188 Iowa 183 | Iowa | 1920
Lead Opinion
A certificate of membership was issued to William Nuhn, January 16, 1905, by the defendant, a fraternal beneficiary association, organized under the laws of Michigan. Its funds are raised by assessment. It is managed for the benefit of its members, and not for profit. The beneficiary named in the certificate was Lillian I. Ingalls, a dependent, not related in any way to the assured. Upon the death of Nuhn, May 24, 1913-, proofs of loss were submitted, and the association paid the stipulated indemnity to the beneficiary named. W. Weiditschka was appointed administrator of decedent’s estate, June 27th following. This suit for such indemnity was begun March 19, 1914, by the administrator of decedent’s estate, and is met with several objections to recovery.
Contrary to appellant’s contention, the contract of insurance so consummated is governed by the laws of Iowa, rather than those of Michigan. The recent cases are quite in accord in holding that the place where the final act occurs which makes, the insurance binding is the place of the contract, and that the validity and construction of the contract are, therefore, to be determined by the laws of that place. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S. 234 (56 L. Ed. 419) ; Haas v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 90 Neb. 808 (Ann. Cas. 1913 B. 919, with cases collected at page 926); Wilde v. Wilde, 209 Mass. 205 (95 N. E. 295). See Collver v. Modern Woodmen, 154 Iowa 615, as to agency of the officers of local lodge in such a case. Nothing in Bush v. Modern Woodmen of America, 182 Iowa 515, is in conflict with the above. The question under consideration was not involved in that case.
II. It is argued, however, that the .decision we reach would violate the clause of the Constitution exacting that:
“Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state.” Section 1, Art. IV, Constitution of the United States.
“The power of the state over foreign corporations is not less than the power of a state over domestic corporations. No case declares otherwise. We said in Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, supra: ‘That which a state may do with corporations of its own creation, it may do with foreign corporations admitted into the state. This seems to be denied ; if not generally, at least as to plaintiff in error. The denial is extreme, and cannot be maintained. The power of a state to impose conditions upon foreign corporations is certainly as extensive as the power over domestic corporations, and is fully explained in Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648.’ ”
In American Fidelity Co. v. Bleakley, 157 Iowa 442, we said:
“The appellant’s claim that the policy in question should issue because of interstate comity cannot be sustained. The state has the undoubted right to say whether foreign corporations shall be permitted to do business here at all, and, if such permission is granted, it may be upon such terms and conditions as the state shall prescribe. And where it is the manifest intention to limit or restrict the powers given to such corporation by its charter, courts have no authority to override such legislation on the ground of comity between the states. Within its power, the state, through its legislature, is supreme, and the court’s duty is ended when it determines what the statutory law is.”
See, also, Frick v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 179 Iowa 149.
Nor can an infraction of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States be said to be involved
III. Section 1882 of the Code Supplement, 1913, in addition to prescribing conditions on which associations like defendant may transact business in this state, declares that:
“If the auditor of state shall approve the articles and also the by-laws or rules, he shall issue to the society, order or association a permit in writing, authorizing it to transact business within this state for a period of one year from the first day of April of the year of its issue. Societies, orders or associations not organized under the laws of this state, in addition to the requirements of the provisions of Section 1829 of the Code, must also comply with all of the provisions of this chapter, except as to the residence of membership.”
Section 1824 of the Code forms a part of this, chapter and provides that:
“No fraternal association created or organized under the provisions of this chapter shall issue any certificate of membership to any person under the age of fifteen years, nor over the age of sixty-five years, nor unless the beneficiary under said certificate shall be the husband, wife, relative, legal representative, heir or legatee of such member.”
Appellant argues that the former section has no application to the latter, but applies only to the general provisions having reference to foreign companies, and bases its argument largely on the legislative construction. The language quoted, however, is too plain to permit of any doubt ; for the requirements are in addition to Section 1829 of the Code, and exact compliance, not with part, but “with all of the provisions of this chapter, except as to the residence of membership.” The language could not well be plainer; and, as the subsequent acts of the legislature are not in
Possibly, where there is no provision to the contrary, the indemnity may be made payable to someone other than those defined by a statute. See Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. v. Cleghorn, (Tex.) 42 S. W. 1043. Section 1824 of the Code excludes any not named therein, by declaring that:
“No fraternal association created or organized under the provisions of this chapter shall issue any certificate of membership to any person, * * * unless the beneficiary under said certificate shall be the husband, wife, relative, legal representative, heir or legatee of such member.”
As no such certificate shall be issued to the beneficiary other than of the classes named, designating a dependent as such, or even the association, would seem to be prohibited. See Smith v. Supreme Tent, Knights of Maccabees, 127 Iowa 115, where Section 1824 of the Code was construed in ascertaining whether the beneficiary named in a certificate issued by this same association was entitled to the indemnity promised.
In Boeck v. Modern Woodmen, supra, the place of the contract only was involved.
The object is not to defeat the alien enemy of his right to recover whatever may be owed to him, nor to shield the citizen from the enforcement of his just obligations, but to obviate the deriving of any advantage by the enemy, directly or indirectly, pending hostilities. These reasons have
“In the first place, an alien enemy cannot maintain an action in our courts, not because his enemy character constitutes a defense to his claim, but because it deprives him of locus standi. He is, while that character lasts, under a temporary disability to sue. Yet the cause of action, if otherwise good, is unaffected. But secondly, in some cases the enemy character does affect the cause of action, as where it is upon an insurance of enemy ships or goods. It being the object of the Crown to destroy the commerce of the enemy, a contract to indemnify him against such loss 'is or becomes illegal, and there is no cause of action. In such a case, even if the broker, a British subject, sues, and the policy was underwritten before the war, the action still fails, and fails finally, not bfecause the beneficiary is an enemy, but because the cause of action is bad. * * * It is essential to distinguish carefully between these two cases, i. e., that where the cause of action is unexceptionable, but the plaintiff, as an alien enemy, is temporarily and personally incapable of being received as a plaintiff, and that where the cause of action, whoever puts it forward, fails in itself, and fails finally. It cannot be put more clearly than in the words of Lord Ellenborough, in Flindt v. Waters, 15 East 260: ‘The defense of alien enemy must be accommodated to the nature of the transaction out of which it arises; it may go to the contract itself on which the plaintiff sues, and operate as a perpetual bar; or the objection may, as in a case of this sort, be merely personal in respect to the capacity of the party to sue upon it.’ ”
Though there are some cases which hold that, where a person, after bringing action, becomes an alien enemy, he
A different view prevailed in Howes, etc., Co. v. Chester & Co., 33 Ga. 89; but the authority of that case is considerably impaired, since it turned out that there was no alien enemy involved. Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700 (19 L. Ed. 227).
As pointed out by Judge Speer, in Plettenberg, Holthaus & Co. v. Kalmon & Co., 241 Fed. 605, the opinion must be regarded as academic. Quoting from Judge Speer:
“With the evolution of law, the courts of the English-speaking peoples exhibit greater magnanimity in affording opportunity of redress to alien enemies. Notwithstanding a ruling of Sir William Scott, afterwards Lord Stowell, made in 1799, to the contrary, the British prize courts of today hear any alien enemy asserting rights under a convention of the Hague Peace Conference. Shall the courts of the United States then, wholly deny a hearing to one not such when he here sought redress, but who has since become an alien enemy? To do this would not, in my judgment, accord with the spirit of our institutions, nor with the spirit of our government, which disclaimed hostilities to
Circuit Judge Buffington, in Kaiser Wilhelm II., 246 Fed. 786, after reviewing the facts of the case, remarked that it called “for. the exercise of that range of discretion” peculiar to the court of admiralty, and that this would be—
“An order which will make due provision for, first, giving the German citizen and belligerent an opportunity to litigate his’ rights, if relations with his country are hereafter resumed; second, providing for adjudging, if the government hereafter so desires, its rights and liabilities, if any, in taking over libeled property of the German subject; third, adjudging hereafter what effect the taking of this ship by the government had on the claim of the British lienor, and the further obligation of the German vessel owner, as between themselves. In following this course, and protecting the unprotected rights of an absent German citizen while this country is at war with the imperial government of its country, we are impelled by three all-sufficient reasons: First, the innate sense of fairness, decency, and justice which respects the rights of an enemy; second, the broad principles of international intercourse, which lead courts and nations that believe in international rights to be the more careful to observe them toward belligerents; and lastly, because the awarding to this German citizen, with whom our country is at war, the careful preservation until times of peace of its rights, is in line with those high ideals of Anglo-Saxon justice which led the British courts years ago, in Re Boussmaker, 13 Vesey 71, decided in 1806, to allow the claim of an alien enemy to be proved in time of war, and the dividends held by the British court until peace. Indeed, the fact that our country is now at war with Germany is all the more reason why this court should most scrupulously award to this German citizen those interna
On principle and authority, then, we reach the conclusion that the court did not err against the appellant in overruling the plea involved, and postponing the further hearing of the cause until the termination of the war. The plaintiff did not appeal; and therefore we have no occasion to decide whether the plaintiff might well have been permitted to go on with the case, and the court retain whatever might be recovered in the hands of the administrator until peace should be restored. — Affirmed.
Rehearing
Supplemental Opinion.
Appellant suggests, in its petition for rehearing, that the conclusion reached in the opinion destroys the principle of uniformity, as between the members, and the members and the association, but does not explain how this will be brought about, save by citing Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Brashears, 89 Md. 624 (43 Atl. 866). On the trial of that case, the beneficiary named in the certificate of insurance, suing for indemnity stipulated therein, offered in evidence a duly certified copy of Chapter 281 of the Acts of 1895 of the state of Massachusetts, relating to misrepresentation in applications for membership in fraternal beneficiary associations, which read:
“When any certificate is issued to a resident of the commonwealth by any fraternal beneficiary corporation organized under the laws of or admitted to do business in this Commonwealth, no oral or written misrepresentations or warranty made by the assured or in his behalf in the application for such certificate, or in the negotiation of the contract, shall be deemed material or defeat or void the certificate or prevent its attaching, unless such misrepresentation
The court held that this was admissible, for that a certificate was issued by. a Massachusetts corporation, and therefore the statute in question' was applicable thereto, even though-the act apparently applied only to cases where certificates of membership were issued to residents of Massachusetts, the court saying:
“The mutuality and fraternity which form the basis of mutual benevolent associations and kindred organizations require that all of their members shall be treated alike. It would be fatal to the whole benefit scheme of the Royal Arcanum if, when the case of the beneficiary of a Massachusetts member of the organization were on trial, his or her rights should be measured by a more favorable standard than would be applied to the beneficiary of a Maryland member. The regulations contained in the constitution and by-laws of the society .contemplate like treatment of all of its members of the same class, without special favor or advantage to any, under a similar state of facts.”
Otherwise, a certificate of insurance valid in Massachusetts must have been adjudged invalid in Maryland, and in Pennsylvania. Fidelity Mut. Life Assn. v. Ficklin, 74 Md. 172 (21 Atl. 680). It is to be noted, however, that there was no statute in Maryland interfering with this conclusion. In Missouri, a statute provided that, in suits on insurance contracts, suicide by the insured shall not constitute a defense, unless contemplated when application therefor was made, notwithstanding that a stipulation in the policy to the contrary uniformly has been held applicable to suits on certificates issued by foreign fraternal associations. Schmidt v. Supreme Court U. O. of F., 228 Mo. 675 (129 S. W. 653). This, of necessity, allows a defense in one state not available in another, and thereby seems to tolerate the inequality denounced in the Maryland decision, though
“An assessment which was one thing in one state and another in another, and a fund which was distributed by one rule in one state and by a different rule somewhere else, would, in practical effect, amount to no assessment, and no substantial sum to be distributed. It was doubtless not only a recognition of the inherent unsoundness of the proposition here relied upon, but the manifest impossibility of its enforcement, which has led courts of last resort of so many states, in passing on questions involving the general authority of fraternal associations, and their duties as to subjects of a general character concerning all their members, to recognize the charter of the corporation and the laws of the state under which it was granted, as the test and measure to be applied.”
The power to fix and collect assessments is fundamental in the organization of fraternal mutual insurance companies, and the court ruled that the New York court, in not giving to the charter, as amended, and the laws of Massachusetts, as announced by its Supreme Judicial Court, full effect, disregarded the full faith and credit clause of 'the Constitution. The soundness of the decision is beyond
“The statutory provision limiting and defilning the classes of persons to whom death benefits should be paid became as much á part of the contract of insurance as if it had been written therein, and it declared the policy of the state with respect to such contracts.” >
In referring to Supreme Council Royal Arcanum v. Green, supra, as being relied on by appellant, the court observed that:
“The question in this case is so different that the opinion in that case does not control its decision. The question there involved the relation existing between the corporation and its members, and between the members themselves, with respect to uniformity of assessments in different states. Here, we are not concerned with such questions, since such
In Dennis v. Modern B. of A., 119 Mo. App. 210 (95 S. W. 967), the court held .that, “where a society may depend for its power to do business on the statutes of two states, one where it is organized, and the other wherein it is permitted to do business as a foreign corporation, the statute of the latter will control as to who can become beneficiaries in cases originating in the latter,” the court observing that, “since no foreign association could do business here without the authority of this state, it must bring itself within the terms of such authority. That is to say, it must bring itself within the description of the local associations in this state, which means they must have for their object the benefit of the same class or classes of beneficiaries that are named in our statutes.”
In Baltzell v. Modern W. of A., 98 Mo. App. 153 (71 S. W. 1071), and Herzberg v. Modern B. of A., 110 Mo. App. 328 (85 S. W. 986), the legal representatives of the assured were named as beneficiaries; and, after noting that legal representatives might not be named as beneficiaries under the Missouri statute, though this might be done in the state where organized, the court ruled that such representatives might not recover. In Wilson v. Supreme Conclave Imp. Ord. of Heptasophs, 174 N. C. 628 (94 S. E. 443), it was held that such a certificate, when a North Carolina contract, was governed by the statute of that state, although the company was organized in Maryland. In Supreme Court I. O. of F. v. Fisher, 172 Ill. App. 454 after reviewing the decisions of that state, the court reached the conclusion that a statute of that- state, defining the classes from which beneficiaries were to be chosen, controlled, rather than the certificate of a foreign association. We have discovered no decision to the contrary, nor has any been cited. The certificate considered in Belknap v. Johnston, 114 Iowa 265, was
The association, organized in the state of Michigan, upon being permitted to engage in business in this state, undertook to do so in accordance with its laws. It might have proceeded without issuing a certificate of insurance with indemnity payable to a beneficiary of a class not sanctioned in this state, though allowed under the laws of Michigan. Other classes from which to choose were common to the statutes of both states; and surely, in holding that such an association, after undertaking to comply with the requirements of this state as a condition to engaging in business therein, may be compelled to perform what it has undertaken, we do not ignore the constitutional requirement that full faith and credit be accorded the public acts of’ Michigan, but rather, exact that compliance with the laws and policy of this state which defendant had promised to carry out upon being permitted to engage in business in Iowa. The ruling does not draw the statutes of Michigan into question. The opinion is adhered to, and the petition for rehearing overruled.