Webb, Appellant, v. Zern.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
June 24, 1966
422 Pa. 424 | 220 A.2d 853
Moreover, such an approach is consistent with that taken in the food cases where, although the true basis of recovery is the duty imposed by law to redress an injury caused by the defective nature of the product, we permit the action to be brought in assumpsit while ignoring any absence of privity of contract. Conceptual abstractions and niceties of pleading have not been permitted to obscure what is truly involved in those cases and they should likewise not be permitted to obscure the considerations which militate in favor of permitting the instant actions against Rexall and Northern Electric.
Finally, as the very least, I would permit plaintiff here to amend his complaint to one in trespass and permit an action on the basis of the rule embodied in §402A of the Restatement 2d, Torts.
Accordingly, I dissent from the action of the majority in affirming the judgment entered for defendant Preitz, on count one of plaintiff‘s complaint, and the judgments entered for defendants Rexall and Northern Electric.
Mr. Justice MUSMANNO joins in this opinion.
Webb, Appellant, v. Zern.
Harris C. Arnold, Jr., with him Arnold, Bricker, Beyer & Barnes, for appellant.
John I. Hartman, Jr., with him W. Hensel Brown, John J. Stork, and Windolph, Burkholder & Hartman, and Brown & Zimmerman, and May, Grove & Stork, for appellees.
This appeal is from the dismissal of a suit in trespass seeking damages for injuries resulting from the explosion of a beer keg purchased by the plaintiff‘s father.
Charles Webb purchased a quarter-keg of beer from a distributor, John Zern. That same day, plaintiff‘s brother tapped the keg and about a gallon of beer was drawn from it. Later that evening, when plaintiff entered the room in which the keg had been placed, the keg exploded, severely injuring plaintiff.
Suit was brought against the distributor, the brewer who had filled the keg, and the manufacturer of the keg. Plaintiff, although there were three parties as defendants, relied on the theory of exclusive control, because he averred in his complaint that he had no knowledge of the cause of the explosion, or of which party defendant was responsible for the explosion. The trial court, pursuant to defendants’ demurrers and motions for a more specific complaint, sustained the demurrers and dismissed the complaint on the theory that the doctrine was inapplicable since plaintiff had failed to join as defendants his father who had purchased and his brother who had tapped the keg and who might have engaged in activities that caused the explosion. The trial court stated that, for the doctrine of exclusive control to apply, all parties against whom an inference of negligence may be drawn must be joined. Since the statute of limitations had run so that no further defendants could be added, the lower court entered its judgment.
We need not, however, determine whether or not the lower court erred with regard to the law of exclusive control, for there is another and clearer issue which is determinative of this appeal. That issue is the nature and scope of the liability in trespass of one who produces or markets a defective product for use
“(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
“(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.” Restatement 2d, Torts, §402A (1965).
We hereby adopt the foregoing language as the law of Pennsylvania.
The plaintiff in this litigation, therefore, must be given an opportunity to plead and prove his case. Since the plaintiff has broadly pleaded those facts necessary to a cause of action for defective products liability and since we are today adopting a new basis of liability, plaintiff will be permitted to amend his complaint to explicitly state a cause of action in trespass for defective products liability.
Judgment vacated and record remanded with instructions to enter an order permitting plaintiff to file an amended complaint.
I am in complete accord with the court‘s action in adopting, as the law of Pennsylvania in tort actions involving products liability, §402A of the new Restatement of Torts. However, I would specifically restrict its application to those instances wherein physical harm to a user, or ultimate consumer, or to such individual‘s property is concerned. In cases involving “economic loss“, I believe the warranty provisions of the sales law, as set forth in the Uniform Commercial Code, present more appropriate standards. Further, in this class of cases wherein §402A is applied, I would specifically rule that contributory negligence or assumption of risk may be a complete defense to the action.
DISSENTING OPINION BY MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BELL:
I very emphatically dissent.
If such a drastic change in the field of tort liability without fault is to be made in our law—even the majority admit that “we are today adopting a new basis of liability“—it is difficult to imagine a more unlawyerlike judicial Opinion than the majority Opinion. The majority Opinion overrules a long established as well as recently reiterated law (1) without even mentioning or referring to the numerous decisions of this Court which they are now overruling,* and (2) after the statute of limitations has run as to several persons who can be liable and therefore are necessary parties-defendant under this new rule, and (3) on facts which disclose that even under this newly adopted rule there
The new rule adopted by the majority so completely changes, not by legislative action but by judicial ukase, the law with respect to trespass actions for injuries resulting from noninherently dangerous products that are either manufactured or bottled or sold by any vendor—even a retail druggist—that in my opinion it is not only very unfair but absolutely unjustifiable in Justice or in Law.
In the last few years, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has radically changed the law in 30 different branches or fields which, prior thereto, had been firmly established.* They have done this either by ex-
Today, no one knows from month to month or whenever the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania or the Supreme Court of the United States meets, what the law will be tomorrow—or, by retrospectivity, what the Court will now say it always should have been—or what anyone‘s rights, privileges, liabilities and duties are. The net result is uncertainty, confusion, dismay, and constantly diminishing respect for Law and for our Courts—and, of course, is one of the major causes of the constantly and rapidly increasing litigation which is literally swamping our Courts.
In a Constitutional form of government such as ours, which is based upon Law and Order, certainty and stability are essential. Unless the Courts establish and maintain certainty and stability in the Law, (1) public officials will not know from week to week or from month to month the powers and limitations of
In Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A. 2d 472 (1958), the Court expressly overruled a very recent decision of this Court and by necessary implication three additional recent decisions of this Court, as well as repudiating all the basic reasons and fundamental principles upon which this Court‘s prior felony murder decisions had been predicated.
In Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 116, 141 A. 2d 606 (1958), the Court changed the law and numerous decisions by stating that general welfare alone, unconnected with health, safety or morals, was a justifiable basis for zoning. In Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Myers, 402 Pa. 451, 167 A. 2d 295 (1961), the Court by dictum changed the presumption in felonious murder which had existed from the time of Coke and Blackstone, and had been reiterated myriad times by this Court in prior decisions.
The basic need for certainty and stability in the law has been recognized for centuries by English-speaking peoples. Lord COKE, Chief Justice of England, thus wisely expressed (circa 1600) these truths: “The knowne certaintie of the law is the safetie of all.” Until very recently, this has been a beacon light for Anglo-American Courts, for text authorities, and for law-abiding Americans ever since the foundation of our Country. In the realm of the Law it is usually expressed in the principle known as Stare Decisis. Stare Decisis is one of the bedrocks upon which the House of Law has been built and maintained.*
Too many appellate Judges envision themselves, not as interpreters of the Constitution and the laws, which is the role and province assigned and limited to them by the Constitution, but as possessing the right, the power and the duty to change and, if necessary, rewrite the Constitution and any and every Law, in order to bring it in accord with what they believe is or will be best for the social, political or economic interests of our State or Country.
I can never approve or condone such a Judge-made revolutionary and unfair rule as the majority promulgate.
I very vigorously dissent.