This appeal from a judgment of dismissal by the trial court (sitting withput a jury) of an action in conversion raises issues of proximate cause and proof of damages. In June, 1966, plaintiff, John Weaver, purchased a tavern and restaurant, complete with liquor license, from Parse Norvell. Weaver gave Norvell several promissory notes and agreed to assume Norvell’s obligation on a conditional sales contract with defendant, Pacific ' Finance Loans, hereinafter called Pacific. Weaver testified in the court below that under his management the business never produced profit. By September 13, 1966, he was delinquent in his payment on the Pacific contract and for a premium on an insurance policy. On that date representatives of Pacific personally notified him the company was foreclosing, and removed the liquor license displayed in the tavern. Paсific informed Norvell of the action taken and Norvell immediately notified Weaver that he was going to enforce payment of the promissоry notes. Weaver closed the business immediately, and, on September 16, 1966, executed with Norvell a “mutual *347 cancellation agreement” voiding the June sale and terminating Weaver’s interest in the premises.
In this action Weaver alleged, and the trial court found, that removal of the liquor license hy Pacific violated a contract provision requiring notice of default thirty days prior to initiating foreclosure. Finding physical possession of the license essential to the right to sell liquor,
1
and interpreting that right as personal property, the trial court held Pacific’s removal of the license “a distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over plaintiff’s personal property,” constituting conversion. Schieche v. Pasco,
Appellant alleges that Pacific’s conduct forced him (1) to close the business on September 13, and (2) to reconvey the business to Norvell on September 16 at a loss, measured as the appraised value of the business less the outstanding obligation to Pacific. Neither allegation merits recovery unless plaintiff’s actual loss is proven with reasonable cеrtainty, Williams v. Bone,
I.
The proрer measure of damages for wrongful taking of personal property is the reasonable value of its use, with interest, during the period of detention. National Motor Service Co. v. Walters,
Neither may exemplary damages be awarded where plaintiff fails to prove defendant’s conduct wanton, maliсious, gross or outrageous. Klam v. Koppel, 63 .Idaho 171,
Finally, we are not required to reach the issue of nominal damages. Even if this Court affirmed the finding below, that a tortious act had been committed, from which the right to nominal damages normally is presumed, Coe v. Bennett,
II.
The trial court found that appellant failed to prove proximate relation between removal of the license and Weaver’s rеconveyance at a loss to Norvell. The court characterized the transaction as voluntary, while appellant contends that Pаcific’s conduct compelled him to relinquish his interest. We believe the dichotomy between volition and compulsion begs a more fundamental question: whether Norvell’s threat to enforce payment on the notes, prompting Weaver to reconvey, resulted from Pacific’s notice оf foreclosure or from removal of the liquor license. While the two coincided in place and were sequential in time, they were sepаrate acts, each of distinct significance. The notice of foreclosure initiated the legal process of terminating Weaver’s interеst in the restaurant and tavern; removal of the license merely interrupted the sale of hard liquor. The former threatened Norvell more immediately than the latter. In the “mutual cancellation agreement” Norvell recited the impending foreclosure by Pacific, and Weaver’s inability either to pay the notes or to continue in business, as reasons for executing the reconveyance. Removal of the liquor license passed unmentioned. Even though the transaction was not entirely voluntary, the element of inducement traces not to the allegedly tortious act of removing the license, but to the precarious state of the business, rendered critical by Pacific’s notice of foreclosure. The evidence produced at trial affords no occasion to disturb the trial court’s finding, that appellant failed to prove removal of the license proximаtely caused reconveyance at a loss to Norvell. See Jones v. Big Lost River Irrigation District, supra, and I.C. § 13-219. That failure precludes recovery of damages in any form. 2
Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondent.
Notes
. Defendant maintained on appeal that removal of the license did not deprive plaintiff of liis right to sell liquor, since that right vested in him personally, not in the physical document. No statute or regulation of the Department of Law Enforсement requires possession of the document to sell liquor. Yet the license itself, whose form is prescribed by the Commissioner of Law Enforcement (seе I.C. § 23-932), instructs in bold type that the document be displayed conspicuously on the premises. Moreover, the application for retail liquor license, also promulgated by the Commissioner, requires the applicant to sketch the premises, indicating where the license will be displayed. Our disposition of the case on other grounds makes unnecessary a ruling by this Court. In any event, the Department of Law Enforcement is the more appropriate body to resolve an apparent conflict in liquor licensing regulations.
. Appellant contends that the court below erroneously dеcided the proximate cause issue on an election of remedies theory. We do not share that interpretation of the court’s language. In any case, the result reached by the trial court will be affirmed if correct, even though reached by an erroneous route. Layrite Products Co. v. Lux,