Weaver v. StateWeaver v. State
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Candler
1. An accused on trial for murder cannot by his own witness on direct examination show general character for violence on the part of the deceased by proof of specific acts.
(a) And where there is no evidence that the person killed was the aggressor, it is not error for the trial court to reject testimony offered to show general character of the deceased for violence, because proof of the violent and turbulent character of the deceased is admissible only when it is shown prima facie that the deceased was the assailant, that the accused had been assailed, and that the defendant was honestly seeking to defend himself.
(b) The same rule announced in (a) above is applicable, even though the defendant may in a statement at the trial undertake to lay the foundation for such evidence by claiming that the deceased was the aggressor.
2. Although the person receiving a gunshot wound in the intestines on July 22 did not die until September 14, and the attending doctor testified that death was caused by a thrombus, stating also in his opinion that most likely death was caused by the gunshot wound, there was not such uncertainty of proof of death from the gunshot wound beyond a reasonable doubt as to require a new trial, especially since there was an abundance of evidence before the jury relating to the severity of the wound, as well as a lack of showing of any other independent cause of death.
3. There was ample evidence to authorize the verdict, and it was not erroneous to overrule the general grounds of the motion for new trial.
Richard Weaver was convicted, with a recommendation of life imprisonment, and so sentenced for the murder of Mary Bell. His motion for a new trial, on the general grounds and two special grounds, was overruled. The exception is to that judgment.
The evidence for the State, was, in substance, as follows. Robert Williams testified: That he first saw Mary Bell Sunday afternoon, July 22, 1945, at Robert Walker‘s cafe on Church and Broad Streets (in Athens, Georgia). Her husband (sometimes called “Georgia Boy“), George Wise, the driver, and another girl were in an automobile, when the witness Williams got in the car with them. They went from Walker‘s cafe to Philip Elder‘s cafe. This was right after a ball game. When they reached Elder‘s, he saw Richard Weaver before the car stopped. The witness Williams got out of the car and went to Richard Weaver to ask the latter for a loan of money. The others remained in the car. Weaver told Williams that he had no money. Then the others in the car walked up to where Weaver and Williams were standing. Weaver said to Mary Bell, “Go ahead, I am talking to Robert Williams.” They were close enough to shake hands. No one made a threatening move. Mary Bell had her arms folded. When Weaver repeated the same words quoted above for the third time, Mary Bell stepped around in front of him. She did not move. She had not said anything. Richard Weaver pulled out his pistol and shot Mary Bell. The witness did not know what Weaver shot her about. She did not have a knife. She was not doing anything to Weaver to cause the shooting. On cross-examination the witness Williams stated that Mary Bell was drinking, but that she was not drunk. The witness stated that he did not see the pistol. On redirect, he said that he did see Weaver put his hands towards Mary Bell, heard the shot, and saw her double up.
George Wise testified: He first saw Mary Bell at Robert Walker‘s cafe. She got in the automobile at that place. Her husband, another girl, and Robert Williams were also in the car. They went to Philip Elder‘s cafe. When they drove up in front of Elder‘s, Richard Weaver was standing on the opposite corner from the cafe. Robert Williams, Mary Bell, and her husband got out of the car, leaving the witness Wise in the automobile. Williams was standing there talking to Weaver. Mary Bell and her husband started towards the cafe. He did not see them stop where Weaver and Williams were talking. When the pistol shot, there were two cars between the witness and Weaver, but the witness could see them. He could see Mary Bell and she was standing out in the street. He did not see her do anything to Weaver.
Sanders Freeman testified: That he owned Philip Elder‘s cafe and the house next to it. On the Sunday afternoon that Mary Bell was shot, he was there. It happened late in the afternoon, between six and seven o‘clock. The witness was feeding his stock when the car drove up. He saw the five persons in the car. Richard Weaver was standing there in front of the cafe. When Weaver and Robert Williams were standing there talking, Mary Bell got out of the car and passed by Williams, and the next thing the witness saw was that she got shot by Weaver. Mary Bell had passed Weaver and Williams and started back. She backed towards the car of the witness, and she had a smile on her face when Weaver pulled a pistol from behind him and shot. Weaver then threw his pistol on Mary Bell‘s husband and Bell ran behind the car and said, “I ain‘t done nothing to you, Rich.” Mary Bell did not have any knife or razor or any kind of a weapon. She did not advance on Weaver. She was backing away with a smile on her face. On cross-examination, the witness said that he did not hear her say, “I am going to get my God damned blade.”
Philip Elder testified: That he operated a cafe on Waddell Street. On the afternoon Mary Bell was shot he and Sanders Freeman were standing out in the street. He saw the automobile drive up with four or five negroes in it. The witness had seen Richard Weaver, who had been talking with them before the car drove up. Robert Williams got out of the car and called Weaver, and they began talking. They were about fifteen feet away. The witness Elder heard Weaver say, “Get back,” and then Weaver “hauled off and shot her.” Mary Bell was not advancing on Weaver. She had not said anything, only smiled. He did not see a knife when he helped to put her in the car after she was shot.
Dr. J. C. Holliday testified: That he was a practicing physician
Grant Bell, the husband of the deceased, testified for the State: That Mary Bell did not say anything about any blade. She had nothing in her hands. She did not even open her mouth.
Testimony for the defendant, Richard Weaver, was, in substance as follows. Scott Bolton testified: That he was sitting in front of the cafe when the automobile drove up. A woman that he did not know got out of the car and said, “Let me get my God damned blade.” She did not say that before she got out of the car. The next thing the witness heard was somebody else saying, “Get back“, and then a pistol fired. Those things followed each other pretty quickly. On cross-examination, the witness, Bolton said: That he and Richard Weaver were pretty good friends. The witness did not know whether Mary Bell was the one who said “Let me get my God damned blade.” She did not have a pocket knife or any weapon whatever so far as he could see.
Scott McCleskey testified: That he was at Philip Elder‘s cafe the afternoon of the shooting. The girl who got shot got out of
Emory Griffin testified: That he saw Richard Weaver a week before the shooting took place. At that time he saw Mary Bell at the bus station, and Weaver was coming across Broad Street. She said to Weaver, “You had better go across, if I get close to you, I will cut your so and so off.”
Jim Day Weaver testified: That he was Richard Weaver‘s son. He knew Mary Bell, and they lived in the same neighborhood.
Richard Weaver, the accused, made a statement, in substance, as follows: That this thing first started when Mary Bell cut his son so badly that the latter had to be taken to a hospital. A few days later the accused saw her at the bus station. She said — I made a case against her — and she said, “You won‘t make another.” He went to the ball game the Sunday it actually happened and came back by Philip Elder‘s cafe. He was feeling bad and sick. He went to Sanders Freeman to ask him to take him home. Then the automobile drove up. Robert Williams got out and called him. Mary Bell got out of the car. Williams called and Mary Bell turned and started back. The accused said to her, “Don‘t come on me.” He then stated, “I got excited and scared, as I saw how bad she had cut my boy, and I was afraid of her. I didn‘t mean to shoot her, but I was scared of her, and I told her to get back, and she continued to come on me, and it looked like I got blind and just shot.” 1. When a son of the defendant was on the stand as a witness, the trial judge refused to permit the son to answer a question as to whether on another occasion the deceased had cut the son. The defendant contends that, if the witness had been permitted to respond to the question, he would have answered that the deceased cut him, and that the reputation of the deceased for violence was bad. Further, in the same special ground, it is contended that
After an examination of the evidence and the statement of the defendant in the trial court, we do not find anything that would lead us to the conclusion that the deceased was the aggressor. One of the witnesses for the defendant claimed to have heard Mary Bell (the person shot) say as she was leaving the automobile, “Let me get my God damned blade;” and another witness for the defendant testified that she said, “Let me get my God damned blade out.” If it be assumed that the testimony of these witnesses was correct, the statement actually made by Mary Bell was not, under the circumstances, any indication of aggression on her part, especially where her words were not coupled with any affirmative act of aggression, but the words may have been consistent with the idea of defensive precaution. Neither the defendant nor his witnesses saw Mary Bell with a knife at the time she was shot. No knife was found. There was positive testimony that she did not have a knife. An eyewitness testified that she was backing towards the automobile in which she had come to the cafe, with a smile on her face, when Richard Weaver pulled a pistol from behind him and shot her. Substantially the same was testified by several other witnesses, all negativing any idea of aggression on her part.
In support of his contention that the testimony was admissible, the defendant cites, and relies on Rawlins v. State, 124 Ga. 31, 45 (11) (52 S.E. 1), which reads as follows: “Evidence was admitted tending to show that there was a state of bad feeling between the Carter family and the Rawlins family, and especially between the heads of the two families. This evidence was objected to on the ground that the evidence of bad feeling should be limited to any bad feeling that might exist between Milton Rawlins and the children that were killed. There was no merit to this objection. The state of feeling existing between the father of the accused and the father of the deceased was pertinent, and especially was it pertinent to show a state of bad feeling generally between the two families. The weight, of course, to be given to this testimony
One of the objections to the testimony, made at the trial, was that the character of the deceased could not be attacked by proof of specific acts and without showing that she was the aggressor. A defendant cannot by his own witness on direct examination show a general character for violence on the part of the deceased by proof of specific acts. Warrick v. State, 125 Ga. 133 (6) (53 S.E. 1027); Vernon v. State, 146 Ga. 709 (92 S.E. 76); Hamby v. State, 71 Ga. App. 817 (32 S.E.2d 546). There being no evidence that the deceased was the aggressor, it was not error for the trial court to reject the testimony offered by the defendant‘s witness which might have tended to show the general character for violence, because “proof of the violent and turbulent character of the deceased is admissible only when it is shown prima facie that the deceased was the assailant, that the accused had been assailed, and that the defendant . . was honestly seeking to defend himself.” Crawley v. State, 137 Ga. 777 (74 S.E. 537); Hamby v. State, supra; Hanye v. State, 99 Ga. 212 (25 S.E. 307); Gardner v. State, 90 Ga. 310 (17 S.E. 86, 35 Am. St. R. 202); Drake v. State, 75 Ga. 413; Doyal v. State, 70 Ga. 134 (5a). The same rule is applicable, even though the defendant may in a statement at the trial undertake to lay the foundation for such evidence by claiming that the deceased was the aggressor. Chapman v. State, 155 Ga. 393 (117 S.E. 321); Jones v. State, 154 Ga. 423 (114 S.E. 326). Accordingly, the matters complained of in the first special ground are without merit.
2. The defendant contends that the evidence does not make out a case of murder, because the testimony of the physician is to the effect that the deceased had been considered on her way to recovery so far as the gunshot was concerned, and that her death was due to another and independent cause. Apparently there is no question as to the severity of the gunshot wound. The intestines were found to be punctured in five places and at one place almost severed. She had four wounds in the misentery. The bullet ranged downward from the level of the umbilicus and lodged inside the left pelvis, but the bullet was not removed. It is not
There is no suggestion of negligence or unskilled treatment of the gunshot wound, but if the deceased had failed to receive skilled treatment of the wound which was the primary cause that produced other and secondary causes from which the death resulted, the accused would not be relieved of the responsibility for the death of the deceased. Downing v. State, 114 Ga. 30 (2) (39 S.E. 927); Bonner v. State, 125 Ga. 237 (1, 2) (54 S.E. 143). In Long v. State, 60 Ga. App. 517 (4 S.E.2d 75), in the majority opinion of two of the three judges of a division, it was held: “Where the defendant shot the deceased with a pistol, inflicting a wound in his body fifteen inches long, and the bullet passed through his lung and was resting on a vertebra in the lower part of the deceased‘s spine at the time of his death about a month after he was shot, and where the defendant immediately after he was shot was taken to the hospital where he was treated for about three weeks and was then discharged from the hospital and went home, lived for about a week, and then died suddenly, there was a sufficient basis for the conclusion that death resulted from the wound rather than from some other cause, the existence of which there was no evidence to establish.” The Long case, supra, was on its facts weaker than the present case as to medical opinion of what caused the death, because in the Long case the doctors failed to give their professional opinion of what caused the death, stating only that syphilis did not cause it, but in the present case the gunshot was given as the proximate cause. See also Brown v. State, 10 Ga. App. 216 (73 S.E. 33); Wells v. State, 46 Ga. App. 412 (167 S.E. 709), and citations; McLain v. State, 71 Ga. 279; Brundage v. State, 70 Ga. App. 696 (29 S.E.2d 316), and citations;
3. There was ample evidence to authorize the verdict and it was not erroneous to overrule the general grounds of the motion for new trial.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.