Frаnk WAYNE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Pat JARVIS, Sheriff, DeKalb County Sheriff Department, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 97-9152.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Dec. 8, 1999.
(R2:144-46).
Q: Okay. When you said you touched her, when you grabbed her, where did you grab her?
A: On her shoulders.
(R2:146).
Q: Did you in fact touch [K.T.] in a sexual manner?
A: No, sir, I didn‘t.
Q: Did you touch her on her breast?
A: No, sir, I didn‘t.
Q: Did you touch her on the vaginal area, on the crotch?
A: No, sir, I didn‘t.
Q: Did you touch her on her inner thigh?
A: No, sir, I didn‘t.
Q: Okay. Did you touch her on the buttocks?
A: No, sir, I didn‘t.
Q: Did you have any bent to touch her in a sexual manner?
A: No, I didn‘t. No, I didn‘t.
(R2:153-54).
James Edward Dearing, Jr., Jones, Morrison, Womack & Dearing, Atlanta, GA, Deborah Faye Weiss, Smyrna, GA, Timothy J. Sweeney, Harman, Owen, Saunders & Sweeney, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before CARNES, Circuit Judge, HILL, Senior Circuit Judge, and HOEVELER*, Senior District Judge.
CARNES, Circuit Judge:
After being beaten by his fellow inmates at the DeKalb County Jail, Frank Wayne filed suit against: DeKalb County Sheriff Pat Jarvis in both his individual and official capacities; the DeKalb County Sheriff‘s Department (the “Sheriff‘s Department“); and seven “John Doe” deputy sheriffs in both their individual and official capacities. Pursuant to
The district court also entered summary judgment for the Sheriff‘s Department and the Sheriff in his official capacity based upon its conclusion that Wayne had failed to bring forward sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning his theory of liability that there was a custom оr practice of housing professed homosexual, bisexual, HIV-positive, and AIDS-positive inmates in the same dormitory regardless of their violent propensities.1 Wayne contends that he proffered sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on this issue.
Finally, the district court denied Wayne‘s motion for leave of court to depose the classification officer who completed the form which resulted in Wayne being placed in the dormitory in question. Wayne contends that the testimony of that officer might have helped him establish thе existence of a custom or policy.
For reasons we will discuss, we affirm all three of the district court‘s challenged rulings.
I. BACKGROUND
A. FACTS
Wayne was incarcerated at the DeKalb County Jail in 1993. While he was in a
On June 8, 1993, Wayne was attacked by Corey Baker while both were housed in E-2-A. Wayne was taken to the staff nurse, who found no injuries, and was returned to E-2-A. Upon his return, Wayne was attacked by four other inmates, including Nick Tanner and Thomas Loyal but not including Corey Baker. Eventually, seven deputy sheriffs arrived to break up the fight and defuse the situation by removing Wayne from E-2-A. When the deputy sheriffs led Wayne back into E-2-A to identify his attackers, Loyal began beating on Wayne again; the deputy sheriffs eventually regained control of the situation. Wayne alleges that these attacks caused continuing back and neck pain, limited his ability to work and function physically, and resulted in mental and emotional trauma.
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 23, 1995, Wayne filed a pro se complaint against Sheriff Pat Jarvis in both his individual and official capacities, the DeKalb County Sheriff‘s Department, and “Seven Unknown Deputy Sheriffs”2 in both their individual and official capacitiеs, alleging that they had violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, pursuant to
On August 8, 1995, Sheriff Jarvis timely filed his answer to Wayne‘s first set of mandatory interrogatories, and that answer identified eight individual deputies as potential witnesses: Ricky L. Long, Shanton Benjamin Hines, Charlton L. Bivins, Darryl L. Tutt, Timothy F. Melton, William Winston, Jr., Kenneth Demetrius Allen, and Darren W. Benedict. On September 5, 1995, Wayne moved to amend his complaint by adding those eight specific deputies as parties in place of the seven “John Doe” deputy sheriffs referred to in the original complaint. On October 27, 1995, the district court granted that motion. By December 8, 1995, Wayne had served all eight of the individual deputy sheriffs with the amended complaint.
All of the defendants moved for summary judgment. On April 12, 1996, the district court denied summary judgment for the deputy sheriff defendants on Wayne‘s § 1983 claim that they failed to protect him from injury in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In addition, the court denied the deputy sheriffs’ claim that they were entitled to qualified immunity on Wayne‘s § 1983 claims against them in their individual capacities. The court did grant summary judgment for all of the defendants on Wayne‘s claims of: (1) inadequate medical treatment; (2) failure to maintain an adequate racial bal-
On June 14, 1996, the individual deputy sheriff defendants moved to dismiss all of Wayne‘s remaining claims against them because he had failed to serve them with the complaint or amended complaint before the statute of limitations ran. On December 17, 1996, the district court granted their motion to dismiss.
The remaining defendants—Sheriff Jarvis in both his individual and official capacities and the Sheriff‘s Department—then filed their second motion for summary judgment. Before the district court ruled on that motion, Wayne filed a motion for leave of court to depose Officer L.J. Roscoe, arguing that Roscoe, who had completed Wayne‘s Inmate Classification Screening Form, could testify about inmate classification policies and procedures. On September 16, 1997, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff‘s Department and Sheriff Jarvis in his official capacity on Wayne‘s § 1983 claim, ruling that Wayne “ha[d] not presented sufficient evidence to establish that Defendants employed a practice or custom of housing professed homosexual, bisexual, and HIV and AIDS positive inmates in dormitory E-2-A regardless of the violent propensities of such inmates.” The district court also denied Wayne‘s motion for leave to depose Officer Roscoe.4
II. DISCUSSION
Wayne puts forward three main contentions in this appeal. First, he contends that the district court erred in granting the deputy sheriffs’ motion to dismiss, because under
A. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY THE DEPUTY SHERIFFS?
The district court dismissed Wayne‘s claims against the individual deputy sheriffs because it concluded that his amended complaint, which he filed after the statute of limitations had expired, did not relate back to his original complaint under
More than three months after filing his initial complaint, and almost three months after the expiration of the statute of limitations, Wayne filed a motion to amend his initial complaint by replacing the seven “John Doe” deputy sheriffs with the eight specifically-namеd deputy sheriffs. We agree with the district court‘s conclusion that Wayne‘s amendment to replace the “John Does” with specifically-named defendants constitutes a change in the parties sued. See Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep‘t, 66 F.3d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1995) (“We have stated that it is famil-
Because Wayne changed the parties being sued after the statute of limitations had expired, his claim against the belatedly-named deputy sheriffs is barred unless he can demonstrate that under
Relation Back of Amendments. An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when ... (3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whоm a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by
Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.
Wayne argues that his lack of knowledge is the equivalent of a “mistake” and therefore satisfies the
We agree with the district court that Wayne‘s lack of knowledge regarding the identities of the deputy sheriffs was not “a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party.”5 The drafters of
Our interpretation of the rule is consistent with the decisions of four other circuits which have held that an amended complaint replacing a “John Doe” defendant with that defendant‘s correct name does not relate back under
Wayne contends that a different application of the relation back rule should apply to him because he filed the complaint as a pro se litigant, and the complaints of pro se litigants should be liberally construed. See Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990) (“In the case of a pro se action, moreover, the court should construe the complaint more liberally than it would formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.“). But the prоblem here is not one of construction; instead, the problem is one of lack of compliance with a deadline imposed by law. Liberal construction does not mean liberal deadlines. See Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that Supreme Court decision at issue had not “create[d] an exception for a pro se inmate to evade time requirements.“). In this case, Wayne‘s problem was not that he drafted his complaint without a lawyer, but that he drafted and filed it close to the expiration of the statute of limitations and thereby waited too long bеfore setting about to find crucial information he needed to make his claim against the deputies. Wayne bears the consequences of his own delay. Had he filed earlier, he could have learned the deputy sheriffs’ identities in time to amend his complaint before the statute of limitations ran.
Finally, Wayne argues that the district court should have equitably tolled the statute of limitations, because the other defendants prevented him from learning the identities of the deputy sheriffs before the statute had expired. The facts disprove this argument. Wayne filed his complaint on May 23, 1995, and the statute of limitations expired on June 8, 1995, just sixteen days later. Wayne did not serve the complaint on any of the defendants until July 6. Therefore, it was not the actions of the other defendants that prevented Wayne from learning the identities of the deputy sheriffs until it was too late. It was Wayne‘s own dilatoriness. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting the deputy sheriffs’ motion to dismiss.
B. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF SHERIFF JARVIS IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AND IN FAVOR OF THE SHERIFF‘S DEPARTMENT?
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Jarvis in his official capacity and in favor of the Sheriff‘s Department on Wayne‘s claim that his injuries were caused by their custom or policy of housing professed homosexual, bisexual, HIV-positive, and AIDS-positive inmates in dormitory E-2-A re-
“[A] plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 [must] identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff‘s injury.” Board of County Comm‘rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1997). “A policy is a decision that is officially adopted by the municipality, or created by an official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting on behalf of the municipality.... A custom is a practice that is so settled and permanent that it takes on the force of law.” Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075, 118 S. Ct. 852, 139 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1998). We have emphasized that:
[t]o establish a policy or custom, it is generally necessary to show a persistent and wide-spread practice. Moreover, actual or constructive knowledge of such customs must be attributed to the governing body of the municipality.
Depew v. City of St. Mary‘s, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1345 (11th Cir. 1994). Wayne alleges that the County had a policy or custom of housing professed homosexual, bisexual, HIV-positive, and AIDS-positive inmates in E-2-A without regard to the violent propensities of those inmates. We agree with the district court that Wayne failed to proffer sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of such a policy or custom.
First, Wayne failed to identify a single inmate who: (1) was placed in E-2-A, a medium-security setting, because he professed that he was homosexual, bisexual, HIV-positive, or AIDS-positive; and (2) should have been placed in a higher-security setting because of his propensity for violence. Wayne points to two of the inmates who attacked him—Nick Tanner and Thomas Loyal—but neither satisfies both of the above criteria. Although Wayne did produce evidence that Nick Tanner had been classified as a close-security to maximum-security risk, he did not produce any evidence indicating that Tanner had been placed in E-2-A because he professed to be homosexual, bisexual, HIV-positive, or AIDS-positive.
As for Thomas Loyal, Wayne demonstrated that, at least initially, Loyal was moved to E-2-A because he told a classification officer that he was homosexual. But Loyal‘s initial classification form indicates that he was a medium-security risk and hence appropriately placed in E-2-A, a medium-sеcurity dorm. Nevertheless, Wayne argues that Loyal should have been placed in a higher-security setting because Loyal was involved in four violent incidents, three of which took place in E-2-A, in less than two years. But Loyal‘s inmate classification form indicates that he was removed from E-2-A after two of the violent incidents. Instead of demonstrating
Another aspect of Wayne‘s failure to create a genuine issue of material fact about a custom or policy is that he did not produce any evidence that only professed homosexual, bisexual, HIV-positive, and AIDS-positive inmates were placed in E-2-A. To the contrary, the evidence in the record indicates Robert Melton, the Jail Commander in 1993, testified at his deposition: “I don‘t think they were just specifically those types of prisoners but, yes, it could have been that those types of prisoners could have been housed there.” Ricky Long, a jail supervisor in 1993, testified at his deposition that known homosexuals were placed in E-2-A, which was considered a special needs cell, but that mentally-ill inmates also were placed in E-2-A. Loyal‘s inmate classification form indicates that Loyal was returned to E-2-A at one point because he was on a “suicide watch,” an entry demonstrating that inmates were placed in E-2-A not just because they professed to be homosexual, bisexual, HIV-positive, or AIDS-positive, but also because they had other special needs, such as those associated with being a suicide risk.
Wayne has failed to satisfy his burden of proffering sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the County had a custom or policy of housing professed homosexual, bisexual, HIV-positive, and AIDS-positive inmates in E-2-A without regard to their violent propensities. Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of the County.
C. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN DENYING WAYNE‘S MOTION TO DEPOSE OFFICER ROSCOE?
Finally, Wayne argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for leave to depose Officer Roscoe, the classification officer who completed his inmate classification form. The district court reasoned that “because Plaintiff has already deposed [Sheriff] Jarvis, and R. Wayne Melton, the individual responsible for drafting the classification policy, allowing Plaintiff to depose Officer Roscoe would merely serve to prolong this case unnecessarily.” We review a district court‘s discovery rulings for an abuse of discretion. See Benson v. Tocco, Inc., 113 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 1997). We find none here.
Relevant to our resolution of this issue is the lateness of Wayne‘s request. In August 1995, the defendants listed “Classification Officer Roscoe” as a potential witness in their answer to Wayne‘s mandatory interrogatories; Officer Roscoe was the only classification officer listed. Wayne, however, failed to depose Officer Roscoe during the initial discovery period, which ended on January 7, 1997. Wayne‘s explanation for that failure is that he allegedly did not learn that Officer Roscoе was his classification officer until January 27, 1997, when the defendants submitted Wayne‘s inmate classification form, which lists Officer Roscoe as his classification officer, as an exhibit in support of their motion for summary judgment. Even assuming Wayne did not learn that Officer Roscoe was his classification officer until Wayne
III. CONCLUSION
AFFIRMED.
HOEVELER, Senior District Judge, concurring, dubitante:
I agree with the well developed opinion of the majority with one exception. As I read
The weight of the law as reflected in several other circuits1 seems to be that a determination as to whether a “mistake” occurred is a prerequisite to permitting relation back of an amendment. In those circuits, the test is straightforward: if plaintiff lists a “John Doe” defendant, it is due to a lack of knowledge—not a mistake—and therefore does not qualify under
Consistent with liberal pleading requirements, an imprecise naming of a defendant does not in all cases prohibit relation back. It seems peculiar to permit relation back when a plaintiff is so lacking in knowledge that he sues the wrong entity or doesn‘t sue all possible defendants, but not to permit relation back when a plaintiff gets the entities right, but doesn‘t completely name them. I would have preferred that a finding have been made below regarding the notice or potential prejudice tо the deputy sheriffs. Indeed a factual inquiry in the district court may well have established that based on the notice to the defendants in question and the lack of prejudice, they were—in fact—“before the court” and that the amendment was merely to change the name under which they were sued. Powers v. Graff, 148 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256 (7th Cir. 1993)). While I concur in the result reached by the majority I am moved to suggest, as I have, that in the future a broader treatment of the rule may be in order.