the warden to cease working the plaintiff. It is insisted by counsel for defendant that he should have had a reasonable time to have examined his records in order to ascertain whether or not the plaintiff had been pardoned for all offenses for which commitments had been delivered to him. This is true; but the warden refused to release the plaintiff solely on the ground that he did not have authority to do so. He told the person who had the pardon that the defendant alone reserved the right to discharge the plaintiff. The defendant having delegated to the warden the authority to have charge of the persons worked by him, it was within the scope of the authority of the warden to have examined the records himself and have determined whether there were other commitments under which the plaintiff might be held. It was his duty to have made such an examination, or caused it to have been made at once, or to have discharged the prisoner. A prisoner who has been pardoned by the Governor is entitled to his freedom, and to deprive him of it is unlawful. Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment for some amount. As above stated, he was in legal custody of the defendant, and he had suffered all the humiliation it was possible for him to suffer solely on account of being a prisoner. The undisputed evidence shows that the illegal detention of the plaintiff by the defendant was not wilful. No indignities were offered to the plaintiff by the defendant, or his servants, after the pardon had been presented to the warden. It is true he was required to work for about two hours and a half thereafter; but this was done under a misapprehension of the law on the part of the warden who had the legal custody of the plaintiff. Under these circumstances, we think that a judgment for $25 would have been sufficient compensation for the jury to have awarded, and a judgment for that amount will be affirmed.
We find no error in the record on the cause of action for compelling the plaintiff to wear a spur, and the judgment on that count will be affirmed.
