25 Conn. 494 | Conn. | 1857
This writ of error was brought upon the original record of the judgment rendered in the superior court. As that record has, since this writ of error was brought, in consequence of its not stating correctly the proceedings of that court, been amended and corrected by that court, so as to state those proceedings truly and formally, and a new record, on such correction, substituted, it is obvious that the latter is now the only subsisting record of the proceedings and judgment of the superior court in the case, and that the original record is annulled, and consequently, in contemplation of law, has no legal existence. It would therefore be futile, and indeed irregular, to treat it on this writ of error, as a subsisting record or evidence of the proceedings of the superior court. It moreover appears, by reference to the decree of that court, by which its original record was so amended, that the plaintiff in error (the defendant below) was thereby expressly perpetually enjoined from claiming, in any form or place, that the judgment of that court was not as it appears to have been by the amended record; so that, on this ground, it is not,competent for the
The first ground on which the plaintiff in error claims that the judgment of the superior court is erroneous, is that the court allowed interest on the sum for which the verdict was rendered, after deducting from that sum the $117, which was remitted by the plaintiff below, (the defendant in error.) The superior court, in pursuance of the advice of this court, refused a new trial in that case, provided the plaintiff should remit that amount, and it was remitted accordingly. It was found that, for the balance, the verdict was right, and that there was no reason for disturbing it. In respect to that balance, as the proper remittitur was made, the verdict was established, and a new trial was consequently refused. As the result showed that the collection of the amount of that balance was wrongfully delayed by the motion of the defendant below for a new trial, we think that the case was equitably, if not literally, within the terms of the rule established by the superior court, (18 Conn., 575,) that where a motion for a new trial made by a defendant does not prevail, he shall pay interest on the plaintiff’s debt while its collection is delayed by it. The defendant not having paid or offered to the plaintiff the amount to which the latter was rightfully entitled, as he might have done when the judgment was rendered, it is just that he should pay interest while payment of it was thus delayed. On this point, therefore, there is no error.
The judgment of the superior court is therefore affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges, Hinman and Ellsworth, concurred.
Judgment affirmed.