FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 11, 2014, plaintiff attended a yoga class at Claremont Yoga taught by Bumiller. According to plaintiff, Bumiller
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants alleging a single cause of action for negligence. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that defendants complied with the relevant standard of care for yoga facilities and instructors and that Bumiller's actions did not cause or contribute to plaintiff 's alleged injuries.
In support of their motion, defendants filed declarations from Jeffrey Deckey, M.D., and Jonathan Simons, Psy.D. Deckey, an orthopedic surgeon, declared that plaintiff 's injuries were due to "chronic degenerative disc diseаse and arthritic changes," not "a traumatic injury or acute injury"
Simons, a psychotherapist аnd yoga instructor, opined that Bumiller's actions as alleged by plaintiff "were within the standard of care for a yoga instructor teaching a Restorative yoga class." He declared that it was "quite common for yoga teachers to touch students during class and assist them when they are improperly doing yoga positions. Further, yoga instructors often adjust students and help them stretch during certain poses." Simons stated that "[t]he majority of yoga students desire the touching and assistance with poses described ... by [plaintiff]. This is a regular part of the yoga practice and an instructor would not know the student was unhappy or felt any pain unless the student so advised the instructor."
Plaintiff opposed the motion but did not file any witness declarations. She objected to the Simons declaration as lacking foundation and the Deckey declaration as "inherently unbelievable." (Boldface, underlining, and capitalization omitted.) Shе disputed the conclusions in those declarations, citing her own deposition testimony and medical records as well as the deposition of one of Claremont Yoga's owners, Nicole Riel.
The trial court overruled plaintiff 's objections to the Simons and Deckey declarations and granted thе motion for summary judgment. It found that plaintiff had failed to produce evidence disputing Simons's conclusion that Bumiller's conduct met the applicable standard of care. It further found that defendants had established that they had not caused plaintiff 's injuries, and plaintiff had failed to provide any competing expert testimony.
Plaintiff appealed from the judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
"We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, 'considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except that to whiсh objections have been made and sustained.' " ( Sakai v. Massco Investments, LLC (2018)
DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff Failed To Show A Triable Issue Of Material Fact That Defendants Breached The Applicable Standard Of Care.
Plaintiff argues that her deposition testimony regarding Bumiller's actions as well as Nicole Riel's testimony were sufficient to show a triable issue of material fact as to defendants' breach of their duty of care. We disagree.
To prove negligence, a plaintiff must show breach of a legal duty and " 'that the breach was a proximate or legal cause of injuries suffered by the plaintiff.' " ( Sakai , supra ,
"In negligence cases arising from the rendering of professional services, as a general rule the standard of cаre against which the professional's acts are measured remains a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts. Only their testimony can prove it, unless the lay person's common knowledge includes the conduct required by the particular circumstances." ( Unigard Ins. Group v. O'Flaherty & Belgum (1995)
Here, defendant's expert Simons explained in his declaration the normal practices of yoga instructors in touching students to adjust their position and help
It was incumbent on plaintiff to contradict this evidence with competing expert testimony. She did not do so. There is no suggestion in the record, nor does plaintiff argue on appeal, that she herself is an expert on the standard of care in the yoga instruction industry. And Riel, even if she could be considered an expert, did not opine on the standard of care or whether Bumiller met it; the portion of her testimony cited by plaintiff simply stated that Bumiller "has a very gentle touch. I have never seen him touch in a way that would suggest otherwise." We reject plaintiff 's suggestion that her testimony that Bumiller was aggressive, contrasted with Riel's testimony that Bumiller normally was gentle, was sufficient to show a deviation from the standard of care absent expert testimony as to what the appropriate standard of care was.
Plaintiff argues that an expert's testimony is nоt determinative, even when uncontradicted, because a jury may reject it. (See, e.g., Conservatorship of McKeown (1994)
Plaintiff argues that yoga teachers are not subject to the rules for professional negligence, and there is no standard of care for all practitioners of yoga, just "many methods and ... means by which one may be a practitioner of yoga." Surely, however, "the lay person's common knowledge" would not include "the conduct required by the particular circumstances" of a yoga instructor in Bumiller's position, and an expert's opinion on the question would be of benefit. ( Unigard , supra ,
The trial court correctly held that plaintiff had failed to show a triable issue of material fact as to whether defendants breached the standard of care, аnd properly granted summary judgment on that basis.
B. Plaintiff Failed To Show A Triable Issue Of Material Fact That Defendants Caused Her Alleged Injuries.
Plaintiff contends that her medical records were sufficient to dispute
As a general matter, juries may decide issues of causation without hearing expert testimony. ( Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985)
Here the causation issue was complex. In moving for summary judgment, defendants сontended, per the Deckey declaration, that plaintiff 's injuries "were due to chronic degenerative disc disease and arthritic changes" as opposed to "an acute or traumatic injury." It would be beyond the ability of a lay juror to determine, in the absence of expert testimony, whethеr plaintiff 's injuries were caused by Bumiller's actions, a chronic condition, or some other mechanism. Plaintiff cites no authority to the contrary. The trial court did not err in concluding that proof of causation in this case required expert testimony.
Plaintiff 's medical records did not satisfy this requirement. Setting aside the question whether medical records standing alone can substitute for expert
An October 15, 2014 record indicates that plaintiff reported neck pain "caused by yoga instructor per patient," with plaintiff explaining that the instructor pulled on her neck and pushed on her shoulders. Although the doctor apparently diagnosed plaintiff with "neck muscle strain" (capitalization omitted), the record does not indicate the doctor concluded that the strain was caused by plaintiff 's yoga instructor, only that plaintiff believed the yoga instructor's actions were the cause. The record states "trap muscle strain 2/2 yoga," but this is not a finding of causation. To the extent plaintiff believes otherwise, she would need to establish it through testimony by her treating physician or an expert familiar with medical shorthand. A lay juror could not reach that conclusion in the absence of еxpert assistance.
An October 31, 2014 record again notes neck strain "per [patient] due to yoga," with no indication that the doctor agreed with plaintiff 's assessment.
A November 24, 2014 record indicates a follow-up exam for the neck strain, with no reference to its cause.
A January 20, 2015 record refers to neck strain, with plaintiff herself reporting that the pain had been a "[p]ersistent issue since straining it in yoga 2-3 months ago."
A January 26, 2015 record from a physical therapy appointment quotes plaintiff 's report of yoga injury from the previous
A February 3, 2015 record indicates plaintiff spoke by telephone with a registered nurse and later a doctor and reported neck pain and swelling.
A February 18, 2015 recоrd indicates under "History" (underlining omitted) that plaintiff reported pain triggered by her "new yoga instructor" pulling on her neck. Later, the report states, "Chronic neck pain after neck was manipulated by a new yoga instructor." This would appear to be an indication of what plaintiff was reporting as opposed to a conclusion by the doctor as to causation; again, to the extent plaintiff contends otherwise, she would have to establish it through testimony from the doctor or a medical expert.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are awarded their costs on appeal.
We concur:
JOHNSON, Acting P. J.
CURREY, J.
Notes
Defendants also argued that plaintiff had signed a contract limiting defendants' liability. The trial court rejected the contract as a basis for granting summary judgment and it is not at issue in this appeal.
Plaintiff does not challenge on appeal the trial court's overruling of her objections to the opinion.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.