The plaintiff brought an action sounding in tort, against the Southern Railway Company, for a breach of its duty to safely carry and deliver a certain shipment of mules and horses. The defendant at first answered the petition by a general denial of its several paragraphs. 'Thereafter the court, over objections of the plaintiff, allowed the defendant to amend its answer by setting up the contract, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, because all of the stipulations of the contract, by its express terms, inured to the benefit of the defendant, and the plaintiff failed to comply with the contract; that it was stipulated therein that the shipper would load and unload the animals at his own risk, and feed, water, and attend to them at his own expense and risk while they were in the stockyards of the railway company awaiting shipment, and while on the cars or at feeding or transfer points, or where unloaded for any purpose, whether arising from accident or delay of trains or otherwise, and to that end he or his agent in charge of said live stock should pay regular published passenger fare when proper under rules governing transportation of live stock, and should ride upon the freight train in which the said ani
Three questions are presented by the record: (1) Was the contract admissible in evidence as a defense to the' action as brought ? (2) Was it proper to allow the amendment to the defendant’s answer? (3) Did the court err in directing a verdict?
We think that the court was clearly right in allowing the defendant to set up the contract if it could, and to use its provisions as a defense, if by the terms of the contract the shipper had barred anjr of his rights. It can not be asserted that the contract was unreasonable, for in the case of Southern Railway Co. v. Adams, 115 Ga. 705 (42 S. E. 35), a similar contract was held to be reasonable; and granting that under the ruling of this court in Carter v. Southern Railway Co., 3 Ga. App. 222 (59 S. E. 603), the plaintiff had the right to show a waiver of the requirement that the notice of a
We think, therefore, that two questions at least ought to have been submitted to the jury: (1) Whether any of the stock were injured otherwise than by lack of food, water, or attention, and the amount of such damage; and, if this question be answered in the affirmative, (2) whether there was a waiver of the agreement to give written notice of the claim for damages before the stock were unloaded. If the jury find that there was no waiver of this stipulation, of course, under the ruling in Central Railway Co. v. James, supra, the plaintiff could recover nothing. If the jury should find (as we have assumed to be true) that the defendant company waived the written notice, by sending its stockman and veterinary surgeon to examine the stock, then the plaintiff might recover, but could only recover for damage to the particular animals shown to have been injured by violence, and for such damage as was due to that violence, taking into consideration the fact that such animals may also have been damaged by lack of care and food. The plaintiff can not recover for injury to his stock caused' by their not having been fed and watered, because he himself undertook to do this.
There -is nothing in the insistence that the initial carrier, the Macon & Birmingham Bailway Company, was in the hands of a receiver at the time the contract was made, and that it purports to be signed by the Macon & Birmingham Bailway Company, “by B. D. Harden, Agent,” for the words “S. F. Parrott, Beceiver,” are plainly written across the face of the blank contract which was filled
We reverse the judgment directing the verdict, not because of any errors of the court in antecedent rulings, but merely because there is some evidence from which a jury might be authorized to' find damages not attributable to the plaintiff’s breach of the stipulation which required him to feed and water his own stock.
Judgment reversed.