History
  • No items yet
midpage
Weida v. State
693 N.E.2d 598
Ind. Ct. App.
1998
Check Treatment

*1 Ray WEIDA, III, Appellant- Charles

Defendant, Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

STATE

No. 08A02-9706-CR-351. Appeals

Court of of Indiana.

March 1998.

Rehearing May Denied 1998. July

Transfer Denied 1998. *2 HISTORY

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL 29, 1996, аfternoon of October In the late Farrell, friend, Mark at a met his Weida after dark and Delphi. Sometime tavern beverages, consuming alcoholic Weida after truck. the tavern in Weida’s and Farrell left was up in a ditch. Farrell The truck ended intoxicated, sitting in the but remembers standing outside passenger seat and Weida door, help get him passenger asking to got Farrell truck out of the ditch. Weida’s truck, in on the driver’s out of the climbed side, truck back and and started to rock the present else was forth in the ditch. No one and Farrell. but Weida Trooper Curt Dittmaier was Indiana State There, dispatched he discover- to scene. ditch, in the truck in the Farrell ed Weida’s seat, passenger in the driver’s and Weida Diamond, Appellant- Delphi, for Darrel K. that he Farrell told Officer Dittmaier seat. Defendant. it into driving the truck when went was not General, Modisett, Attorney Ra- Jeffrey A. Dittmaier asked the ditch. When Officer General, Zaffrann, Attorney In- Deputy chel happened, admitted driv- Weida what Weida Appellee-Plaintiff. dianapolis, for spoke ing truck. As Officer Dittmaier Weida, had diffi- he noticed that Weida

with removing license from his culty his driver’s OPINION wallet, speech, had bloodshot and had slurred KIRSCH, Judge. strоngly of alcohol- watery eyes, and smelled Dittmaier also noticed beverages. ic Officer Weida, Ray appeals III his convic- Charles of the truck. open beer cans on the floor two intoxicated,1 operating а vehicle tion of felony, his enhance- D sentence a Class hard, raining very it was Officer Because offend- being an habitual substance ment for county jail to Dittmaier took Weida to for our review: raises five issues er. He sobriety exhib- field tests. Weida administer jail. into the poor as he walked ited balance presented suffi- I. the State Whether perform to Dittmaier asked Weida Officer independent proof of the cor- cient tests, sobriety both two different field that Weida’s admission pus delicti so Dittmaier then Officer which Weida failed. vehicle was being the driver of the to to believe probable he had cause told Weida admissible. intoxicated and informed was Weida the evidence was suffiсient II. Whether Implied Consent Law. of Indiana’s Weida conviction. support to Weida’s a chemical breath agreed to submit to Weida subjected an was III. Whether Weida alco- that he had a blood test which revealed enhаncement impermissible double of .22. hol content of his sentence. charged operating while was with in- properly trial court IV. Whether and, in a A misdemeanor intoxicated as Class duty concerning jury its structed the information, operat- сharging separate a the law. to determine felony a D intoxicated as Class ing while properly en- the trial court Whether V. qualifying a upon the existence of based sentence. hanced Weida’s charged as an was also conviction. In a bifurcated offender. habitual substance We affirm. -3. 1. See hypotheti- Although Weida advances several jury Weida as convicted

proceeding, may provide alternative cal situations that court sentenсed Weida charged. The trial ending up truck explanations for Weida’s felony charge, D enhanced years on the ‍‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‍ditch, supports the reason- the evidence upon the habitual sub- years three based person an intoxicаted inference that able finding, for a total sentence offender stance *3 required all that is to drove it there. This is appeals. years. Weida of five corpus and render Weida’s prove the delicti driving the truck admissible. to admissiоn AND DECISION DISCUSSION 442, (although at 404 N.E.2d at 1351 See id. Corpus Delicti I. hypothesis of not exclude circumstances do injuries, corpus delicti noncriminal cause for trial first contends that the Weida are con- by circumstances which established by admitting of erred evidence Weida’s court give to infer- with and rise reasonable sistent driver of the truck that he was the admission occurred). ence that crime indepen present failed to because the State Sufficiency II. of Evidence corpus For a of the delicti. dent evidence evidence, the to admitted into confession be sufficiency challenges the of Weida corpus the delicti. State establish must grounds. The first the evidence on (Ind.Ct. State, 18, Rickey 23 v. 661 N.E.2d premised on thе identification of ground is purpose for App.1996), trans. denied. The Having the driver. determined Weida as corpus of the delicti is to requiring proof that he the driv that Weida’s statement was prevent the admission of a defendant’s con admittеd, properly the er of the truck was a crime that never occurred. Hurt fession to necessarily sufficient to establish evidence is (Ind.1991). State, 16, The N.E.2d 19 v. 570 also claims that the this element. Weida corpus required prove to the State is nоt evidence was insufficient to establish the doubt, must beyond a reasonable but delicti crime, i.e., temporal of the that he element which an present independent evidence from driving was the car “while” intoxicated. may a crimе was inference be drawn that reviewing involving When claims State, Douglas v. 481 N.E.2d committed. evidence, sufficiency court the of the (Ind.1985). 107, corpus need 110 The delicti only the evidence and the reason considers prior to admission of the nоt be established sup arising inferences therefrom which able totality indepen long so as the of confession State, port the verdict. Davis v. 672 N.E.2d presented at trial establishes dent evidence 1365, (Ind.Ct.App.1996). 1366 Without State, 143, 544 N.E.2d 146 Morgan it. v. determining weighing thе evidence or wit- (Ind.1989). corpus may The delicti be estab if credibility, ness we will affirm a conviction Grey v. by circumstantial evidence. lished inferences establish that a the evidence and 1348, 439, 442, State, Ind. 404 N.E.2d 273 reasonably conclude that trier of fаct could (1980). 1350 beyond guilty a reason- the defendant was established, corpus here was The delicti State, Boushehry v. 648 N.E.2d able doubt. statement, by regard to Weida’s evi- without (Ind.Ct.App.1995). 1176 drinking that Farrell and Weida were dence establishes that the aсcident evidence afternoon beverages from the late alcoholic reported p.m. at 9:16 and that was Officer until after dark. The two left Weida’s Dittmaier arrived on the scene five seven Only up in a ditch. Far- truck which ended Officer Dittmaier had driven minutes later. present were rell and Weida were and both hour through the area about one earlier and This evidence establishes intoxicated. not the vehicle. The breath test was seen driving the influence the under offense jail to Weida at the at 10:09 administered by one of these two was in fact committed p.m. This evidence establishes that less than individuals. elapsed three hours between the accident acknowledge argument distin- and the administration of the breath test that We Weida’s qualitative quanti- .22 blood alcohol level. Un- guishing and a revealed Weida’s between circumstances, intoxication at the proving corpus der such tative standard for delicti. may person operated time the the vehicle be here satisfies either standard. The evidence

601 (Ind. State, v. 234 -15. See also See Jones presumed. State, 687, 692-93 Thompson Ct.App.1983) (discussing v. amendment to defi Although (Ind.Ct.App.1995), dwelling burglary trans. denied. statute and nitiоn of permits in- argues that the evidence noting legislative to statute amendment at that Weida not intoxicated pre ferences was is ‍‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‍that has been construed courts vehicle, operated it was for time he response appellate deci sumed to be to such any jury weigh sions). State, and draw evidence Haymaker See also jury’s (Ind.1996) inferences. We will not disturb (noting amend N.E.2d conclusions. declaring that ment to IC 35-50-2-10 and 1, 1996, July convictions un “effective

III.Double Enhancеment (operating der I.C. 9-30-5 a vehicle he was sub next claims that intoxicated) predicate will be as of available *4 impermissible enhance jected to an double for habitual offender en fenses substance operating he was of ment when convicted hancements.”). statutory Given the amend felony, a D rather intoxicated as Class ment, the double of Weida’s enhancement misdemeanor, upon A as a Class based than proper. sentence was conviction, a and when the existence of IV.Jury Instructions sentenced as an habitual substance he was upon of two based the existence offender the trial court Weida next contends that prior operating while intoxicated convictions. jury gave following it the instruc- erred when enhance claims such a double tion: supreme court’s prohibited our ment is the the of Indiana “Under Constitution State, in 658 pronouncements Freeman v. jury given right the to decide both the is (Ind.1995). N.E.2d 68 duty fulfilling the facts. law and In Freeman, supreme our court held that In actually you apply you as are the law legislature did not for a defendant the intend it, you disregard are it for find not to (op- under 9-30-5-3 punished both IC be any The of the court reason. instruсtions felony) D erating while as a Class intoxicated your determining in what are best source (habitual of- 35-50-2-10 substance and IC the law is.” fender). Because IC was the more 9-30-5-3 recognizes that Indiana Record at 56. Weida statutes, the court held spеcific of the two approved have a of this instruc courts form only punishment it was the to which See, many e.g., on occasions. Johnson v. tion subjected. may be Id. at 71. In a defendant (Ind.1988); State, 1073, 1076 case, supreme the court relied on companion (Ind. State, 131, 657 135 v. N.E.2d Jackson and stated that the absence of “[i]n Freeman abrogated grounds by Ct.App.1995), on other contrary, legislative language to the clear (Ind. State, Winegeart v. 665 N.E.2d 893 permit- be double enhancement cаnnot such 1996). Nonetheless, argues that we State, 740, v. 742 ted.” Devore light in of reexamine instruction should (Ind.1995). State, (Ind.1993). 622 954 Price v. N.E.2d in 1995 and Devore were decided Freeman in nothing that warrants ‍‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‍We see Price upon and its based IC 35-50-2-10 existing precedent conсerning and were changing as of offense” broad definition “substance challenged instruction. felony A or Class D any “Class misdemeanor V.Enhanced Sentence use, abuse, delivery, possession,

involving Finally, that the trial or of alcohol or Wеida claims transportation, manufacture Freeman, improperly imposed an enhanced sen 658 at 69-70. In court drugs.” N.E.2d felony trial 1996, Assembly the D The Indiana General amend- tence on conviction. upon statutory of- enhanced Weida’s sentence based definition of substance court ed the repeated of alcohol-related by adding language: “The term his commission fense 9-30-5_” despite probation the imposition of an offense under IC offenses includes 97-1996, imprisonment. court § 96- No. and Pub.L. No. and short-term Pub.L. 5 aggravating 1996, legislative lan- noted as an circumstance § This is the clear also 8. when he in extreme level of intoxication absent Freeman and Devore. Weida’s guage found 602 These were sufficient

operated his vehicle. MILLER, Appellant-Defendant, to enhance aggravating circumstances Phillip year presumptive term to one and one-half v. (one and one-half years. 35-50-2-7 D felo- term for Class years presumptivе is Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. of STATE State, N.E.2d ny). v. 620 See Scheckel No. 49A02-9706-CR-387. (ineffectiveness (Ind.1993) previous of re- 685 aggravating is valid habilitative treatment Appeals of Indiana. Court State, factor); N.E.2d Schick (continued March 1998. alcohol аbuse is (Ind.Ct.App.1991) factor), trans. denied. aggravating valid

Affirmed.

FRIEDLANDER, J., concurs.

SULLIVAN, J., part in and dis- ‍‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‍concurs part separate opinion.

sents

SULLIVAN, concurring part Judge, *5 dissenting part. I, II, fully respect to Parts

I concur with However,

IV, respect I dissent with and V.

to Part III. (1995) Ind., view, my

In Freeman v. State (1995) 68, and Devore v. State

Ind., viable as con- remain notwithstanding

trolling authority, the 1996 35-50-2-10. See also

amendment of I.C. (1996) Ind.App., 672

Morphew v. State By adding IC.

N.E.2d 461. offenses under

9-30-5, embracing all of the numerous of- Chapter, forth in that I.C. 35-50-

fenses set specific. broader not more

2-10 was made statutory 9-30- scheme reflected I.C. specific more of the two. Fur-

5 remains the

thermore, upon if one focuses I.C. ‍‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‍concerned, ap- are here it is

with which we compo- “previous conviction”

parent provision particular even

nent renders regard with to the specific

more and detailed statutory punishment. for

overall scheme reason,

For I would reverse the habit- re-

ual offender enhancement and substance the sentence to

mand for modification of years, only of two

reflect the sentence felony. year suspended, for the Class D

one

Case Details

Case Name: Weida v. State
Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals
Date Published: Mar 31, 1998
Citation: 693 N.E.2d 598
Docket Number: 08A02-9706-CR-351
Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.
Log In