118 Misc. 91 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1922
It seems to me clear beyond possible argument or contention that the plaintiff corporation is organized exclusively for charitable or benevolent purposes and that its real property is held exclusively for such purposes and is exempt under subdivision 7, section 4 of the Tax Law. The corporation was formed to carry out a provision in the will of the late Charles B. Webster in which he created a trust fund to be used for the erection of an apartment building and directed “ that the said apartments shall not be conducted for profit but solely for the purpose of providing unmarried working women with homes and wholesome food at a small cost to them and in deserving cases without cost to them," and further directing “ that the directors of the said corporation shall fix the rentals for the said apartments and the prices for the food to be served in the said restaurant with the view of carrying out that purpose; and the cost of maintaining the said apartments- and restaurant in excess of the receipts therefrom shall be met from such income as the said corporation may have, exclusive of the receipts from said rentals and restaurant.” The objects of the plaintiff, as stated in its certificate of incorporation, include: “ to generally improve the conditions of unmarried working women and particularly to establish, maintain and conduct apartments in the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, for occupation by unmarried working women regardless of their religious belief or nationality and wherein they may find comfortable and attractive homes," and this purpose is expressly limited and defined by the inclusion in the certificate of incorporation of the words contained in Mr. Webster’s will quoted above. The defendant makes no claim that the purpose of the bequest and of the corporation formed to carry out its terms is not praiseworthy and will not prove beneficial to the working women for whom homes may be provided in the building to be erected. It does not claim that these benefits are to be limited to the members of any particular or favored class but it does claim that “ the plaintiff must go further and show that the recipients of its alleged charity are persons in need of assistance and proven objects of charity.” To restrict the meaning of the word “ benevolent ” as used in the Tax Law to such a purpose would clearly be contrary to the intent of the legislature and to the public policy of the state as defined in all the previous decisions of this and other courts. It may well be presumed that the working
Judgment is, therefore, directed for the plaintiff.
Ordered accordingly.