WEAKLAND v TOLEDO ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC
Docket No. 119495
Supreme Court of Michigan
February 4, 2003
Rehearing denied 468 Mich 1216
467 MICH 344
In an opinion per curiam, signed by Chief Justice CORRIGAN, and Justices TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, the Supreme Court held:
MCL 418.315(1) requires an employer to supply an injured employee with crutches, artificial limbs, eyes, teeth, eyeglasses, hearing apparatus, and other appliances necessary to cure and relieve the effects of an injury. The phrase “other appliances” is restricted to include only things of the same kind, class, character, or nature as those specifically enumerated in the statute, i.e., artificial adaptive aids that directly ameliorate the effects of a medical condition. A van is dissimilar because it is not an artificial adaptive aid. The necessary vehicular modifications constitute the “adaptive aid.”- The commission‘s conclusion that the motorized cart was not medically necessary was a factual determination properly supported in the record and, thus, conclusive.
Justice CAVANAGH concurred in the result only.
Affirmed.
Justice KELLY, dissenting, stated that given that the Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act is remedial legislation that should be interpreted liberally in a humanitarian manner in favor of the injured employee and that Wilmers v Gateway Transportation Co (On Remand), 227 Mich App 339 (1998), held that where the loss of mobility was a consequence of the worker‘s work-related injury, a van could be necessary to give a claimant a sense of normalcy and could reasonably fall within the definition of an appliance as that term is used in
Levine, Benjamin, Tushman, Bratt, Jerris & Stein, P.C. (by Charles P. Burbach), for the plaintiff-appellant.
Lacey & Jones (by Michael T. Reinholm) for the defendants-cross-appellants.
PER CURIAM.
I
In this worker‘s compensation matter, we are called on to construe the statutory provision that places the obligation on the employer to supply the injured employee with appliances that are necessary to alleviate the effects of the work-related injury.
II
Plaintiff was employed as a bricklayer by defendant Toledo Engineering. In January, 1981, while at work, he was injured and disabled, and later began to receive worker‘s compensation. Subsequently, his physical health deteriorated, and by 1990 he was having difficulty walking any substantial distance without assistance. As his condition worsened, plaintiff acquired assistive devices, including a motorized cart, as well as a van that was customized to transport the cart.
Plaintiff sought reimbursement for the cost and customization of the van and other related expenses pursuant to
The Court of Appeals denied plaintiff‘s application for leave to appeal. Plaintiff then filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court, and defendants sought leave to appeal regarding the award of reimbursement for the van conversion. This matter turns on the proper construction of
We review de novo questions of statutory construction. DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 401; 605 NW2d 300 (2000). The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the Legislature‘s intent. Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 212; 501 NW2d 76 (1993). That intent is clear if the statutory language is unambiguous, and the statute must then be enforced as written. Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992).
IV
Subsection 315(1) of the WDCA governs liability of an employer for the cost of enumerated assistive devices:
The employer shall furnish, or cause to be furnished, to an employee who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment, reasonable medical, surgical, and hospital services and medicines, or other attendance or treatment recognized by the laws of this state as legal, when they are needed. However, an employer is not required to reimburse or cause to be reimbursed charges for an optometric service unless that service was included in the definition of practice of optometry under section 17401 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368,
MCL 333.17401 , as of May 20, 1992. An employer is not required to reimburse or cause to be reimbursed charges for services performed by a profession that was not licensed or registered by the laws of this state on or before January 1, 1998, but that becomes licensed, registered, or otherwise recognized by the laws of this state after January 1, 1998. Attendant or nursing care shall not be ordered in excess of 56 hours per week if the care is to be provided by the employee‘s spouse, brother, sister, child, parent, or anycombination of these persons. After 10 days from the inception of medical care as provided in this section, the employee may treat with a physician of his or her own choice by giving to the employer the name of the physician and his or her intention to treat with the physician. The employer or the employer‘s carrier may file a petition objecting to the named physician selected by the employee and setting forth reasons for the objection. If the employer or carrier can show cause why the employee should not continue treatment with the named physician of the employee‘s choice, after notice to all parties and a prompt hearing by a worker‘s compensation magistrate, the worker‘s compensation magistrate may order that the employee discontinue treatment with the named physician or pay for the treatment received from the physician from the date the order is mailed. The employer shall also supply to the injured employee dental service, crutches, artificial limbs, eyes, teeth, eyeglasses, hearing apparatus, and other appliances necessary to cure, so far as reasonably possible, and relieve from the effects of the injury. If the employer fails, neglects, or refuses so to do, the employee shall be reimbursed for the reasonable expense paid by the employee, or payment may be made in behalf of the employee to persons to whom the unpaid expenses may be owing, by order of the worker‘s compensation magistrate. The worker‘s compensation magistrate may prorate attorney fees at the contingent fee rate paid by the employee. [Emphasis added.]
In Wilmers, the Court of Appeals addressed the scope of the services and devices that an employer can be called on to provide to an injured employee pursuant to
Judge YOUNG dissented from the decision of the Court of Appeals in Wilmers. Concluding that a van did not constitute an “appliance” within the meaning of subsection 315(1), he discussed the substantial difference between a van and the examples of appliances provided by subsection 315(1):
I conclude that the Legislature‘s selection of the phrase “other appliances,” when preceded by specific examples of artificial adaptive aids (such as crutches, hearing aids, dentures, glasses, etc.), creates an unambiguous legislative intent to mandate that an employer is obligated only to supply devices of like kind. . . . Consequently, I find it hard to reconcile with my construction of the statute the majority‘s view that a van is considered to be “like” such adaptive aids as a crutch, a hearing aid, false teeth, or a pair of eyeglasses. [Id. at 352.]
We agree with that dissenting opinion‘s conclusion regarding the proper understanding of “other appliances.” Judge YOUNG was applying the canon of statutory construction described formally as ejusdem generis. This Court has utilized this canon frequently in defining the scope of a broad term following a series of specific items. In discussing this canon in Huggett v Dep‘t of Natural Resources, 464 Mich 711, 718-719; 629 NW2d 915 (2001), we described how meaning is given to the general term in that situation as follows: “[T]he general term is restricted to include only things of the same kind, class, character, or nature as those specifically enumerated“; that is,
As Judge YOUNG pointed out, the statutorily listed items, “dental service, crutches, artificial limbs, eyes, teeth, eyeglasses, hearing apparatus” share a commonality in that they are artificial adaptive aids that serve to directly ameliorate the effects of the medical condition. A van is dissimilar to the listed items in
V
We affirm the WCAC determination that the employer was not obligated to provide a van to plaintiff, and we overrule Wilmers for the reasons stated above.
Defendants’ application for leave to appeal as cross-appellants to contest the WCAC decision to reimburse plaintiff for the cost of the van conversion is denied for the reason that the Court is no longer persuaded the question should be reviewed by the Court.
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.
CAVANAGH, J., concurred in the result only.
WEAVER, J. Though not joining in the opinion, I concur in the result because the Worker‘s Compensation Appellate Commission correctly found that the van at issue was not an “appliance” pursuant to
KELLY, J. (dissenting). The majority today overrules Wilmers v Gateway Transportation Co (On Remand)1 and holds that a van is not an appliance within the meaning of subsection 315(1) of the Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA),
In the past, this Court interpreted the WDCA and its predecessors broadly. For example, in Wells v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co2, Justice CAVANAGH wrote for the majority:
The statutory workers’ compensation scheme was enacted for the protection of both employees and employers who work and do business in this state. The system assures covered employees that they will be compensated in the event of employment-related injuries. In addition, employers are assured of the parameters of their liability for such injuries. By agreeing to assume responsibility for all employment-related injuries, employers protect themselves from the possibility of potentially excessive damage awards. In order to effectuate these policies, the statute has been liberally construed to provide broad coverage for injured workers.
Wells reflected the Court‘s view that “[t]he social and remedial purposes of the [WDCA] were structured to quickly and assuredly compensate employees for injuries suffered.” Farrell v Dearborn Mfg Co, 416 Mich 267, 280; 330 NW2d 397 (1982). Until recently, Michigan courts adhered to this view.3
The Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act is remedial legislation that should be interpreted liberally in a humanitarian manner in favor of the injured employee. Wells v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, [supra at 651]; Matney v Southfield Bowl, 218 Mich App 475, 486; 554 NW2d 356 (1996). Literal constructions that produce unreasonable or unjust results that are inconsistent with the purpose of the act should be avoided. Rowell v Security Steel Processing Co, 445 Mich 347, 354; 518 NW2d 409 (1994). . . . [T]he clear purpose of § 315(1) is to provide the injured employee with such services and products as are reasonably necessary to cure or relieve the effects of injury. Here, plaintiff‘s evidence (which was never rejected by the magistrate or the WCAC) indicated that one of the effects of his injury is a loss of mobility, including an inability to use an ordinary car, or even a specially equipped one, for transportation. We conclude that under these circumstances the entire specially equipped van that plaintiff requires for transportation, and not just its special modifications, may be considered a reasonably necessary “appliance” for purposes of § 315(1). [Wilmers, supra at 345-346 (emphasis added).]
Today, the Court rejects Wilmers and the cases on which it relied. It does so without addressing Wilmers’ interpretation of the WDCA, focusing instead on Judge YOUNG‘S dissent.
This omission is not surprising. Earlier, the majority was confronted with the fact that the WDCA has long been broadly interpreted, and the majority chose to ignore that fact. For instance, in Crowe v Detroit4,
The majority reacted dismissively, stating:
We do not think that the statute at issue is ambiguous. In any event, if the statutory language were ambiguous, our first duty is to attempt to discern the legislative intent underlying the ambiguous words. Only if that inquiry is fruitless, or produces no clear demonstration of intent, does a court resort to the remedial preferential rule relied on in the dissent. [Id. at 13.]
The response indicates the majority‘s preferred method of legislative interpretation. However, it avoids the fact that Michigan courts have consistently applied a different interpretation than the majority does to the WDCA. Thus, without overruling or distinguishing it, the majority ignores past case law because the majority disagrees with it.
Likewise, the majority disregarded the accepted interpretation of the WDCA in DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394; 605 NW2d 300 (2000). There, the majority noted the accepted interpretation, but ignored it, holding that the “plain language of the statute” precluded a broad interpretation, “no matter how liberally that language is construed.” Id. at 406. Moreover, the majority did not acknowledge that “any inquiry into the applicability of the [WDCA]” involved principles of liberal construction, but instead restricted those principles to where the statutory language was ambiguous. Hagerman v Gencorp Automotive, 457 Mich 720, 739; 579 NW2d 347 (1998).
Of course, a dearth of analysis begs a dearth of argument. It is difficult to analyze the majority‘s reasoning in changing the law when it provides no reasoning to question. The opinion states why the majority‘s view is correct, but fails to state why the old view is wrong.
THE WILMERS COURT REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT A VAN COULD BE AN “APPLIANCE” UNDER SUBSECTION 315(1)
The Wilmers Court held that a specially modified van could be an “appliance” under subsection 315(1). The section at issue provides:
The employer shall also supply to the injured employee dental service, crutches, artificial limbs, eyes, teeth, eyeglasses, hearing apparatus, and other appliances necessary to cure, so far as reasonably possible, and relieve from the effects of the injury. . . . [
MCL 418.315(1) (emphasis added).]
Specifically, Wilmers held that loss of mobility was a consequence of the appellant‘s injury and that a van was necessary to give the appellant a sense of normalcy. Wilmers, supra at 345-346.
The dissent in Wilmers and the majority here assert that “appliance” cannot mean a van because a van is not similar to or related to the other items listed in
As in Wilmers, the plaintiff here cannot walk without difficulty.5 This lack of mobility is the result of a work-related medical condition in both cases. What could ameliorate a lack of mobility? I submit that a van reasonably falls within the majority‘s definition of an appliance in certain cases.
The majority argues that a van is unlike crutches, prostheses, or hearing aids. However, in some cases a van serves the same purpose as crutches or prostheses because it allows an individual freedom of movement. Moreover, subsection 315(1) also includes the term “dental service” as well as artificial teeth. Dental service is a broad term that is unlike any of the others and it may include anything from cosmetic surgery to jaw repair.
The Wilmers Court was not alone in holding that the term “appliance” may include a van in a worker‘s compensation context. It noted:
Our conclusion is supported by the decisions of courts in several other states that have held that specially equipped vans for paraplegics may constitute, in their entirety, a compensable “appliance” or “apparatus” under worker‘s compensation statutes similar to § 315(1). Terry Grantham Co v Industrial Comm, 154 Ariz 180; 741 P2d 313 (Ariz App, 1987); Aino‘s Custom Slip Covers v DeLucia, 533 So 2d 862 (Fla App, 1988); Edgewood Boys’ Ranch Foundation v Robinson, 451 So 2d 532 (Fla App, 1984); Manpower Temporary Services v Sioson, 529 NW2d 259 (Iowa, 1995); Mis-
sissippi Transportation Comm v Dewease, 691 So 2d 1007 (Miss, 1997). We find the following passage from the Iowa Supreme Court‘s decision in Manpower Temporary Services particularly instructive:
“We begin with the unusually strong medical evidence of necessity and of the record that [the injured employee‘s] family status and past lifestyle reveal no other use for the van. That evidence refutes any contention that the van is a frill or luxury and reveals what can be described as an appliance, not greatly different from crutches or a wheelchair. The point is that a van is necessary in order to make [the injured employee‘s] wheelchair fully useful.
“In another context, like other courts, we have agreed with the dictionary definition that describes the term ‘appliance’ as ‘a means to an end.’ Murray v Royal Indemnity Co, 247 Iowa 1299, 1301; 78 NW2d 786, 787 (1956). The ‘end’ of the van is merely an extension of [the injured employee‘s] 300-pound wheelchair. Without a van she is, more than need be, a prisoner of her severe paralysis. The [factfinder] could thus reasonably view the van as an appliance, a necessary part of [the injured employee‘s] care. [529 NW2d 264.]”
We acknowledge that there are decisions from courts in some other states that deny worker‘s compensation coverage for specially equipped cars and vans on the ground that such vehicles simply do not constitute a medical apparatus or device, and decisions from courts in still other states that allow reimbursement only for the cost of the special vehicle modifications or allow the employer to offset the cost of the vehicle before modification with the cost of an average, midpriced car of the same year. However, we are persuaded that, under the circumstances of this case, and given the kind of substantial vehicle modifications that this plaintiff requires, the entire vehicle may here be considered an “appliance” covered by § 315(1), even though it is not actually necessary to rebuild the entire vehicle to accommodate the handicap. The WCAC‘s interpretation of the term “appliance” is unduly restrictive and contrary to the principle of interpreting the Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act in a liberal and humanitarian manner so as to effec-
CONCLUSION
Therefore, considering the majority‘s own malleable definition of “appliance”6 and other jurisdictions’ decisions, I submit that the Wilmers Court reasonably concluded that a van could be an “appliance” under subsection 315(1). I would reaffirm Wilmers as good law.