delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action brought by Eric S. Alanko, administrator with the will annexed of the estate of Emily M. Johnson, deceased, as plaintiff against V. L. Wayman, who was guardian of Emily M. Johnson, and his surety, the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company.
The situation in this case was set out in the case of In re Johnson’s Estate and Guardianship,
On April 25, 1958, the matter came again before the District Court of Park County, Wyoming, in pursuance of the mandate by this court and the district court directed “That V. L. Wayman shall pay to the Administrator of the Estate of Emily M. Johnson, deceased, the sum of $4,858.34 with interest at the rate of seven percent per an-num from April 16, 1953, and the sum of $889.25 with interest at the rate of seven percent per annum from October 1, 1953.” No appeal was taken from that judgment. The money was not paid as directed by the court, but at the time of the hearing and before judgment was entered Wayman paid $1,282.28. Thereupon on June 14, 1958, Alanko, plaintiff herein, brought an action against Wayman and the surety company, the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, alleging the appointment of *102 Wayman and Steadman as guardians; that they gave bond in the sum of $5,000 and that that bond was furnished by the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company in the sum of $5,000; that thereafter Way-man was ordered to pay to plaintiff the sums hereinabove mentioned; that Way-man as such guardian has failed to pay the money; and that plaintiff on July 27, 1958, made a demand upon the surety company for payment of $5,000. Plaintiff, accordingly, asked judgment against Wayman for the sums above mentioned and judgment for $5,000 with interest from July 27, 1956, against the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company. The answers by the defendants separately are substantially the same as the contentions made in the guardianship above mentioned, namely that the sum of $1,900 was used on behalf of the deceased, Emily M. Johnson, and that the sum of $5,347.59 belonged to Wayman individually and did not belong to the guardians and was not part of the guardianship. It was agreed that Wayman had not paid the judgments above mentioned. Return to Wayman of the $1,282.28 was also asked. A trial was held before the Honorable Rodney M. Guthrie, who had been called to sit in the case. The judgments and proceedings against Wayman were introduced in evidence. The action taken by the court as previously mentioned was affirmed and, after giving credit for $1,282.28 already paid, judgment was entered against Way-man in the sum of $6,828.41, and judgment was entered against the surety company in the sum of $5,595.90. The judgment further provides in substance that if Wayman should pay any amount over and above the difference between the judgment against Wayman and that of the surety company it should then operate as payment on the latter’s judgment pro tanto and vice versa. Thereupon an appeal was taken to this court and the matter is now pending before us. The parties will be referred to herein as in the court below or by name.
1. The contentions made in this court are substantially the same as made in the court below, namely that the $1,900 item above mentioned was received by Wayman before he qualified as guardian and that, accordingly, the surety company cannot be held liable for that sum. It is further contended that the $5,347.59 item above mentioned belonged to Wayman personally pursuant to the joint account in the bank in the names of Wayman and Emily M. Johnson. The trouble in this case is that the defendants herein pay no attention to the judgments rendered in the guardianship matter on May 1, 1957, and again on April 25, 1958. No appeal was taken from either of these judgments either by Way-man or by the surety company. The surety company could have appealed from the order of the probate decree. 25 Am.Jur. Guardian and Ward § 195, p. 122. But it did not do so. The defendants herein attempt to relitigate what has been previously litigated and fully adjudicated. If the district court sitting in probate had jurisdiction to enter the judgments hereinbefore mentioned, then the rule of res judicata applies herein with full force and the defendants cannot relitigate it at this time. Thus it is said in 25 Am.Jur. Guardian and Ward § 171, speaking of a judgment on the final accounting of the guardians:
“ * * * In most jurisdictions, this is considered to be a judgment of court, which becomes res judicata and can only he reopened on such proof of fraud or gross mistake as would justify opening any other judgment. Thus, in the absence of fraud, sureties on a guardian’s bond are concluded by a decree, entered on a hearing or final settlement, as to the amount of the principal’s liability, even though the sureties were not parties to the accounting. * * * >>
See also 39 C.J.S. Guardian and Ward § 166; 12 R.C.L. Guardian and Ward § 46, p. 1154. Again- it is said in 25 Am.Jur. Guardian and Ward § 195:
“The bond creates a privity of contract between the surety and the guard *103 ian on one hand, and the ward on the other. The surety, as well as the guardian, is estopped, after the guardian has filed his bond and received the ward’s estate, to deny the validity of his appointment or the capacity of the guardian. If the guardian’s account has been settled in probate or in chancery, it is generally held that the judgment is conclusive against the sureties, in the absence of fraud or collusion, as to the guardian’s liability and the amount thereof, even though the sureties were not parties to the proceeding
See also 39 C.J.S. Guardian and Ward § 205. And we may note at this point that it is said in a note to § 2-126, W.S.1957, as follows:
“When liability of administrator becomes fixed, that of surety also attaches, and upon failure of principal to pay money action can be maintained against surety. In such case decree of probate court is conclusive upon status of account as respects sureties as well as administrator. * * * ”
A number of California cases are cited.
It only remains then to determine whether the court sitting in probate had jurisdiction' to determine the liability of Wayman as guardian, that is to say whether or not it had jurisdiction to determine whether or not the $1,900 item and the $5,347.59 item belonged to the guardianship. We think we determined that question fully in the affirmative in the case of Security-First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles v. King,
“It is contended by counsel for defendants that the trial court, sitting in probate, had no jurisdiction to determine the title to the property in dispute, and that it was right in so holding. It is true that this is the rule-in cases in which a third party claims property as against the representative of the estate. 24 C.J. 942. But, due mainly to the necessities of the case, the rule is, by the weight of authority, otherwise when the representative himself claims such property. * * * ”
An annotation to the case is contained in
“A majority of the jurisdictions follow the rule that a court sitting in probate has jurisdiction-to determine the title to property which the personal representative claims in his own right.”
Cases from ten states are cited. See also 21 C.J.S. Courts § 303, p. 549; and 5 and 6 Decennial Digest, Courts, <⅞=3200½. The King case involved an executor but it is quite apparent that the rule cannot be different in the case of a guardian. A court sitting in probate has power over the estate in a guardianship as it has over the estate of a decedent. In fact, § 3-20, W.S.1957, provides: “The provisions of this act relative to the estates of decedents, so far as they relate to the practice in the court, apply to proceedings relating to estates of wards.” But counsel claim that the rule cannot apply in a guardianship and they cite us to a case from one of the California courts of appeal, namely In re Guardianship of Tompioner,
“ * * * It will be readily noted from these citations that the line of demarcation between jurisdiction and *104 non jurisdiction of the probate court to determine what money or property, title to which is disputed, belongs to the estate, is determined by the status of the claimant. If it is claimed by the executor in his individual capacity, the probate court has power to consider and determine the validity of that claim. But if claimed by or on behalf of a stranger to the estate, the probate court has no jurisdiction to determine the controversy. It appears obvious that the- foregoing rules affecting proceedings on accounts of executors and administrators of estates of decedents also apply to those of guardians of estates of minors. This is made manifest by the terms of section 1606 of the Probate Code, wherein it is provided that ‘when not otherwise specially prescribed in this division [guardian and ward], practice and procedure and the making and entry of orders under this division shall be governed by the provisions of division III of this code * * * f
Again the question arose in the case of Central Bank v. Superior Court,
“The primary question is whether the respondent court sitting in probate can adjudicate a controversy between the bank and the guardianship estate under the undisputed facts, or whether the controversy must be decided by the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. It is the general rule that the superior court while sitting in probate is without power to decide a disputed claim between an estate and a stranger thereto. ⅜ * * The same rule applies to guardianship proceedings under the Probate Code, § 1552, Probate Code. But if the controversy is between an estate and those not strangers to probate proceedings relating to the estate, the court sitting in probate has power to entertain the action and adjudicate the conflicting claims. In such a case the contest is often referred to as between those in ‘privity’ with the estate. ⅜ * *
“From the foregoing it follows that controversies properly within an estate proceeding should be adjudicated therein, that is, as necessary incidents of the proceeding. The question then is whether the bank in this case is in ‘privity’ with the guardianship estate in the sense that the term has been employed in the decisional law on the subject.”
It is quite apparent therefore that the contentions of counsel for the defendants in this connection must be and are overruled.
2. Counsel for defendants seem to contend that we practically decided the points here involved in the case of In re Johnson’s Estate and Guardianship,
In connection with the item of $5,347.59, counsel call our attention to the fact that we stated in our foregoing case at
“ * * * When Wayman withdrew the money from the bank, he was guardian, hence acting as a trustee. He invested some of the money, according to his testimony, on his own account. On February 14, 1953, he made application to be appointed executor of Emily M. Johnson, then deceased, and listed as part of the property owned by the estate of Emily M. Johnson a savings account of $5,000. He was acting in a fiduciary capacity during the time that he withdrew the money, and we think that he should pay interest on the amount which he withdrew as of April 16, 1953. * * *”
Furthermore, counsel forget the question that the liability of Wayman was fully adjudicated as heretofore mentioned. In fact, there is no statement in the Johnson case, supra, which in any way supports any contention on behalf of defendants herein.
3. Further, in connection with the contention that since Wayman survived Mrs. Johnson the money became his absolutely against the heirs and administrator, counsel cite us Howard v. Imes,
4. Counsel say that the action herein should have been against Wayman as guardian rather than against him individually. There is no merit in that contention. If, as a matter of fact, the judgment herein would have been against him as guardian, then the guardianship estate would have been compelled to pay the money which Wayman was ordered ,to pay. That of course could not be so. In a case such as the case at bar, the suit was properly brought against him in his individual capacity. See 25 Am.Jur. Guardian and Ward § 151; Annotation,
The judgment of the trial court must, accordingly, be and is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
