119 Pa. 223 | Pa. | 1888
Lead Opinion
Opinion,
The question principally discussed in this case is a novel one. It does not appear to have ever been determined or even presented in this court before. Briefly stated it is this: whether a defendant in a criminal ease who alleges his insanity at the time of arraignment is entitled, as a matter of legal right, to have a separate, independent and preliminary trial of that question by a jury specially impaneled for the purpose.
It is certainly the fact that the 66th and 67th sections of our criminal code of 1860 are substantially, almost literally, taken from the English statute of 39 and 40 Geo. III., c. 94, and that under that statute the English criminal courts do, not infrequently, award preliminary issues to determine the sanity of prisoners by the verdict of a jury. The same is true of the practice in several of our sister states. We have examined with much care the various authorities cited in the very able and exhaustive argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error, and we find that in all of them the inquest was directed, generally by the court of its own motion, sometimes at the instance of the attorney general, but always in cases where the appearance and actions of the prisoner were such as to manifestly indicate a condition of insanity, either real or
In the cases in which this subject has received consideration, the doctrine has been expressed in accordance with these views. In Whart. Crim. Law, 8th edition, vol. 1, § 58, it is thus said: “ By the common law if it be doubtful whether a criminal who, at his trial, in appearance is a lunatic, be such in truth or not, the issue shall be tried by the jury who are charged to try the indictment; or, being a collateral issue, the fact may be pleaded and replied to ore tenus and a venire awarded, returnable instanter, in the nature of an inquest of office. If it be found by the jury that the party only feigns himself a lunatic and he still refuse to answer, he was, before the act of Geo. IV., c. 28, § 2, dealt with as one who stood mute and as if he had confessed the indictment. The principal point to be considered by the jury would be whether the defendant has a sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of the proceedings on the trial so as to be able to make a proper defence. Whether the prisoner was sane or insane at the time the act was committed, is a question
In the case of Freeman v. The People, 4 Den. 9, cited for the plaintiff in error, the question arose upon a section of the Code which provides, “No insane person can be tried, sentenced to any punishment, or punished for any crime while he continues in that state.” The court said, “ The statute is explicit that no insane person can be tried, but it does not state in what manner the fact of insanity shall be ascertained. That is left as at common law and, although in the discretion of the court, other modes than that of trial by jury may be resorted to, still in important cases that is regarded as the most discreet and proper course to be adopted.” In the case of Jones v. The State, 13 Ala. 157, the court said: “ But in the case before us the judge did not see proper to test the prisoner’s sanity by a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether he was capable of pleading to the indictment or not; he did plead and a trial and conviction was the result, although we are of opinion that the facts disclosed in the bill of exceptions might well have warranted the preliminary inquiry as to the prisoner’s mental condition, yet this must be left to the sound discretion of the court below.”
In State v. Arnold, 12 Ia. 483, the court said: “The court is to inquire into the prisoner’s mental condition at the time he appears for arraignment. In determining whether a reasonable doubt exists as to his sanity before impaneling a jury, the judge is not confined alone to the case made by the counsel .....but may in his discretion investigate the whole matter and determine whether the necessity exists for the inquiry. But the inquiry should not be allowed, if from all the circumstances he has no reason to doubt his sanity.” The foregoing was said in construing a statute of the state of Iowa, which
The foregoing are the only text books and reports of cases which we have met with, in which the subject we are considering has been discussed or decided, and they all concur substantially in the proposition that it is only in cases of doubt as to the sanity of the prisoner upon arraignment, that a preliminary inquiry is to be ordered. This being so, it is manifest that neither the assertion of the prisoner or his counsel, nor the production of affidavits, nor the entering of a plea of present insanity upon the record, can of themselves alone suffice to produce the state of doubt which is a necessary prerequisite to the ordering of the inquiry. They are all necessarily addressed to the court, as there is no other tribunal to entertain them; and it is the court, after all, which must be affected by the various considerations which are supposed to, or in fact do, produce the doubt which must precede any order for an inquiry.
It follows of course, that other considerations than those stated may affect the judicial mind and induce the existence of a doubt. A personal inspection of the prisoner, an examination of him whether public or private, inquiry from an attending physician or from those around the prisoner who have means of knowledge, all of these, and, doubtless, other facts or testimony, may contribute to the creation of doubt in the mind of the judge and for that reason all may be resorted to ; but, if after all have transpired, the judge has no doubt of the prisoner’s sanity, he is neither bound, nor would he be justified in ordering an inquest. It is the judicial conscience alone which can determine this question, and it is that conscience only which must be informed so that it may act intelligently.
These views dispose of the question.
The absolute right of the prisoner to have the question of his sanity tried by a jury is not at all affected. Nor was it in any manner denied to the prisoner in this case. The question
There is nothing in the 66th and 67th sections of our criminal code of 1860 which requires a different conclusion from the one we have reached. The 66th section directs, that if upon the trial the prisoner shall be acquitted by the jury upon the ground that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offence, they shall so declare specially, and thereupon the court shall order him to be kept in strict custody so long as he shall continue of unsound mind. The 67th section merely provides that if upon arraignment he shall be found to be a lunatic by a jury lawfully impaneled for the purpose, the same proceedings shall be had. Certainly this ought to be so, for if the fact of insanity be found by a jury whether before the trial or on the trial, the same power to hold him in custody during the continuance of the insanity ought to be exercised. The court cannot find the prisoner to be insane, for that is matter of fact to be found by a jury. But if the court has, upon arraignment, reason to think him insane, or even has doubt upon that subject, they may order an inquest for the purpose of trying that question; and then, if the inquest should find him insane, the order for custody may be made, and this is the whole meaning of the act. There is nothing in its letter or spirit which makes it obligatory upon the court to order a preliminary inquest.
In view of the evidence offered and admitted on the trial in support of the allegation of insanity, we think the learned court below could with entire propriety have heard the testimony offered when the application for a preliminary inquiry was made. And if, after hearing it, the judge had entertained doubt as to the present sanity of the prisoner, it would have been his duty to award an inquest for the trial of that fact before any further proceedings were had. This was not done, but the jury has now found that the prisoner was not insane, either at the time of the trial or at the commission of the of-fence. The verdict was reached after a patient hearing of all the testimony relied upon by the prisoner, and after a fair and
The 20th assignment is without merit. What happened at the previous visit of the prisoner to Martin’s store was no part of the res gestee occurring at the shooting, and there was nothing in the examination in chief of Mrs. Martin which would make it a subject of cross-examination.
The language of the court covered by the 31st assignment is fully sustained by the testimony of Mrs. Martin who testified that her husband said to the prisoner, “ Oh! you can’t frighten me that way. The pistol was then held to him. Webber fired then, in as quick succession as he could fire.”
The rejected question covered by the 21st assignment was
The evidence offered and rejected under the remaining assignments related to the earlier history of the prisoner, and was directed mainly to the inquiry whether he had been of a kind and affectionate disposition'. A time was stated, about 1885, when a change was noticed in his temper and in his actions. All the witnesses were allowed the fullest latitude in describing this change, and in doing so his former disposition was described. His mother testified that “he was always good to us and sent us several times money in Germany.” His brother testified, “He was always a good friend to me and we never fought together.” His wife testified, “His treatment was right good up to 1885,” and then described the change which took place in him in that year and continued afterwards. She also said, “His manner was very different than before 1885. He was always very affectionate. He always thought no one was like his family, particularly his little girl.”
Some of the offers of testimony were rejected and not fully supplied by testimony afterwards; as, for instance, that he was the principal means of support of his parents from 1873 to 1881. We cannot see the relevancy of this offer, nor how its exclusion harmed the prisoner, when it was subsequently proved that he sent money to his parents in Germany several times, and that when they came to America they lived with him. The offer to show that the prisoner’s father had been a merchant in Germany and failed, was certainly irrelevant, and so also the offer to prove that the prisoner had been the means of his brother Paul obtaining employment in 1881. Everything else covered by these assignments was in fact given in evidence, as was also everything that was offered as to his mental condition from the time the change was noticed in 1885 until the offence was committed.
We do not see any errors in this record which would warrant a reversal of the judgment.
The judgment of the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Philadelphia county is affirmed and it is ordered that the record be remitted to said court for the purpose of carrying the sentence into execution.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
Being in accord with the majority of my brethren, except as to certain specifications of error which, in my humble opinion, imperatively demand a reversal of the judgment, I propose to address myself, as briefly as possible, to the general question involved in those specifications, viz.: Did the learned judge of the Oyer and Terminer err in either of his rulings relating to the application of prisoner’s counsel for a preliminary inquiry, such as is contemplated by the first clause of the 67th section of our criminal procedure act, to determine, “by a jury lawfully impaneled for the purpose,” whether the prisoner was, at the time of his arraignment a lunatic or not ?
If it were not for what I conceive to be manifest error in the rulings of the learned judge in that regard, especially his refusal to even hear any evidence in support of the application, I would be in favor of affirming the judgment; but, with these radical errors patent upon the face of the record, resulting as I believe, in an improper conviction of the prisoner who, according to the weight of the evidence, was insane when he was compelled to plead to the indictment, and probably in the same condition of mind when he committed the homicide, I am constrained to dissent and put on record my reasons for so doing.
I have no sympathy whatever with the pettifogging and groundless defences of insanity that are too often interposed to shield the guilty from merited punishment; but the case at bar is not one of that class, as the evidence which the learned counsel by their diligence, unaided by the prisoner, were able to adduce on the trial, will show. That evidence tends to prove that, before the marked change in his mental condition occurred and he became the victim of delusions, he was peaceable, industrious and thrifty; a kind and affectionate son, husband and father, exemplary in all the relations of life. But let the testimony-of a few witnesses speak for itself.
George P. Mueller: “ I knew the prisoner. Got acquainted with him in 1877. He was not then in my employ. I engaged him in 1878. He was recommended to me as an industrious man; engaged him as engineer and machinist. He was 'a good workman, the kind .of man I was looking for, and was steady in his work. In the fall of 1885, I noticed disturb
■ Oscar, aint you mistaken ? ’ He said, no, I saw them and that proves it. I talked to him for an hour and tried to get the idea out of his head, but he said ‘ no.’ He went away and came the following day, and staid in my place till towards evening. I said to him, go and see the doctor. I noticed his expression and whole conversation were like that of a man who was suspicious. I told him ■ to go see Dr. Schrotz; see what he says, etc. I told him, ‘ Oscar, go round 6th street where I get my dinners and get a good supper.’.....I went home at 7 o’clock, took supper and all at once heard my name called......I saw it was Oscar Webber. I said, ‘Oscar, what’s the matter?’ He said, ‘Mr. Mueller, I had to do it. While I was at supper three men followed me, and when I ate supper they looked at me.’ He said he did not eat supper in the restaurant, as he did not want to be poisoned. He said, ‘ I left there and the men followed me, while I was going to Dr. Schrotz.’ He said he was afraid the men would catch him. He said he went over different streets to escape them, until he got to Sixth and Berks streets. I took him in. My wife and sister-in-law pitied him. His condition was like, I don’t know what. I said, ‘Oscar, sit down and eat some supper.’ My wife said to me, ‘go down and see Dr. Schrotz.’ Dr. Schrotz came up at 9 o’clock, called Webber into the parlor, and he talked to him. I don’t know what he said. I got a prescription made for him. Dr. Schrotz went away. We took Webber to bed, and thought all was right.' After midnight some one came down and knocked at our door. I got up, opened the door, and Oscar was there. I said, ‘why, Oscar, what do you want ? ’ He said, ‘ some one got in the window, and it was the men who followed me.’ I said to him, he was wrong, there was no one there I’m sure. I went down
Dr. Julius Schrotz: “I have practiced medicine 31 years. My office is 808 North Eighth street. That is the man referred to by Mr. Mueller (pointing to prisoner). I knew the prisoner. Never knew him before that night when I was called. I got there at 8 o’clock. Was in the parlor with Webber. He was very much excited, and said he feared persecution by men who followed him all the time. I tried to have him go home, but he wouldn’t do it. I gave a prescription for him ; told Mrs. Mueller he might be noisy at night. Two months afterward he came in again, and asked for a certificate of sound mind. I referred him to his family physician. At that time he was out of his mind, suffering from hallucinations. When I saw him he undoubtedly was not in his right mind.”
Dr. Eugene Lamparter: “ Have been practicing since 1866. I know the prisoner for 9 or 10 years. He used to come to me to consult me for himself and family.....I remember meeting the prisoner on 13th street during 1866, about August. He was disturbed and excited. I asked him where he was going. He said his brother was in his house with his wife; he had caught him. He told me if he found him again he would try and shoot him. I told him I did not believe him. He had but one brother at home. I tried to persuade him not to believe such a thing. He said he would have shot' him then, but his brother got out of the key-hole. He said his brother was a gifted boy and could get in or out of cracks.
R. F. S. Heath: “ I was a manufacturer of straw goods, and formerly in the firm of Mueller & Co. I knew the prisoner.' He came to us in 1878 and remained as long as I was a member of the firm, which was up to January, 1885. I always found him gentlemanly, and quiet, and industrious, and we never had any difficulty with him. He came to my store afterwards, in 1886; he talked strangely about a physician, and his own family; that they conspired to get him away, and he left with me three or four kinds of medicine. He said they were poison, and I destroyed them. He had a vacant look and talked strangely. He frightened my daughter. I say he
Mrs. Parvin: “ Know the prisoner. Lived next to him for three years up to 1886. He lived in a three story brick house. For the three years that I saw him he was a quiet man, devoted to his family. Question: Did you notice any change in him ? Answer: All at once he became very noisy. He would come home making excitement all the time. This was in the latter part of 1885. He accused his wife of doing things I don’t think she had done. He came out of the house with a wild look, as if some one was following him. His wife came and told me what he said of her. One Sunday I sent my daughter up for his wife’s father, I thought he would kill her. He came up Thirteenth street on a street-car, and jumped in the parlor window, without trying to open the door. It was in the middle of the day.”
J. H. Lloyd, M. D.: “Live at 40th and Walnut streets; have been practicing for ten years; am connected with the nervous department of the University Hospital.....I have heard testimony in this case. I make up my opinion from the observation and history of the case. I have examined prisoner five times. Question: Assuming the facts to be true that were presented by defendant, what is your opinion of hi3 mental condition ? Answer: I believe him to be insane. I base my opinion, first, on his change of character and habits; second, the formation by him of delusions of persecutions; these delusions were that his food was being poisoned, that his wife was unfaithful, that his fellow workmen were false to him, the instance of his being followed by night. Those are some of the main persecutions and delusions testified to which I now recall. I remember also he suspected the use of chloroform, and he believed that his wife could transform men into lower animals. I remember also the delusion as to putting of poison in his food. I cannot give the exact date of the four examinations of prisoner I have made. I have not my note books here. The last time I examined him was on Wednesday. In examining him I can state in general terms that I received evasive answers. There were few direct answers to'
Dr. Charles K. Mills: “ Office 1909 Chestnut street; have been practicing since .1869; practice in Episcopal Hospital, University Hospital and the Norristown Hospital for Insane; have given special attention to nervous and mental diseases; have a very large experience with nervous diseases and the insaiie; see such cases every day in hospitals and private cases. During the testimony here I have been present a large part of the time. Once I went out of court to send a telegram, and one morning I was a few minutes late in getting to court. I have made examinations of the prisoner in Moyamensing prison four or five times. I examined him in January, February, May and June, and a few days ago, last week on Wednesday.....It was impossible to get a direct, explicit reply to any question; he would make but few direct answers. His manner and tone were very peculiar.....His answers were not sensible, he would occasionálly utter a sentiment that would be sensible.....He impressed me as a man who was suspicious, restless, and whose mind was unhinged. My opinion is that this man is a very insane man, from the evidence and as a result of these examinations. In forming my opinion upon the evidence, I considered his suspicions of chloroform being given him, and of unfaithfulness of his wife. The scene about the revolver, that he broke a hole in door by which latch
On cross-examination Dr. Mills said: “In the facts I have heard testified to of the shooting of Mr. Martin, it might have been either the result of Webber’s delusion or of revenge. It might be either. If his mind was obscured by its general delusional condition, relative to suspicion, I do not think it would be revenge, but would be the act of an insane man. The explanation I have heard here of putting Webber out of the store would not clear it of the delusion.....In' my judgment this man was not simulating. I believé this man is a case of delusional insanity. He suffers from delusions of suspicions, persecutions, etc. I believe there is a general delusional condition. He believes he was poisoned, was chloroformed and followed; that his wife was unfaithful, etc.”
It was conclusively shown that the suspicions, etc., of the prisoner, referred to by the witnesses, were wholly groundless.
This is the general character of the evidence with which prisoner’s counsel were prepared to support their application for a preliminary inquiry as to his insanity at the time he was arraigned, and the kind of evidence the learned judge resolutely refused even to hear, either in the form of affidavits or by examination of the witnesses in open court. If that was an exercise of sound judicial discretion, it would be difficult indeed to say what, in a legal sense, constitutes abuse of discretion.
The 66th section of the act referred to, provides for cases in
The first clause of the next section, under which the application in question was made, provides: “ The same proceedings may be had, if any person indicted for an offence shall upon arraignment be found to be a lunatic by a jury lawfully impaneled for the purpose.” The last clause of the same section provides for the case of a prisoner who has gone to trial without such preliminary inquiry as is contemplated by the first clause. “ If the jury find by their verdict that he is then insane, the court shall direct such finding to be recorded and order him to be kept in close custody,” etc.
These provisions, substantially copied from the English act, 39 and 40 Geo. III., c. 94, were first enacted by our legislature in 1836 and afterwards embodied in our criminal code of 1860. It is conceded the. English courts frequently award preliminary issues to determine, by the verdict of a jury, the sanity of prisoners when arraigned on indictment, and the same practice prevails in several of our sister states whose legislation on the subject is similar to our own.
Our learned brother, who speaks for the majority, after reviewing the authorities on the subject, comes to the conclusion “ that they all concur in the proposition that it is only in cases of doubt as to the sanity of the prisoner upon arraignment, that a preliminary inquiry is to be ordered. This being so, it is manifest that neither the assertion of the prisoner or his counsel, nor the production of affidavits, nor the entering of a plea of present insanity upon the record, can of themselves alone suffice to produce the state of doubt which is the necessary prerequisite to the ordering of the inquiry. They are all necessarily addressed to the court, as there is no other tribunal to entertain them; and it is the court, after all, that must be affected by the various considerations which are supposed to, or in fact do, produce the doubt which must precede any order for an inquiry.....It is the judicial conscience alone which can determine this question and it is that conscience only ■which must be informed so that it may act intelligently.” He
This construction of the act is quite as favorable as the commonwealth can possibly ask, and I agree with the majority in saying it is the proper construction; but, in the practical application of the law, as thus construed, to the undisputed and indisputable facts of this case, we reach entirely opposite conclusions as to the legality of the court’s action in this case.
Granting that it is discretionary with the trial judge to award or refuse the preliminary inquiry contemplated by the first clause of the 67th section, above quoted, it must of course be understood to mean a sound legal discretion, not an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of judicial power; nor can it be the preconceived opinion, however strong, of a judge who refuses to hear evidence tending to show that the application is meritorious and not frivolous. If it is the “ judicial conscience alone ” that must be enlightened so that it can act intelligently, it would seem to follow that affidavits and oral testimony of witnesses in open court, calculated to shed light on the subject, should not be waived aside as unworthy even of being heard. That is substantially what was done in this case, as abundantly appears by the bill of exceptions.
The prisoner being without counsel, the court, sometime • before the case was cálled for trial, appointed two reputable gentlemen of the bar to represent him, and they are entitled to great credit for the marked ability and energy with which they have performed their duty. Having obtained such information as was within their reach, as to the mental condition of the prisoner, etc., when the case was called' for trial on October 17, 1887, they moved a stay of proceedings for the purpose of having the question of the prisoner’s insanity determined in the Common Pleas. That being denied, they then asked leave to file a special plea, setting forth his then insanity in order that an issue might be formed to determine that question. That also being refused, they then signed and presented to the court a suggestion setting forth that the prisoner then in court “ is a lunatic of non-sane mind, and has not sufficient intelligence to comprehend the course of proceedings on the trial so as to make a proper defence, nor conduct it with discretion, and
That the application for a preliminary inquiry as to the insanity of the prisoner was prompted by a sense of duty to the unfortunate prisoner and made in perfect good faith, cannot be doubted. The evidence which the learned counsel were able to adduce on the trial is convincing proof that they were prepared to sustain their application by affidavits or witnesses viva voce; and if the court had not persistently turned a deaf ear to both, facts would have been presented, which, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, would not only have justified but demanded a preliminary inquiry as to the then mental condition of the prisoner.
The learned judge having refused to hear the evidence offered by prisoner’s counsel, in what way, it may be asked, was the “ judicial conscience ” enlightened, and upon what did he base his judgment in refusing the application ? The only answer that can be given is what he himself says in his opinion overruling motion in arrest of judgment and for new trial, viz.:
As to the information acquired by “ observing the appearance and conduct of the prisoner,” etc., it is perhaps all well enough so far as it goes, but it should not have been permitted to exclude the evidence of competent experts and others at hand. As to the information of the jail physician “ and others,” we are not informed how or when it was communicated. It does not appear, however, to have been in the shape of testimony in open court, and for aught we know it may have been mere hearsay. At best, neither of the sources of information referred to should ever be accepted as a substitute for competent evidence adduced in open court in the regular qnd orderly way. It would be a most dangerous precedent to sanction such a course of proceeding in any case.
It has been suggested that the jurors, impaneled to determine the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, were also authorized to pass upon the question of his insanity at the time of trial; and, inasmuch as they did not find, as part of their verdict, that he was then a lunatic, he has no right to complain that the preliminary inquiry was refused in the manner it was. That is a non sequitur. If his counsel had a right, as they undoubtedly had, to make the application in question, it was the plain duty of the court to hear the testimony they had to offer in support of it. If that had been done, it can scarcely be doubted the learned judge, in view of the evidence, would have been constrained to grant the request, and thus the prisoner would have had the benefit of the single inquiry as to whether he was then insane, and therefore incompetent to plead,
I am clearly of opinion that the judgment should be reversed for manifest abuse of judicial discretion in not granting the application referred to, and especially in refusing to hear any competent evidence in support of it.
On May 11, 1888, in Webber v. Commonwealth, writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States allowed: per Gordon, C. J., May 30, 1888, motion of Mr. Graham, District Attorney, to revoke the order allowing said writ of error, refused: per Gordon, C. J.
