595 N.E.2d 421 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1991
Cherry M. Wolfe appeals from the judgment of the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which set forth a child support obligation and an order withholding wages with respect to Wolfe's two minor daughters living in Wayne County, Ohio.
On January 11, 1985, the Wayne County Probate Court issued a letter of guardianship appointing David Huffman and Cherryol Clarice Huffman as guardians to Rhonda, one of Ronald and Cherry's daughters. Cherryol Huffman is apparently Ronald's sister, and David is her husband. The Wayne County Bureau of Support's ("bureau") brief to this court contains in its appendix an undated "Waiver of Notice" form, purportedly signed by "Ronald E. Pohl" and "Cherry M. Pohl," consenting to this guardianship.
On April 6, 1988, the probate court issued a letter of guardianship appointing the Huffmans as guardians to the other daughter, Lisa. The bureau did not produce a consent or waiver form relating to this guardianship.
In 1990, the Huffmans began receiving Aid to Dependent Children ("ADC") benefits for Rhonda and Lisa, as paid through the bureau. The bureau then assumed the Huffmans' rights to pursue support under R.C.
Cherry responded pro se by challenging the court's jurisdiction over her person. She also filed a responsive answer to the complaint denying any duty of support and any knowledge as to the Huffmans' guardianship over the girls.
On June 5, 1990, the juvenile court referee held a hearing upon the bureau's complaint. Cherry was neither present nor represented. The referee noted Cherry's jurisdictional challenge in his June 12, 1990 report and recommendation, but determined that "if in fact the children are within the jurisdiction of this court, then this court has the authority to issue support orders." The referee found that Cherry had income of $11,000 per year, imputed the same level to Ronald Pohl, although he was neither present nor named as a party defendant, and recommended support withholding at $115 per month per child. By order dated June 13, 1990, the trial court adopted the referee's report and recommendation and entered a simultaneous order for withholding pursuant to R.C.
Cherry timely perfected her pro se appeal to this court by notice dated July 9, 1990,1 raising six assignments of error.
"III. The Court of Common Pleas, Wayne County, Ohio did not take into consideration that the father of the children, namely: Rhonda M. Pohl, born April 29, 1973 and Lisa I. Pohl, born January 22, 1980; Ronald E. Pohl Sr., was residing at 1535 Madison Hill, Wooster, Ohio 44691 (phone: 216-264-9350), well within the jurisdiction of the court.
"IV. The Court of Common Pleas, Wayne County, Ohio did not take into consideration that the father, Ronald E. Pohl, Sr., had physical custody and control of the mentioned children when he removed them from the State of California to the State of Ohio. This was by agreement between the father and the appellant.
"V. Appellant had no knowledge that her two children were made wards of the court and that guardianship was granted to Ralph [sic] Cherryol Huffman on January 10, 1985 as to Rhonda M. Pohl, and on April 5, 1988 as to Lisa I. Pohl; and for the court's information, Cherryol Huffman is the sister of the father, Ronald E. Pohl, Sr.
"VI. The Court of Common Pleas, Wayne County, Ohio was nothing more than a `Kanagree [sic] Court,' and with the assistance of the Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, disregarding or parodying the existing principles of law and for human rights. They reached out with a long arm, in the name of justice, attempting to snatch up appellant from another state, abusing its authority to levy against earnings of appellant without proper authority and well beyond its staturity [sic] authority to do so."
Each of the preceding errors assigned concerns the trial court's in personam jurisdiction over Cherry with regard to support for her minor children, and shall be considered simultaneously.
Cherry concedes that the trial court properly retained subject matter jurisdiction over the case, as the girls both reside in Ohio, and the bureau is providing funds for their support. She challenges the court's assertion of in *769 personam jurisdiction, claiming that she is without the requisite minimum contacts with Ohio to place herself within the personal jurisdiction of the court. Although we disagree with the court's determination that the girls' mere residence in the county conferred personal jurisdiction over Cherry to the court, we nonetheless find that in personam jurisdiction was properly founded. See Joyce v. General Motors Corp. (1990),
As a litigant, Cherry is guaranteed fundamental fairness and due process by the Fourteenth Amendment. State ex rel. Stone v.Court (1984),
The concept of "minimum contacts" is a well established United States constitutional requirement. International Shoe Co.v. Washington (1945),
"`The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state court to exert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. "The constitutional touch-stone" of the determination of whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process "remains whether the defendant purposefully established `minimum contacts' in the forum State." * * * Most recently we have reaffirmed * * * that minimum contacts must have a basis in "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." * * *' (Citations omitted.)Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (1987),
The test for minimum contacts is not susceptible to mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite affiliating circumstances are present. Kulko v. California Super. Ct.
(1978),
We must look to the Civil Rules and Ohio's long-arm jurisdiction statute, R.C.
Ohio places a statutory burden of support for minor children upon their parents. See R.C.
In Upole, supra, the trial court had dismissed a paternity action for lack of in personam jurisdiction over the putative father, a nonresident who claimed that the act of conception of the child occurred outside the state. In reversing the trial court and reinstating the complaint, the appellate court, finding itself presented with a case of first impression, determined that the long-arm jurisdiction of Civ.R. 4.3(A)(3) is not triggered by a putative father's participation in conception, but rather by his subsequent failure to pay the costs for necessary support of the child. Upole, supra, at 2, citing Black v. Rasile (1980),
We are well aware of the limiting effect our Supreme Court's decision in Stone, supra,
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised in personam jurisdiction over Cherry by virtue of her tortious failure to support her two minor children residing in Wayne County, Ohio. The assignments of error are overruled.
As the bureau properly posits, Cherry is without standing to contest on behalf of her employer the order establishing wage withholding for support. Such action by an employer is contemplated by R.C.
Judgment affirmed.
CACIOPPO, J., concurs.
BAIRD, P.J., dissents.