90 Wis. 467 | Wis. | 1895
The circumstances under which the several judgments were confessed, entered, and docketed, and the several executions issued and levied, and this action commenced, and the receiver appointed and qualified, were well calculated to invite thorough judicial investigation. Assuming that such judgments, executions, and levies were the result of collusive and fraudulent purposes of giving and obtaining unlawful preferences and to defraud other creditors, still the questions recur whether the receiver, or Stearns & Spingarn as mere creditors at large, were in a position to successfully invoke the equity powers of the trial court, to set aside such judgments, executions, and levies, in whole or in part. The statute prescribes five classes of cases in
Where a receiver is appointed in such an action or proceeding, he may, as the representative of such judgment creditor or creditors, successfully invoke the equity powers -of a court in setting aside fraudulent transfers previously made by such judgment debtor. But here the receiver was not appointed in any such action or proceeding, and there is no claim that he represents any such judgment creditor. He was appointed in a suit by two of the partners of an insolvent firm against the other partner for the ostensible purpose of winding up the business of the firm. By such appointment he succeeded to all rights of action belonging to the firm, and occupies, in general, substantially the same relation to the creditors of the firm and those claiming liens upon firm property which was previously occupied by the firm. 20 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 235; Beach, Receivers, § 576; High, Receivers, § 495. The judgments, executions,- and levies were certainly binding as against Weber Bros. Clemens v. Clemens, 28 Wis. 637; Dietrich v. Koch, 35 Wis. 618; Davy v. Kelley, 66 Wis. 452. Upon the principle already stated, the same is true as against the -receiver in this .-action. But the receiver was not a necessary party to a suit or proceeding by other creditors than those having such judgments, to set aside the levies made before his appoint
But counsel seek a departure from these well-established rules of law, on the ground that the trial court, by the order of September 5, 1894, appointing a receiver and sequestrating the property of the firm, expressly restrained “ all persons having claims or demands against the said partnership . . . from commencing any action against said copart-nership.” That portion of that order was certainly improvidently granted, and must be regarded as a nullity. It tends to support the argument of counsel that the judgments, executions, and levies mentioned were procured by collusion with the debtors and for unlawful purposes. But, however strong may be our suspicions in that direction, we must, nevertheless, declare the law as it is, leaving creditors at large to such remedies as they may be advised. Certainly, the trial court could not, by such order, bar Stearns & Spingarn, or any other creditors at large, from commencing and maintaining a personal action against .Weber Bros., nor
The orders mentioned are appealable. E. S. sec. 3069. They affect the sheriff individually and as the representative of the parties named; and the attorneys represent their clients as well as themselves.
By the Court.— The several portions of the orders of the superior court of Milwaukee county of September 25,1891, and October 11,1894, which are appealed from, are reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings according to law.