WEEMS v. THE STATE
S23A1179
Supreme Court of Georgia
January 17, 2024
318 Ga. 98
Justice PINSON
FINAL COPY
On thе morning of June 3, 2018, a motorist driving down Bromack Drive in Fulton County saw a man lying in the front yard of a home, covered in blood and shaking back and forth. She called 911, and the man in the yard, Christopher Welch, was taken to the hospital where he died of blood loss from a gunshot wound to his head. As part of the investigation of Welch‘s shooting, the police entered the home that Welch was found in front of, and law enforcement fоund Welch‘s girlfriend, Chloe Dowdy, shot to death in one of the bedrooms. That bedroom belonged to Rufus Weems, who was later convicted of two counts of malice murder and other crimes related to Welch‘s and Dowdy‘s deaths.1
On appeal, Weems raises several claims. He contends that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his convictions as a matter of constitutional due process, and under
Each claim fails. The evidence was sufficient to support Weems‘s convictiоns as a matter of constitutional due process, and it authorized the jury to reject Weems‘s hypothesis that someone else was the shooter. As for the trial court‘s ruling on the general grounds, Weems has not established that the trial court applied the wrong standard, and his argument is otherwise not properly before us. The trial court was required to deny his motion for remote testimony under the relevant Superiоr Court rule after the State objected. And Weems has not shown that the trial court‘s repeating of a witness‘s testimony while ruling on an objection was an improper comment on the evidence. So
1. The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, showed the following. At the time of the shooting, Weems was staying in a spare room at the home of Lakesha Reed, who lived with her children, her mоther (Carrie Reed) and her brother (James Jordan III) on Bromack Drive in Fulton County. On the night of June 2, 2018, all of them, including Weems, ordered pizza and watched a movie at home. By 1:00 a.m. on June 3, 2018, everyone had gone to bed—Lakesha, Carrie, and Weems in their respective bedrooms (with the children split between Lakesha‘s and Carrie‘s rooms) and Jordan on the couch in the living room. In the early hours of that morning, Jordan wokе up because someone was walking from the hall bathroom to Weems‘s room with a flashlight. Jordan did not see who this was. Separately, Lakesha saw a stranger, who was using his phone as a flashlight, walk into the hallway bathroom that was across from her bedroom. She later identified the stranger as one of the shooting victims, Christopher Welch.
Still later that morning, close to sunrise, Jordan saw Weems leave and return with another man and go into Weems‘s bedroom. After Weems‘s bedroom door closed, Jordan heard gunshots. Lakesha and Carrie also heard the gunshots and hid in Carrie‘s bathroom with Jordan and the children. While in the bathroom, Lakesha and Carrie each looked out a window and saw Weems—who they each described as wearing a white tank top and basketball shorts—get into his car and drive away. Jordan did not see Weems when he looked out the window, but he saw Weems‘s car driving away.
Around 7:00 a.m. on June 3, Cynthia Johnson drove past Lakesha‘s home, heard gunshots, and saw two men leave the home. One of the men had a dark complexion and a “low haircut” and was wearing a white T-shirt and shorts and carrying a handgun; she saw him get into a car. The other man walked around the side of the building. After seeing this, Johnson stopped at a gas station fоr a few minutes, then got back in her car and drove by Lakesha‘s home again, where she saw Welch lying on the ground, covered in blood and shaking. Johnson stopped and called 911. She did not think that Welch was one of the two men she saw leaving the home earlier that morning. In the meantime, Lakesha, Carrie, and Jordan left their hiding place in Carrie‘s bathroom after they heard a woman outside the home screаm. They saw blood throughout the hallway leading to the front door.
Soon after, the police arrived. Welch was taken to the hospital, where he died of blood loss from a gunshot wound. At trial, the medical examiner explained that Welch had suffered two gunshot wounds—one to his hand, which was not fatal, and a second to his head, which caused him to bleed to death.
As part of the investigation of Welch‘s shooting, thе police entered Lakesha‘s home soon after arriving on June 3. Inside, officers found the body of Chloe Dowdy, Welch‘s girlfriend, in Weems‘s bedroom. Like Welch, Dowdy had also suffered two gunshot wounds—one to her head, which killed her instantly, and a second to her back.
Jacquelyn Holt testified that Welch and Dowdy had been staying at her apartment, but she asked them to stay somewhere else on the night of June 2. Around 11:00 that night, somеone drove Welch to Holt‘s house and picked up Dowdy.
Welch‘s mother testified that, two or three years earlier, Welch had brought Weems to her house at least twice, but she did not know whether the two men had stayed in touch. She last saw Welch on the Wednesday before his death, when he gave her some money. At that time, she saw that Welch had a large amount of cash in his backpack. A backpaсk full of cash was found at the crime scene. After the shooting, the Reed family gave law enforcement Weems‘s name. Detective Courtney Murphy testified that Weems also fit Johnson‘s description of the man she saw outside the house with a handgun. Lakesha, Carrie, and law enforcement tried calling Weems in the hours after the shooting. Lakesha spoke to Weems briefly on the phone, and he denied knowing anything аbout the shooting and refused to return to her home. Several days after the shooting,
2. Weems contends the evidence was not sufficient to support his two convictions for malice murder or his firearms convictions either as a matter of constitutional due process or under
(a) When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of due process, we view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the verdicts to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). In doing so, we do not “weigh the evidence on appeal or resolve conflicts in trial testimony,” Byers v. State, 311 Ga. 259, 266 (2) (857 SE2d 447) (2021) (citation and рunctuation omitted), but instead defer “to the jury‘s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence,” Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 692, 695 (878 SE2d 502) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).
The evidence here was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to authorize the jury‘s guilty verdicts for the two malice murders, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury‘s verdicts, the еvidence showed that Weems knew Welch, Lakesha saw Welch in the house with a flashlight, Jordan saw someone with a flashlight go into Weems‘s room, multiple gunshots were heard from his room, Dowdy‘s body was found shot to death in the same room, and only Weems emerged from the room unharmed. Weems also left the scene immediately after the shooting and while Welch was still alive but bleeding from his gunshot wounds. As discussed further below, the jury was аuthorized to reject Weems‘s defense that someone else was the shooter. Together, this evidence was constitutionally sufficient to authorize the jury to find Weems guilty of the two murders and the firearms offenses for which he was convicted.3 See Scoggins v. State, 317 Ga. 832 (_ SE2d _) (2023).
(b) When a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, the State must present sufficient evidence to “exclude every other reasonable hypothesis sаve that of the guilt of the accused.”
During the investigation of the shooting, an individual named Christina Eaves gave Jones‘s name to the police as a possible suspect, but Detective Murphy did not interview Jones. Weems called Jones to testify at trial. At trial, Jones denied knowing anything about the shooting at Bromack Drive or any of the individuals involved and said he was with his sister in Auburn, Alabama on the day of the shooting. He did not know that Eaves had given his name to the police as a potential suspect in the shooting and said Eaves was his ex-girlfriend and had been upset about their breakup around the time of the shooting in June 2018.
The evidence was also sufficient under
3. Weems claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial on the “general grounds.” See
In its order denying Weems‘s motion for new trial, the trial court ruled that “Defendant‘s case is not an exceрtional one where the evidence preponderates heavily against the jury‘s verdicts. On the contrary, the evidence heavily supported the verdicts. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise its discretion as the ‘13th juror’ to grant Defendant‘s request for a new trial under sections 5-5-20 and 5-5-21.” This order makes clear that the court applied the correct standard to this claim, so it did not abuse its discretiоn in that respect. See King, 316 Ga. at 616 (2) (concluding that the defendant‘s claim under the general grounds failed because the trial court “found that ‘the weight of the evidence does not preponderate heavily against the verdict and the verdict was not contrary to the evidence or the principles of justice and equity‘“). Weems‘s argument is otherwise not subject to review by this Court. See id.
4. Weems claims that the trial court erred by denying his request to present the testimony of Christina Eaves by videoconference.
At trial, Weems asked for Eaves to testify by videoconference under Uniform Superior Court Rule 9.2 (C) (2019). Defense counsel proffered that Eaves, who had left the State after being subpoenaed in Georgia, would testify that William Jones, who was also under subpoena, had confessed to her that he shot Welch and Dowdy. The version of Uniform Superior Court Rule 9.2 (C) in force at the time of Weems‘s 2019 trial provided that witnesses “may testify” by videoconference, but that in a criminal case, “a timely objection shall be sustained.” Uniform Superior Court Rule 9.2 (C) (2019). The State objected to Eaves testifying by videoconference because it had concerns about Eaves‘s credibility based on earlier conversations and wanted to bе able to confront her in person. So the trial court sustained the State‘s objection to the presentation of Eaves‘s testimony by videoconference. The trial court did not rule that Eaves‘s testimony was inadmissible, however: the court offered to assist defense counsel with securing Eaves‘s live testimony, including by entertaining a motion for funds to pay her travel expenses or to enforce an out-of-stаte subpoena. Weems did not take any of those steps and did not call Eaves to testify at trial, but he did call Jones as a witness.
Weems also contends that not having Eaves‘s testimony likely affected the verdict and deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense in violation of his due process rights under the federal and state Constitutions. But this constitutional claim was neither raised nor ruled on below, so it is not properly before us. See Mahdi v. State, 312 Ga. 466, 468 (1) (863 SE2d 133) (2021).
5. Weems contends that the trial court erred by improperly commenting on the evidence in violation of his state and federal due process rights, аs well as Georgia law, citing
At trial, Jordan testified that he “heard the lady screaming after 6:30.” The prosecutor then asked, “And what do you mean by that?” Defеnse counsel objected to the question. In addressing the objection, the trial court said, “Why don‘t you ask a more narrow question? There didn‘t seem to be ambiguity in the answer. He said he heard a lady scream after 6:30.” Weems argues that the trial court‘s final statement restating the witness‘s testimony was an improper comment on the evidence.
The trial court‘s statement did not obviously violate
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided January 17, 2024.
Murder. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Dempsey, Senior Judge.
David A. Hoort, Frances C. Kuo, for appellant.
Fani T. Willis, District Attorney, Kevin C. Armstrong, Mario Kladis, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Meghan H. Hill, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Matthew B. Crowdеr, Elizabeth Rosenwasser, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.