5 Mo. 147 | Mo. | 1838
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
At the August term of this court for the year 1835, this cause was for the first time argued, and the judgment of the circuit court for the plaintiff being reversed; the cause was remanded to be further proceeded in con-'formably to the opinion of this court then given; for which see Second Semi-annual Part of the fourth volume of the decisions of this court,page 100. The judgment of the circuit court being again in favor of the plaintiff the defendants come again into this court to reverse that judgment. The evidence given on the last trial is the same as that given on the first, and the only points now to be decided are those left undecided on the first argument of the cause in this court; the rest, though made, are not insisted on now. Fora full statement of the ' case, reference may be made to t'ne first opinion delivered, as above cited. In order, however, to avoid the inconvenience of too frequently recurring to the opinion formerly delivered, some part of the evidence, and so much of the act of Congress of 17th. of February, 1815, as is necessary to the decision of this cause, will be transcribed. Its title is “anact foi the relief of- the inhabitants of the late county of New Madrid,in the territory of Missouri, who-suffered by earthquakes.” The first -section reads thus: “Any person or persons owning lands in the county of New Madrid, in Missouri territory, with the extent the said county had on the tenth day of November, 1812, and whose lands have been materially injured by earthquakes, shall be and they are hereby authorized to locate the like quantity of land on any of the public lands of said territory, the sale of which is authorized by law: provided, thatno person shall be permitted to locate any greater quantity of land under this actthan the quantity confirmed to him, except the owners of lots of ground or tracts of land of less quantity than one hundred and sixty acres, who are hereby authorized to locate and obtain any quantity of land not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres; nor shall any person be entitled to locate more than six hundred and forty acres,” &c. “And, provided, that in every case ■where such location shall be made according to the provisions of this act, the title of the person or persons to the land injured, as aforesaid, shall revert to, and become absolutely vested in, the United States.”
The second section is, that “whenever it shall appear to the recorder of land titles for the territory of Mis
The first point now to be decided is the fifth, made on the first argument of the cause in this court, viz: That the circuit court erred in refusing to give the third and fourth instructions asked by the defendant, which in substance are, that unless Louis St. Aubin, or those claiming under him, have relinquished to the United States their lot in New Madrid, in lieu of which the recorder's certificate was granted, and by virtue of which the land in controversy was located, they must find for the defendant; and also, that there was no evidence before them to prove that Louis St. Aubin, or those claiming under him, have relinquished to the United States the lot in New Madrid, in lieu of which the recorder’s certificate was granted, and by virtue of which the land in controversy was located.
The second point made in this, and the sixth in the first argument is, that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it was necessary for the plaintiff to show that the location was made by Louis St. Aubin, his children, or those claiming under him.
The third point in this, and the seventh in the first argument is, that the court erred in telling the jury that there was evidence of the consent of the heirs of Louis St. Aubin.
The fourth in this, and the seventh in the first argument is, that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury, as piayed in the fourteenth instruction, viz: that the location read in evidence by the plaintiff is evidence to prove that Hickman located for himself, and not for Louis St. Aubin or those claiming under him.
1. Whether it be necessary for the plaintiff in the circuit court, and defendant in error, to prove that Louis St. Aubin, or those claiming under him, have relinquished the lot, in lieu of which the certificate was granted, and by virtue of which the land in controversy was located.
The right of location is granted by the first section the act of Congress above cited; and by the second proviso of that section it is declared, that in every case where a location shall be made according to the sionsof that act, the title of the person to the injured land shall revert to, and become absolutely vested in, the
When the United States shall become party to a suit m this court, in which it may be necessary to contend for their right to the injured land, then it will be time enough for this court to determine whether the provision mad® in this act of Congress to secure that right is such as it ought to have been. At present, the only question before this court is, whether they have the right and power to grant their own land on such terms as they choose to prescribe, and in such manner as seems proper to themselves? Such a question, I should suppose, requires no decision. The circuit court, then, in my opinion, committed no error in refusing to instruct the jury that it was necessary for the plaintiff in the action to prove that Louis St. Aubin, or those claiming under him, have relinquished the injured land to the United Slates. Through abundance of caution, the circuit court was also required to tell the jury that there was no evidence before them to prove a relinquishment. When the court had refused to instruct the jury that it was necessary to prove a relinquishment, it seems to me that it would have done something worse thari useless if it had told them that there was no evidence before them to prove what they had,almost in the same instant, been told was
The second point is, that the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the jury, that it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the location was made by Louis St. Aubin, his children, or those claiming under him.
This point is made on the alleged refusal of the circuit court to give the first and eighth instructions, were, that the jury must be satisfied that the New drid certificate .given in evidence in this cause, was procured, and the location on the land was made, by the agency and consent of the said Louis St. Aubin, his ■dren, or those claiming under him. The circuit gave the instructions, with this explanation, viz: Although the certificate was granted and the location made, without the consent of those under whom .the claims, yet if they afterwards consented, it is sufficient. It is the same in point of legal, effect as if they had consented at the time, and that, there is evidence of such subsequent consent. The counsel for the defendants, who are here plaintiffs in error, being dissatisfied with this explanation, chose to consider the instructions as p j refused.
tore this point is investigated, it will perhaps be best to divest the subject, of what is mere verbiage, and to endeavor to ascertain the import of some of the tenps used. The term “New Madrid certificates” was once much used in popular language to designate the certificates issued by the recorder of land titles, as evidence that the owner of land, certified by him to be materially injured by earthquakes, was entitled to locate on any of the public land, the sale of which was authorized by law. The word “children,” it appears tome, is mere surplus-age. In Missouri, all children do not necessarily succeed to the estate of the father. Those children which do succeed or take by dissent, are heirs, and all others are purchasers, in the legal acceptation of the word purchaser. Then the words “those claiming under him,” (Louis St. Aubin,) include every person'who can, in any manner whatever, hold the injured land by title derived from him. The word “children” will therefore be hereafter omitted as a mere expletive, calculated to render the sense more obscure. And the words “those who claim under him,” will be used to designate all such persons ■as may derive title from him, whether as heirs or pur
The plaintiffs in error, (says their counsel,) do not claim-under Louis St. Aubin, but they claim the located land as the legal representatives of Louis St. Aubin, one of them having applied to locate the land in controversy as the legal representative of Louis St. Aubin, and in the name of the said St. Aubin and his legal representatives. The words, “legal representatives,” have no technical meaning, and must, therefore, whenever they are used, be construed according to the subject matter.
A “legal representative,” in the most extensive acceptation of those words, is one who legally or lawfully represents another in any matter or thing, of whatever nature or character it maybe. Thus, the supreme court of the State of Pennsylvania, in the case of Duncan v. Walker, say that the words “legal representatives” must, in legal contemplation, be the heirs, and not the administrator, because the subject matter in that case-was land or real estate; and in the case of Mulanphy's heirs v. Simpson, the president of this court, referring to the above mentioned ease of Duncan v. Walker, and admitting its authority, says that the representatives of the deceased must, in legal contemplation, be the executors or administrators, because the subject matter in that case was personal property,or the payment of the debts of the deceased; and the rest of the court concurred with Him in the construction of the word “ representatives.” For Duncan v. Walker, see 2 Dallas, 205; and for Mulanphy’s heirs v. Simpson, see 4th vol. Mo. Decisions, p. 319.
What, then, was the subject matter before the mind of the recorder when he certified that Louis St. Aubin, or his legal representatives, is entitled to locate, &c?' Lest we might possibly mistake, he points in his certificate to the subject matter, thusr “I certify that a lot of one arpent, in the village of Little Prairie, &c., which appears from the books of this office to be owned by Louis St. Aubin, has been materially injured by eartquakes,. and that, in conformity to-the provisions of the act of Congress of 17 th February, 1815, the said Louis St. Au-bin, or his legal representatives, is entitled to locate,” &c. The first, and principal provision of that act, i-twiil be recollected, was contained in the first section, to wit, that any person owning land in the county of New Madrid* whose land had been materially injured by earthquakes* shall be authorized to locate the like quantity on any of tha-
The legal representative, then, pointed out in the recorder’s certificate, can be no Other person than the owner of the land injured by earthquakes, and that owner must claim under Louis St. Aubin, either as heir ox purchaser. The legal representatives of Louis St. Au-bin, and those persons claiming under Louis St. Aubin, are then the same persons. But Hickman applied' to locate as the legal representative ofLouis St. Aubin, and in the name of said St. Aubin or his legal representatives. Therefore, he applied to locate the land as a person claiming under Louis St. Aubin, either as owner of the. Injured land, or as agent of some person who did owni it; that is to say, the lot of onearpent, in the village of Little Prairie, which the recorder had certified to be materially injured by earthquakes. The certificate of this
The fourth point is, that the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the jury, as prayed in the fourteenth instruction, viz: That the location read in evidence by the plaintiff is evidence to prove that Hickman located for himself, and not for Louis St. Aubin, or those claiming under h. m.
. In the' argument of this point, we are told that it is evident Hickman located for himself, and that it is the duty °f the court to give such effect to the location as he intended it should have. When a man, by a written ¡nstrnmeht, makes a disposition of his own property, is undoubtedly the duty of a court to ascertain, from the writing, his intention, and to constrne that wri
In conformity to the provisions of the second section of the act, the recorder issued his certificate, above mentioned, as evidence that the owner of the one arpent of injured land was authorized to locate one hundred and sixty acres, in consideration of the injury he had edfrom earthquakes; and in consideration, also, that he agreed that, on the location being made, the lot of injured land shall revert to, and become absolutely vested in, the United States. The question then to be decided- i whether the defendant in error, (who- is a purchaser from two of the heirs of Louis St. Aubin, the confirmee of the Government ol the United States,) or Hickman, (whosfe only evidence of title is, that he, having obtained possession of this certificate, in some manner unexplained on the record, went before the surveyor, and applied to locate the land in litigation,) be, the rightful owner of the interest of these two heirs in the land? The avowed object of the law-making power, as explained both m the title of the act and in the body thereof, is to relieve the distress of those persons who had suffered by earthquakes, and the means provided, were to give uninjured land in exchange for théir injured land. If, then, the person who gets possession of this certificate of the recorder become, by that possesion, clothed with all the rights of the owner of the injured land, Congress have legislated to no purpose but to harass the sufferer by putting it into the power of any person who may happen to get possession of the certificate, even in thejmost-unlawful manner, not only to obtain the right of property in the located land, but also to strip the sufferer of his injured land, which, by the act of location, was to revert
But when we take into consideration that Congress had, by the act of 4th June, 1812, transferred to the General Assembly, composed of a governor, legislative council, and house of representatives, all legislative power necessary for internal government; and to the superior and inferior courts, all judicial power, it is incredible that they should, by mere implication m this act, pretend to prescribe how the rights of property in this located land should be transferred from one citizen to another. And had the act declared in express terms, that any person coming to the possession, whether by accident or fraud, of such certificate, might apply to the surveyor to locate the land for his own use, and by such location, acquire a good title to the located land, to the prejudice of the owner of the injured land, it might well be doubted whether even the territorial courts would not have been in duty bound to declare so much of such act repugnant to the third article of the treaty of cession, of the 30th April, 1803, and therefore void? The language of the actcouldnot, as it seems to me, have been more clear and explicit than it is. The owner of the injured land, from the beginning to the end of the act, is before the mind of the legislature. No change of property is contemplated throughout; it was prudent to leave the transfer of title, whether by descent or purchase, to be regulated by the local law. Indeed, cautious language is used when the recorder is charged to perform his duty; he is directed to issue his certificate to the claimant, thereby intimating to the person receiving it, that he must claim at his own risk, and be prepared to make good his claim under the local law, if it be disputed. I should, myself, hardly have believed that an intimation of this kind could, in ordinary cases, have been necessary. But the act was passed for the relief of persons, most of whom were of the French population, then lately transferred by France from the domain of Spain to that of the United States. Most of them weie very imperfectly acquainted with our language, and still less with our laws and institutions. Some of the more uneducated sort might otherwise have believed that the United States intended to confer on the recorder of land titles, or on the
But it is contended that the plaintiff in error, if he has not a perfect title to the located land, must have at least the legal title, having purchased it from the United States with the certificate of another, which, it is contended, is the same thing as if he had purchased the lo-. catedland with that person’s money. The similarity of the two cases is not obvious to me. In the first place, the United States do not offer the choice of their unsold lands in exchange for those certificates issued by the're-corder of land titles, but, as in this case, they grant to the owner of the injured land, in consideration of his having suffered by earthquakes, this located land in exchange f°r injcired land, then deemed of no value; and the certificate itself was of no value except that it furnished to the surveyor the necessary legal evidence that th« injured land was entitled to locate and set aside for his own use one hundred and sixty acres of the land. A deposition, taken in due form of law; or a copy from the books of the recorder, would have been necessary .to prove the same thing, had not the act of Congress made the certificate legal evidence. But who ^ie injured land, must necessarily be determined by the local law, when a doubt arises,
Secondly, this certificate, issusd by the recorder of ^anc* bears, neither in its character nor on its face, any resemblance to money. Money, intended to pass by delivery as a circulating medium, carries on its face the impression of the sovereign by whose order it is issued, and no' person can by inspection ascertain who is its owner. This certificate bears on its face all the information necessary to' enable the holder'to ascertain who is the owner of the injured land. It announces to him that, at the time of the confirmation, Louis St. Au-bin was' the owner of that land; and if an alienation, either by death or otherwise, had taken place, the local laws step in and point the attention of the holder of the certificate to the records of the circuit and county courts of New Madrid county for information on that head.
If any other construction of this act shall obtain, and be admitted as a precedent in the construction of other laws, it will, in my opinion, amount to a virtual repeal of all the laws by which the rights of property are now guarded and maintained in society.
But it was contended,'also, that such was the poraneous construction of this act of Congress, of 17th Febiuary', 1815; and that a greater part of the titles of located lands depends upon the principle that the person applying to locate as the legal representative of the firmee of the United States, does thereby acquire the right of property in the located land. Moreover, said, that among the owners of the injured land, there were many dishonest persons who did not hesitate to sell
The jate Q^ief Justice of the United States, delivering the opinion of the supreme court, in the case of the United States v. Fisher, says, that where the intent (of the lawmaking power) is plain,there is nothing left for construction—2 Cranch, 386. If my view of this statute has been correct, it is one of those where nothing is left for construction. But much deference is due to the opinion of others, whose views of this act of Congress do not correspond with mine. I will therefore bestow some attention on the statement made, with a view to influence the decision of the court. First, with regard to the dishonesty of the vendors of the injured lands. This is so plainly a subject of legislative action in futuro, that it seems to me no person could urge it seriously on the attention of a court with a view to influence its decision. Long previous to the passage of this act of Congress of 17th of February, 1815, it had been provided by an act of the territorial legislature, that deeds should be recorded in a given time, on pain of such deed being held fraudulent and void against subsequent purchasers. The time within which they were required to be recorded was several times changed, till at last the first recorded deed was declared to be good, without regard to the time of execution. If the plaintiff, or those under whom he claims, had been guilty of any fraud in this matter against the rights of the defendants, it should have been put in issue before the jury.
Next, then, as to this contemporaneous construction of the act of Congress. It is my misfortune to differ in opinion with the counsel of the plaintiffs in error, so much, that I do not believe that any one purchaser or vendor in the country, either under the territorial or State government, ever calculated at the time of the sala on securing his land by what he calls the title by location. In what manner these applications to locate may have
Without troubling myself to refer to the records of deeds to be found in the office oí the clerk of the circuit court in Howard county, I could now with very little trouble recollect numerous instances of contracts made and suits decided in the circuit courts, and in the supreme court, too, the history of which plainly showst that purchases were made with a view to securing the-title by a regular chain of title, (after a patent could be obtained,) from the confirmee of the United States down to the last purchaser.
But let it be granted, that every purchaser in Missouri, when he made his purchase, did rely on this title by location; and, also, that there is some obscurity in this act of Congress, which appears to me to be expressed in terms the most plain and perspicuous, let us also move the consideration of the injustice that would result to others from such a construction of this act; still this general be
It had been contended by counsel, that the chief justiee, who decided this cause in the circuit court, could not exercise the duties or jurisdiction assigned to the court of the fifth circuit, because, by the constitution of the United States, the supreme court has only appellate jurisdiction, except in. cases where a State ora foreign minister shall be a party; whence it was concluded that the jurisdiction of the supreme court, being appellate only, no judge of that court, as such, is authorized to hold a court of original jurisdiction. In this case, the contemporary construction was made by all the parties interested. The constitution was the work of the people of the United States. They beheld their representatives in Congress while they were organizing the judicial system. They had not complained of that organization, and the constitution consequently remained unchanged. In the case now before this court, there is an acquiescence of Hickman only. The purchaser from iwo of the heirs of Louis St. Aubin, and the others similarly situated, did not participate in settling this construction of the law.
Again, Mr, Madison, as in his latter days he informed the people of the United States, surrendered to contemporary construction his constitutional objections to chartering a Batik of the United States, The charter of the first bank was granted by an act of Congress of 1791, and expired on the 4th of March, 1811. In the year 1816, the people of the United States expressed their will, through their representatives in Congress, to charter another bank. If he had, before the 4th of March, 1811, surrendered his constitutional scruples to the contemporaneous construction of stockholders in the old bank, that would have been bad enough; for the interest which they probably felt in continuing an establishment in
Thus much for the fourth point, in which is involved the consideration of this titie by location; a title, it is said, not much esteemed by the bar of the daj' where the locations were made, a bar less enlightened than the bar of the present day for want of books, and because the subject had not been discussed; a title yet well understood by purchasers, without discussion, and generally relied on by them, although they might fairly be presumed to have no law books; a title yet unheard of by me, and as it seems unknown to the circuit judge who has twice decided this cause against the plaintiffs in error, although we two weie, during the most busy time of making these locations, the only practising lawyers and conveyancers residing in that extensive tract of country then included in Howard county, in which most of the locations were made; a title yet well known to the counsel for the plaintiffs in error to have been much relied on by purchasers, although he was a stranger in the country till most, if not all, of these locations had been made.
I have not been able to learn from the argument what are the,books so necessary to elucidate this- title by location, It seems, however, to me, that it would not contribute much to the reputation of thp age, either for intelligence or probity, to have given birth to books to sustain such a title. For, unless my views of the subject are very incorrect, the same rule of construing laws which would maintain the plaintiffs in error in this (to me)
Concurrence Opinion
On the first point in the opinion just delivered, I entertain no doubt; in regard to that, I concur with the other Judges. On the second point, my opinion is not so clear, but as at present advised, I concur. Oci the third point, I have no doubt, and con-~ur also. In my view of this particular case, the fourth point is immaterial to either party. In affirming the judgment of the court below, I do not concur with the other Judges.
The defendant below asked the court to instruct the jury, that there was no legal evidence before them to enable them to find for the plaintiff. This instruction the court refused, and' this Te isal, among other matters, Is assigned for error. This instruction is broad. Where there is any evidence to support a recovery, such an instruction should i~ot be given. But here, as I understand the testimony, there was nothing to enable the jury to
In support of his right to recover, the plaintiff below relies upon a written instrument given in evidence, and, in this case, miscalled a location, as I ¡nn inclined to be-]jeve# The language of this pape.r is this: “Thomas applies to locate,” and the paper is signed by “Ihomas Hickman.” If the language had been: “John B. Wallace locates,” as in the case of Tindall v. Johnson, it would not have varied the matter. This instru-t is not a location, but a mere application to locate, Every person who wished to avail himself of the benefit act °f Congress, had first to get his eertiucate from the recorder of land titles; next, to make his application to the deputy surveyor for a locution; and the inhere offered in evidence, is Hickman's application to locate, and in my opinion nothing more. It was competent for any person to make the same, application, at the same time, and for the same tract of land. But the application to locate was one thing, and.ihe location made by the “deputy surveyor, or under his direction,” was another and a very different thing. Suppose two persons, Hickman and another, for example, had applied at the same time, in the very same terms, to locate the same tract of land, (a thing that might w'ell have happened,) would each application have amount! d to a location of the land applied for? If so, each would have had, at the same time, a location for the same land; and as a “New Madrid location,” under our statute, will maintain ejectment, each might have maintained ejectment at the same time for the same land. But this instrument, in my opinion, cannot amount to a location; some subsequent action was required upon it. It does not appear that any subsequent step was taken. The deputy surveyor may have rejected it; he may have thought Hickman showed no authority entitling him to claim a location. When a claimant applied for a location, and showed himself entitled to one, it was the duty of the deputy surveyor to make the location' — “to cause a survey thereof to be made — to return a plat of such location to the recorder — to return a notice in writing, designating the tract located, and the name of the claimant on' whose behalf the location was made; and this notice and plat the recorder was required to cause to be recorded in. his office” — see act of Congress, 2, 485, Geyer’s Digest. In this case, where fa the application to locate? The paper in evidence, signed by “Thomas
1 am of opinion, then, that this -instrument, wasffiot a “New Madiid location;” that- there- wasmo evidence.to support the-.plaintiffs’ action; that the court erred-in-refusing the above instruction; and that the judgmenl.-bf the circuit court ought to be reversed and remanded.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in affirming the foregoing ~-udgment, but lam not well satisfied.