170 A.D.2d 972 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1991
Order unanimously reversed on the law without costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed. Memorandum: Plaintiff, while acting in the course of his employment as a police officer, was injured on May 23, 1983, as he was assisting two fellow officers in effecting the arrest of defendant Ronald Sherk. Plaintiff sustained his injury when Sherk resisted arrest and when, in an attempt to extricate her son from police custody, defendant Madonna Sherk lunged toward the group, causing all of them to fall over a wrought iron railing. Plaintiff commenced this action against Ronald Sherk, his mother and father, alleging that they were negligent in resist
A police officer is precluded from recovering damages for injuries suffered while performing "a function particularly within the scope of duty of police officers” (Santangelo v State of New York, supra, at 397). Courts have consistently held that the investigation of reports of criminal activity and the apprehension of suspects are functions particularly within the scope of police duties and that police officers are not entitled, under the common-law rule, to recover damages sustained during the performance of those functions (see, Wynne v Tullman, 151 AD2d 476; O’Connor v O’Grady, 143 AD2d 738; Campbell v Lorenzo’s Pizza Parlor, 143 Misc 2d 1022; see also, Santangelo v State of New York, 71 NY2d 393, supra). Under the circumstances, defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint allegations of common-law negligence.
We further conclude that, to the extent the complaint may be liberally construed to include a cause of action under section 205-e of the General Municipal Law, defendants also are entitled to summary judgment dismissing that cause of action. In 1989, the Legislature enacted section 205-e to create a cause of action for injuries sustained by police officers in the line of duty (L 1989, ch 346). Although the statutory cause of action was created six years after plaintiff’s injury, the Legislature, in 1990, revived those causes of action pending on or after January 1, 1987 (L 1990, ch 762), and it appears that the amendment applies to the subject complaint. This issue was not considered by Supreme Court because the statutory cause of action had not been "revived” at that time. We consider it at this time in the exercise of our power to search the record under the law as it exists at the time of appeal.
Legislative history, as reflected in the Executive Department’s memorandum submitted to the Legislature, the legislative memorandum submitted to the Governor and the Governor’s memorandum, reveals that section 205-e was intended to provide the same relief to police officers that exists for firefighters under General Municipal Law § 205-a. Section 205-a created a cause of action for firefighters "who sustain