No. 118 | 4th Cir. | Jun 5, 1895
(after stating the facts). Is this ordinance of the city of Alexandria a regulation of and a tax upon commerce between the states? There can be no question that a state, and municipal corporations within a state, acting under state authority, can impose a license upon all business conducted by common carriers within a state. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1882-04-18" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/telegraph-co-v-texas-90600?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="90600">105 U. S. 460; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Alabama State Board of Assessment, 132 U.S. 472" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1889-12-16" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/western-union-telegraph-co-v-alabama-state-board-of-assessment-92620?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="92620">132 U. S. 472, 10 Sup. Ct. 161; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City Council of Charleston, 153 U.S. 692" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1894-05-14" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/postal-telegraph-cable-co-v-charleston-93928?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="93928">153 U. S. 692, 14 Sup. Ct. 1094. But in the imposition of such tax the interstate business must be discriminated from the infra state business, or it must be made capable of such discrimination, so that it may clearly appear that the infra state business alone is taxed.
“The act, after defining in its first section what shall constitute an express company, or what shall be deemed to be such in the sense of the act requiring such express company to file with the state auditor an annual report ‘showing the eniii-e receipts for business done within the state of each agent of such company doing- business in this state,’ etc., further provides that the amount which any express company pays ‘to the railroads or steamboats within this state for the transportation of their freight within this state’ may bo deducted from the gross receipts of.the company on such business, and the act also requires the company making the statement of its receipts to include as such all sums earned or charged ‘for the business done within this state,' etc. It is manifest that these provisions of the statute, so far from imposing a tax on receipts derived from the transportation of goods between other sta tes and Missouri, expressly limit the tax to receipts for sums earned and charged for business done within the state. This positive and oft-repeated limitation to business done within the state — that is, business begun and ended within the state — is evidently intended to exclude, and the language employed does exclude, the idea that the tax is to bo imposed on the interstate business of the company.”
The language used in the ordinance discussed in Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City Council of Charleston, supra, is equally clear in its discrimination:
‘Telegraph companies or agents each for business done exclusively within the city of Charleston, and not including any business done to or from points without the state, and not including any business done for tho government of the United States, its officers and agents, S500.”
The ordinance of the city of Alexandria makes no discrimination whatever between business done without and within the state; but, imposing a tax on the company if it has an office in that city, and if some of its business is between points in the state of Virginia, is repugnant to the interstate commerce law, and is void.
The decree of the circuit court is affirmed, with costs.