80 N.J.L. 364 | N.J. | 1910
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This writ of error brings up for review a judgment entered upon a verdict directed for the defendant at the Cumberland Circuit in an action brought by William S. Weatherby against the bTewfield Smyrna Bug Company to recover damages for personal injuries.
At the trial, at the time the verdict was directed, the jury, if it had viewed the proofs in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would have been justified in finding the following matters of fact:
The plaintiff was an engineer in the employment of the defendant company. Whilst so, engaged-:ke--was~scalded and burned as a resul^f-i-he" breaking of a defective steam pipe attached to the, toiler, which was used to clean the boiler by "blowing jvg5;' and ejecting through the pipe by means of steam tjrie sediment and dirt that from time to time accumu
The only assignment of error argued is that challenging the legal propriety of the direction of a verdict. •
We think the direction was right.
A person who enters into the employ of another assumes to understand it, and assumes all the risks usually incident to the employment; and included in such risks are those arising in consequence of special features of danger known to him, or which he could have discovered by the exercise of reasonable care, or which should have been observed bjr one ordinarily skilled in the employment in which he engages. Coyle v. Griffing Iron Co., 34 Vroom 609; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. McMullen, 29 Id. 155; Foley v. Jersey City Electric Light Co., 25 Id. 411.
Iron pipes are obviously subject to rust and deterioration when exposed to moist air. That the “rusty and insecure” condition of the threads was an obvious defect, and one which the plaintiff, by exercising a’ reasonable degree of caution, would have discovered, is clearly shown by the proofs offered by him. It appears that the pipes used by him when hurt were the identical ones which he had used upon the several occasions when he had cleaned, or attempted to clean, the boiler during his employment as engineer. On each occasion he, personally, screwed them together, and, after using, unscrewed and placed them in a place where they were exposed to the elements.. According to his proofs, the rusty and insecure condition of the remaining threads was readily observable immediately after the accident. In such circumstances, it cannot be doubted that a defect so easily seen would have been discovered by him had he used ordinary care in observing if the threads were disintegrating. The plaintiff therefore failed in his duty to use due care to observe the danger and to avoid it by substituting new pipe from the adequate supply at hand.
In Coyle v. Griffing Iron Co., 34 Vroom 609, this court, in its opinion delivered by the present Chief Justice, said:
“Although the master is charged with the duty to his ser
Since the proofs would not have supported any other verdict than that directed by the trial judge, there was no error in the instruction complained of. McCormack v. Standard Oil Co., 31 Vroom 243.
The judgment of the court below will be affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). A verdict having been directed we must assume the case made by the testimony of the plaintiff’s ‘witnesses; a legitimate inference from that testimony being that the master was negligent in the inspection of the appliance furnished to the servant, I am unable to concur in the view that the danger and risk of using the appliance thus furnished were so clearly obvious to the servant that the question need not be left to the jury. To me it looks like an inference drawn by the court under such circumstances that the assumption that a court question was presented can rest
Masters and their appliances remain while servants come and go, and tire opportunities of the latter for inspection are, at best, merely coincident with the performance of some piece of work they are set to do. The opportunity of the master on the contrary and his duty to inspect are constant and continuous ; moreover, he may choose his time to inspect and may take his time in the inspection; the servant may do neither. If the age of an appliance, its history, the length of time it has been in use, the place of its storage, its repair or the reports that have been made respecting it have a bearing on the likelihood of its being unsafe, and they normally have, they arc all known to the master, or ought to be, and are all unknown to the servant, or are likely to be. Upon the other hand, the servant, 'in some eases, notably in that of hand tools in constant use, has the better opportunity, and hence the greater duty of current inspection. For present purposes, however, the point is not to balance the relative opportunities and duties of master and servant, but to recognize that they are radically different. The notion, therefore, that because the unsafe condition of an appliance would have been discovered by the master, if he had not been negligent, it was obvious to the servant is fallacious in the extreme; yet not more so than the opinion that because, after an accident has happened, its cause is apparent to those whose attention is then concentrated upon its discovery, it was, therefore, before the accident, a danger that was obvious to the ordinary observation of one whose attention by the terms of his calling was concentrated upon the performance of the work he was set to do.
If these two fallacious ideas be eliminated there is no possible ground for holding in the present case that the inference as to what a reasonably observant servant would have discovered in his use of his master’s appliance was one to be drawn by the court rather than by the jury.
I think that the testimony pro and con should have been submitted to the jury, and therefore vote to reverse.
For reversal—The Chancellor, Garrison, Yredenburgh, JJ. 3.