We convened a special panel
1
to resolve the conflict between
Weaver v Detroit,
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The following summary of the facts and proceedings is adopted from our Court’s opinion in Weaver I, supra at 801-805:
Defеndant city of Detroit appeals by right the trial court’s order entered upon a jury verdict that found defendant liable for the wrongful death of Dennis Wеaver and that awarded plaintiff Marcella Weaver, the decedent’s personal representative, $2 million in damages plus interest. . . .
This сase arises from an accident that occurred when a bus struck a light pole, and the light pole fell on Dennis Weaver and killed him. Plaintiff’s theory оf the case was that because of defendant’s failure to inspect and repair the light pole, the pole corroded so seriоusly that when the bus merely bumped or rubbed it, it fractured and broke. Testimony presented at trial established that the rusty light pole, erected in 1970 and last inspected in 1979, was placed eighteen inches from the highway’s curb, which was in accordance with industry standards, and was owned and maintained by defendant сity.
Defendant city asserts that it is immune from tort liability in this case because the highway exception to governmental immunity is inapplicable in this casе. . . .
. . . Defendant. . . asserts that the light pole at issue was a utility pole; consequently, defendant is not liable under the highway exception to governmental immunity. But in the recent case of Ridley (On Remand), supra at 691-692, a majority of this Court explicitly concluded that a light pole is not a utility pole, so it is not excluded by definition from the highway exception of governmental immunity and an *242 action may be maintained. This Court’s decision in Ridley (On Remand) followed the Supreme Court’s remand 5 of this Court’s first decision in Ridley v Detroit,231 Mich App 381 ;590 NW2d 69 (1998) (hereinafter “Ridley i”), for reconsideration in light of Evens v Shiawassee Co Rd Comm’rs,463 Mich 143 ;615 NW2d 702 (2000), the companion case of Nawrocki [v Macomb Co Rd Comm].
In Ridley I, supra at 383, a group of men attacked and beat the plaintiff’s decedent. After the beating, an automobile struck the decedent when he tried to stand. Id. After the first automobile knocked him down, a second vehicle struck and killed him. Id. On the night and on thе street where the decedent was killed, the streetlights were not functioning and had not been for some time. Id. at 383-384. The trial court found that the defendаnt, city of Detroit, was liable because it had been negligent in failing to provide street lighting and awarded plaintiff damages. Id. at 384. This Court affirmed the trial сourt’s entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff and rejected the defendant city’s argument that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by governmental immunity. Id. at 383, 384.
E. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because this case involves a question of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo.
Pohutski v Allen Park,
*243 m. ANALYSIS
A GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY WITH REGARD TO MUNICIPALITIES
Recently, in
Pohutski, supra,
our Suprеme Court reviewed the development of governmental immunity in our state and noted the important historical distinction between “sovereign immunity,” which аpplies only to state government, and “governmental immunity,” which initially through judicial construction was applied to “inferior” divisions of government, including muniсipalities.
Id.
at 682. In
Williams v Detroit,
As enacted, the act grants immunity from tort liability to governmental agencies involved in еxercising or discharging governmental functions. MCL 691.1407(1). The definition of “governmental agency” includes municipal corporations such as defendant сity of Detroit.
Weakley v Dearborn Heights (On Remand),
B. EXTENT OF IMMUNITY
The immunity granted under MCL 691.1407 is expressed in the “broadest possible language . . . .”
Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm,
C. INAPPLICABILITY OF THE HIGHWAY EXCEPTION
The Court in Ridley (On Remand) reaffirmed its previous determination that, bеcause a streetlight was not a utility pole and not otherwise specifically excluded from the definition of “highway,” the highway exception to governmental immunity applied and the defendant city could be held responsible for failing to maintain a streetlight. Ridley (On Remand), supra at 690-692. Moreover, the Ridley (On Remand) Court held that Nawrocki and its companion case, Evens v Shiawassee Co Rd Comm’rs, were not con *245 trolling for two reasons: (1) Nawrocki and Evens both involved claims against county road commissions, but the defendant in Ridley was a municipality and (2) the Supreme Court did not address in Nawrocki and Evens whether a streetlight is a utility pole. Ridley (On Remand), supra at 691-692.
We find these distinctions to be insignificant when the facts of this cаse are analyzed in a manner consistent with the central theme of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nawrocki. Critical to the Court’s analysis in Nawrocki is the basic principle that “the immunity conferred upon governmental agencies is broad, and the statutory exceptions thereto are to be narrowly construed.” Nawrocki, supra at 158. Consistent with this basic principle, “[n]o action may be maintained under the highway exception unless it is clearly within the scope and meaning of [MCL 691.1402(1)].” Weakley, supra at 326.
Applying these principles, we conclude that the highway exception to governmental immunity does not apply here because a streetlight pole is not part of the “highway.” At the time of the accident, MCL 691.1401(e), in part, defined “highway” to meаn “every public highway, road, and street which is open for public travel and shall include bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks, and culverts on any highway.” 4 We agree with the Weaver I panel and hold that, as with traffic signals and signs, see Nawrocki, supra at 180, 182 & n 37, the plain language of the statute does not support the conclusion that streetlight poles are included within the definition of the term “highway.” Weaver I, *246 supra at 804. Accordingly, wе reject as inconsistent with the plain language of the statute the holding in Ridley (On Remand) that a streetlight pole is part of the “highway” because it is not specifically excluded from the definition of “highway” in MCL 691.1401(e). The Court in Ridley (On Remand) also concluded that the highway exception to governmental immunity applies to сases involving negligent failure to provide street lighting because a streetlight pole is not a utility pole as provided in MCL 691.1401(e). However, becаuse a streetlight pole is not included in the definition of “highway,” we need not and do not decide whether the Court in Ridley (On Remand) correctly decided this question.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the Court in Weaver I that a streetlight pole is not pаrt of the highway as defined in MCL 691.1401(e) and that Rid-ley (On Remand) was wrongly decided. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order of judgment in favor of plaintiff consistent with the juiy verdict, and remand this case to the trial court for entry of a judgment of no cause of action in favor of defendant. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Notes
Pursuant to MCR 7.215(T)(1).
MCL 691.1402.
Ridley v Detroit,
The Legislature subsequently amended the definition of “governmental function” in
The definition of “highway” was subsequently amended by