25 Ind. 4 | Ind. | 1865
Suit by the appellee to set aside the sale of real estate mortgaged to the school fund of Fountain county.
The complaint alleges, in substance, that on the 12th day of August, 1846, Samuel Williams, then the owner thereof, mortgaged the north fourth of lot 154, on the old plat of the town of Covington, in Fountain county, together with
The defendants filed an answer to the complaint in two paragraphs.
1. A general denial.
2. “The defendazits admit the incumbi’azice charged to exist on the lots specified in the complaizrt, by mortgage for the amount, and at the date specified izr the complaint. They also admit that said premises wez’e advez'tised to be sold on the temzs, azid under the notice givezi, as set forth in the plaintiff’s coznplaizit, azid that the defezzdant, David Webb, as auditor of said county, did, at the time alleged, bid izi said lots izz the- name of the State of Indiana, for the use of the commozi school fund, and they aver that he did, as such auditor, and in conformity to' the laws of this State, enacted izi 1861, azid approved Marcji 11 of that yeaz’, cause the same to be appraised at their specie value, and that he sold the said north half of lot 154, on the old plat of Oomigton, at private sale, as he was authorized by law to
The court sustained a demurrer to the second paragraph of the answer, to which the defendants excepted.
The defendants then withdrew the general denial, and “failed and refused to make further answer to the complaint,” whereupon the court rendered a final decree setting aside the sale and forfeiture to the State, and the subsequent sale by the auditor to Hetfielcl, and also rendered a judgment against the defendants for costs,
The only error assigned by the appellants is, that “the court erred in sustaining the demurrer of the appellee to the second paragraph of the appellants’ answer.”
The only question discussed by the counsel of either party, is as to the sufficiency, in point of time, of the notice of the time and place of the public sale of the property, at which it was bid in by the auditor and forfeited to the State. The pleadings, in point of certainty, do not exhibit a very high degree of skill, but will be deemed sufficient to raise the question presented by the briefs of counsel.
The loan-wras made under the revision of 1843. Section 39 of chapter 13, of that revision, p. 245, prescribes the form of the mortgage in such cases, and section 40, of the same chapter, gives the form of the note to be secured by the mortgage, which is as follows: “I, A. 33., promise'to pay to the State of Indiana, on or before the-, the sum of---, with interest thereon at the rate of seven per cent, per annum, in advance, and do agree that in case of failure to pay any installment of said interest, the said principal sum shall become due and collectable, together with all arrears of interest; and on any such failure to pay principal or interest when due, five per cent, damages on the whole sum due shall be collected, with costs, and the premises mortgaged may be forthwith sold by the auditor, for the payment of such principal sum, interest, damages, and costs.” The pleadings in the case do not contain a direct averment of the fact, but we assume that the note and
These various provisions were copied, substantially, into, the revision of 1852, except that, by the latter, only three weeks’ notice of the time and' place of such sale was required. The school law containing these provisions was again revised in 1855, and again in 1861, but neither of the' latter revisions make any material-changes in the law of' 1852, so far as it related to the loaning of the fund, or the-sale of property mortgaged to secure the same; the length-of notice required by each is three weeks. In the case at bar, it is admitted that the sale was made, including the notice thereof, in strict accordance with the statute of 1861, but the notice was not given for the period of sixty days before the day of sale, as required by the statute of 1843, under which the mortgage was made. It is insisted by the appellee that the law of 1843 furnished the proper rule in making the sale, and that the auditor, therefore, could not legally sell, until he had given at least sixty days’ notice of the time and place of sale, as required by the law under which the mortgage was executed. Such seems to have been the holding of the Circuit Court, and hence the decree setting the sale aside and declaring it void.
The Circuit Court, in its decision, was doubtless governed by the case of Hopkins v. Jones, 22 Ind. 310. In that case,
To qur minds, it seems clear that reducing the length of time of notice, in such cases, does not impair the obligation of the contract, but, on the contrary, if it can be said to affect the contract in any way, it is to strengthen its obligation, by expediting the remedy for its violation. In the apt language of Perkins, J., in Hopkins v. Jones, supra, we ask, “ What were the obligations of the contract disclosed in this suit? There was an obligation on the side of the creditor to wait till the money named in the securities appearing in the case became due, before attempting to enforce its payment, and an obligation on the part of the debtor to
No clearer case, it seems to us, can be presented, of a statute relating to the remedy only, and in no wise affecting tlie contract or impairing its obligation, than the one at bar.
In the case of Hopkins v. Jones, supra, it was held that the act of 1852, shortening the time of notice, was not operative, in that particular, on existing contracts; that “the time of notice was right,under the statute, so long as it was in force, and it should not be taken away by mere implication; and that sales upon mortgages executed prior to the act of 1852, should proceed according to the prior law, under section 2 of the general repealing act.” 1 G. & II., 535. The section here referred to saves all rights vested, and suits instituted under then existing laws. The applicability of that section to the provision of the statute under discussion in the case, is not, to our minds, very clearly perceptible; but, without expressing any opinion as to the correctness of the conclusion of the court in that case, the present case is, we think, very clearly distinguishable from that, and especially if the saving clause referred
Section 163 of the act of 1861, (see acts of 1861, p. 97,) reads as follows: “All laws heretofore enacted on the subject of common schools, and all other laws and parts of laws in conflict with this act, are hereby repealed.” This section is clear, broad and explicit, and leaves no ground for an inference that the provision of the act of 1843, as to notice of such sales, is continued in force. "We hold, therefore, that the statute of 1861 prescribes the only rule for the government of the auditor, in selling lauds mortgaged to the school' fund, for the non-payment of the principal or interest of such loans; and, as the sale'’'in this case was made after that act was in force, and in accordance with its provisions, the Circuit Court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the second paragraph of the answer.
The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court, with instructions to sustain the demurrer to the complaint, and with leave to the parties to amend their pleadings.