This is an appeal by an employee from a decree entered upon his petition for an award of compen-' sation under Chapter 831 of the Public Laws on account of personal injury sustained in the course of petitioner’s employment with the respondent.
Nearly all of the allegations of the petition are admitted by the respondent in its answer. The answer raises issues only as to the extent of the injury, as to the petitioner’s incapacity for work, and, dependent upon these two issues, as to the amount of the award.
The testimony, among other things, shows the following facts: The petitioner had for three years and a half been a foreman and overseer in the mill of the respondent; he had had forty-five years’ experience in silk manufacture and was. skilled in determining by feeling with the hand the quality of silk, both in its raw and in its manufactured state. At the hearing he testified that he was fifty-nine years of age *311 and was unmarried. As foreman he gave orders to those under him, saw that the machines were kept properly .adjusted, and gave out and looked after all of the work. If he personally fixed a machine, it was necessary to use both •of his hands in doing it. He always had, however, in the mill, subject to his orders, a second hand competent under his direction to fix the machines. His wages were $31.24 a week. He was injured October 15, 1914, and was taken to the Rhode Island Hospital; but, beyond having his hand bandaged, declined treatment therein and shortly after went to New York for treatment. He returned to Providence early in January, 1915, and in the latter part .of February or early in March following the respondent offered the petitioner his former position as foreman at the same wages as before, but the petitioner did not accept the offer and claimed that he was not able to work. It is also in testimony without contradiction that the suggestion was made to the president of the respondent corporation in behalf of the petitioner that the latter would come back as foreman and perform the same work as before, but at less wages. The place was held open for him for several months, but he never returned to it. It also appeared that in this ■country there are positions in silk factories for only seven foremen. The petitioner testified that he had been unable to work since the accident happened, but did not show that he had tried to do so. There was medical testimony that no reason was apparent from his condition why petitioner on April 22nd, when he was examined, should not do “any kind of ordinary manual labor.”
The case was heard June 30, 1915, and a decree was •entered the following 7th day of July, awarding the petitioner $382. The reasons of appeal are nine in number.
The finding of fact relative to the extent of the injury, as •embodied in paragraph (3) of the decree, is that the petitioner’s “left hand was injured in such manner that the index finger thereof was afterwards amputated between the :second joint and the third joint, and that a small piece of bone *312 in the thumb of said hand and pieces of tendons and flesh were lost, and the said thumb has been rendered permanently stiff. That the power of rotating said thumb has not-been lost, and the petitioner still has the power of pressing, said thumb against the other fingers of his said hand, although said pressure is light and without force. That said thumb has not been amputated or severed, but that a small piece of' bone and pieces of tendons and flesh of said thumb have been severed. That the remaining three fingers of said hand were not and are not injured or impaired in any way. That-the said hand is a useful and serviceable hand except in the manipulation of small objects.”
The petitioner does not in his reasons of appeal question the correctness of these findings of fact as to the character and extent of the injury. He does, however, claim in the third and fourth reasons of appeal that the court erred in finding that under Section 12 of Article II' of said chapter the petitioner was entitled to compensation for the loss of one finger only, as provided for in paragraph (d) of said section and also erred in not finding him entitled under paragraph (c) of the same section to compensation for twenty-five-weeks. He urges that these are errors of law.
So much of Section 12 as is pertinent to the questions thus-raised is as follows. "Sec. 12. In case of the following-specified injuries the amounts named in this section "shall be-paid in addition to all other compensation provided for in this act: . . . (c) For the loss by severance at or above the second joint of two or more fingers, including thumbs, or toes, one-half the average weekly wages, earnings or salary of the injured person, but not more than ten dollars, nor less than four dollars a week, for a period of twenty-five-weeks, (d) For the loss by severance of at least onephalange of a finger, thumb, or toe, one-half the average weekly wages, earnings or salary of the injured person, but-not more than ten dollars, nor less than four dollars a week,, for a period of twelve weeks.”
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The first and second reasons of appeal taken together claim that the foregoing finding of fact is erroneous. The seventh and ninth reasons of appeal may also be taken to refer to the same finding.
Giving the decree the meaning before stated, inasmuch as there is evidence to support the finding of fact of the Superior Court, this, court, following the rule of interpretation of the statute adopted in Jillson v. Boss, 38 R. I. 145, and Gorral v. W. H. Hamlyn & Son, 38 R. I. 249, will and does accept this finding as conclusive. The first, second, seventh and ninth reasons of appeal, in so far as they relate to this finding, «are, therefore, destitute of merit. «
In the present case, it appears that the petitioner, while ■•claiming no general impairment of his health ánd no disability whatever, except such as arises from the injury to the thumb and finger, has neither done nor attempted to do any work since his injury, either in his former position as foreman or in any other way; and, if it be suggested that the offer of the respondent to reemploy him at the former rate of wages did not necessarily imply permanency of employment, the fact still remains that the petitioner has presented no evidence showing loss of earning capacity or which would enable a court to make an award of compensation for partial incapacity after April 1st. The eighth reason of appeal is accordingly without merit.
The fifth and sixth reasons of appeal and so much of the first reason as charges error in the finding of the decree that the petitioner refused to resume his former employment do not require discussion as there is evidence to support the findings of the court to which they relate. They are accordingly not sustained.
The petitioner’s appeal is denied and dismissed; the decree of the Superior Court is affirmed and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.