Wear v. Imperial Window Glass Co., 224 F. 60

Wear v. Imperial Window Glass Co.

224 F. 60 | 8th Cir. | 1915

SANBORN, Circuit Judge

[1] (after stating the facts as above). This case was argued and submitted on the supposition that there were exceptions to rulings of the court below upon questions of law and an assignment of errors which presented some legal question to this court for review, but a reading of the record and the briefs subsequently disclosed the fact that this was a mistake. The ohly question the sped-*63fications of error attempt to present is whether or not the evidence, which is conflicting, sustains the finding and judgment of the court. They invite this court, in other words, to retry this case and to determine whether or not tinder the applicable law the weight of the evidence sustains the finding and judgment. But the case was tried by the court below without a jury, and its decision of that issue is not reviewable in this court. It is, like the verdict of a jury, assailable only on the ground that there was no substantial evidence in support of it, and then it is reviewable only when a request has been made to the trial court before the close of the trial that it adjudge, on the specific ground that there was no substantial evidence to sustain any other conclusion, either all the issues or some specific issue in favor of the requesting party. No such request was made in this case, and the specifications of error, therefore, present no question reviewable by this court. When an action at law is tried without a jury by a federal court, and it makes a general finding, or a special finding of facts, the act of Congress forbids a reversal by the appellate court of that finding*, or the judgment thereon, “for any error of fact” (Revised Statutes, § 1011 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1913, § 1672, p. 700J), and a finding of fact contrary to the weight of the evidence is an error of fact.

[2] The question of law whether or not there was any substantial evidence to sustain any such finding is reviewable, as in a trial by jury, only when a request or a motion is made, denied, and excepted to, or some other like action is taken which fairly presents that question to the trial court and secures its ruling thereon during the trial. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Board of Com’rs, 145 Fed. 144, 150, 151, 76 C. C. A. 114, 120, 121, and cases there cited; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Wood, 60 Fed. 346, 348. 349, 8 C. C. A. 658, 660, 661; Barnard v. Randle, 110 Fed. 906, 909, 49 C. C. A. 177, 180; Barnsdall v. Waltemeyer, 142 Fed. 415, 417, 73 C. C. A. 515, 517; Bell v. Union Pacific R. Co., 194 Fed. 366, 368, 114 C. C. A. 326, 328; Seep v. Ferris-Haggarty Copper Min. Co,, 201 Fed. 893, 894, 895, 896, 120 C. C. A. 191, 192, 193, 194; Pennsylvania Casualty Co. v. Whiteway, 210 Fed. 782, 784, 127 C. C. A. 332, 334.

[3] There is another reason why no reviewable question of law is presented to this court in this case. A trial court is entitled to a clear specification by exception of any ruling or rulings which a party challenges find desires to review, to the end that the trial court itself may correct them if so' advised, and, if it fails to do so, that there may be a clear record of the rulings and the challenges thereof. For this purpose a rule has been firmly established that an exception to any ruling which counsel desire to review, which sharply calls the attention of the trial court to the specific error alleged, is indispensable to the review of such a ruling. Block v. Darling, 140 U. S. 234, 11 Sup. Ct. 832, 35 L. Ed. 476; Webb v. National Bank of Republic, 146 Fed. 717, 719, 77 C. C. A. 143; Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Thomas, 152 Fed. 365, 372, 81 C. C. A. 491, 498; Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 153 Fed. 1, 16, 82 C. C. A. 135, 150, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 400. The only exceptions taken by counsel for defendant that might possibly have related, in their mind, to any ruling of the court below on any question of law *64which they discussed in this case, are those set out in the foregoing statement, which were taken at the conclusion of the trial court’s oral statement of its intended finding of facts and opinion. They áre so general, indefinite, and clearly insufficient to sustain any right to a review of any ruling of the court below in this case that it would be useless to discuss them, because they fail to point out to or to inform the court below of any specific ruling he has made, or would in the future make, that counsel claim was or would be erroneous. They amount to nothing more than a statement that the defendant excepted to everything that the court had said and done, and to everything that it might thereafter say and do, in the trial of the case, or the entry of judgment therein.

Because no exceptions were taken and no specifications of error were made in this case, which present to this court for review any questions of law discussed by counsel in this case, the judgment below is affirmed.