53 A. 1024 | N.H. | 1902
A construction of the clause in the deed, — "Reserving, however, the building situated on the last-described premises known as the chapel, together with the right to the land on which said building stands, said building to remain as long as the association owning the same may want it," — necessitates a determination of the extent of territory in which the plaintiff retained a property interest, and the nature of that interest. The investigation involves an ascertainment of the fact of the parties' intention from competent evidence. Johnson v. Conant,
In proceeding to construe the clause, it is the duty of the court to place itself as nearly as possible in the situation of the parties at the time the instrument was made, that it may gather their intention from the language used, viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances. It will inquire into the "actual, rightful state of the property" at that time (Dunklee v. Railroad,
It appears in this case, that at the time the deed was given the land or lot upon which the chapel stood was situated at the southeasterly junction of two roads; that it was enclosed by fixed *584 bounds, separating it from the balance of the farm; that upon it were horse-sheds constructed for the accommodation of persons coming in teams to attend worship in the chapel; that while the horse-sheds were not absolutely necessary to a reasonable occupation, use, and enjoyment of the chapel, they would render such that the chapel was used for religious purposes by an informal religious group or organization, called the Holiness Society, of which the plaintiff was a member; that the plaintiff owned the and chapel, the other members having no interest in the property; that the chapel, horse-sheds, and fences were plainly visible from points where the defendant traveled in making an examination of the property before purchasing; and that she saw the chapel and sheds, and saw or could have seen the fences, had she desired. This evidence establishes by a balance of probabilities that the parties understood and intended that the words "land on which said building [the chapel] stands" should mean the lot of land upon which the chapel stood and devoted exclusively to chapel purposes. The property retained by the plaintiff was the chapel lot as it existed at the time of the execution of the deed, with the sheds upon it.
The Holiness Society (the association referred to) owned no part of the property; and as the words "owning the same" are meaningless, they may be rejected. Holbrook v. Bowman
It matters not whether this clause is technically a reservation or an exception; such a classification lends no aid to its interpretation. The estate retained by the plaintiff in the lot is a fee, not because as a matter of law it "is an exception and not a reservation," but because the clause, "understood in the ordinary and popular sense of its terms," reserves an estate which may be of perpetual continuance. Cole v. Lake Co.,
Judgment for the plaintiff.
All concurred.